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ABSTRACT

COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS:
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO END TORTURE
SEPTEMBER 1998

KATHERINE H. BRANNUM, B.A., MICHIGAN
STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST

Directed by: Professor M.J. Peterson

This study of state compliance with
international norms
against torture focuses on the period 1979 1993
.

Configurations of factors are compared using
the Qualitative
Comparative Approach. The first part of the
study is a

cross-national analysis of government compliance
in 1993
To elucidate the circumstances under which
states that are
.

democracies or are in transition to democracy may
improve
their records of compliance with norms against torture,
the
second part of this study presents the results of a

comparison of a group of such states where the governments
improved compliance and a group of states where the

governments continued to torture at high levels.
This study shows that the record of compliance with

international norms against torture in 1993 is a weak one.
Total compliance was rarely achieved and difficult to
maintain.

The states that improved from the worst levels

were still in 1993 torturing at middle levels.

Both the

cross-national study and the analysis of selected
governments' behavior from 1979 to 1993, present evidence of

V

the importance of type of
political regime. This study
demonstrates that in many cases
the presence or absence of
armed conflict distinguishes
democracies or states in

transition that complied from those
that did not. However,
while there are clear patters
among some states that
torture, these important factors
do not alone distinguish
governments that torture from those
that do not. They are
clearly not sufficient to explain
government behavior. The
second part of this study, looking at
behavior over time,
shows that membership in any of the
torture regimes has not
had any serious impact on government
behavior. An analysis
of the comparison also confirms and
further develops
the

importance of armed conflict as a domestic
factor and
indicates the circumstances under which the
presence of

minor armed conflict may be overcome. This study
also
highlights the importance of foreign pressure and
the more
limited circumstances under which NGOs with
transnational
links may have been able to effect government practice.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

This study of state compliance with
international norms
against torture focuses on the period
1979-1993, an era of
significant change in world politics, most
notably

democratization, the breakup of a superpower,
the emergence
of new states, and new internal conflicts.
These changes
created additional opportunities for raising
human rights
issues, intensifying a trend visible since the
early 1970s.

The early 1970s were a period of increased human
rights

activism and optimism.

Public awareness was increased as new

large scale human rights abuses, like those in Argentina
and
Chile, received widespread media attention.

The work of

groups like Amnesty International and the willingness of

governments to create and sign new human rights treaties like
the conventions against torture, the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the

Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
African Ban jul
(

)

Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights inspired

greater expectations that human rights abuses could be
curtailed.

Many scholars concerned with the importance of

the human rights movement argue that this is the period when

human rights activists and organizations began to affect
state practice (Donnelly, 1993; Buergenthal, 1997; GarciaSayan, 1992)

1

Evaluating the Impact of the
human rights movement requires
establishing whether the way
governments treat their citizens

actually changed.

This study explores whether
governments
began to practice torture less
frequently after transnational
human rights actors became active,
while exploring how norms
may have altered the language of
state actors and their
interactions with human rights activists
is also useful, the
primary task of a study seeking to
understand the

determinants of government behavior is to
examine changes in
state behavior.
The first part of the study is a
cross-national analysis of
government compliance in 1993. This analysis
has been

included to elucidate some global tendencies.

An initial

survey of the conditions present in states where
the

government was complying and in states where the government
was not complying with international norms against
torture

Provides a broader overview as a check on the observations

drawn from a time analysis of a smaller selection of states.
The factors, or variables, examined in this section are; the
level of prosperity, membership in one of the regimes against
torture, the level of internal armed conflict, the type of

domestic regime, and the presence or absence of statesponsored religion.

Because regional and universal comparison for one year is

insufficient to increase understanding of the dynamics of
choice, this study also undertakes a dynamic analysis by

looking at change in state behavior over time.

o

To elucidate

the circumstances under which
states that are democracies
or
are in transition to democracy
may improve their records
of
compliance with norms against torture,
chapters four and five
present the results of a comparison
of a group of such states
where the governments improved
compliance and a group
of

states where the governments
continued to torture at high
levels. Exploring systematically
why some governments in
states that are democracies or in
transition to democracy
reduced the amount of torture practiced
while others did not
provides insight into whether, and under
what circumstances,
the three additional factors, foreign
pressure, active human
rights NCOS operating within the state, and
transnational
links to the international human rights community
could have
had an effect on compliance.

A study of state compliance with international human
rights
norms is useful because it provides the sort of in-depth

study needed to assess the propositions advanced in the

literature on compliance.

Examining the circumstances under

which compliance can be achieved even on a very sensitive and

traditionally domestic issue is particularly useful.

Many

analysts view human rights as a difficult area in which to

achieve an acceptable level of compliance (e.g. Chayes
Chayes, 1993, p.l97; Haggard

Peterson, 1984, p.337)

&

&

Simmons, 1987, p.514; Onuf

As Chayes and Chayes note:

The effort to protect human rights by international
agreement may be seen as an extreme case of time
lag between undertaking and performance. It is
apparent that some states adhered without any
serious intention of abiding by them. But it is

3

&

parties committed to the
treaties had different expectations
about
regulatory treaties

a993^^p?®197^?

Issues of compliance with Human
Rights norms are particularly
complex because of the lack of incentive
to cooperate, the
absence of inter-state damage caused
by violation, the
nonreciprocal character of human rights
treaties, the
difficulty in identifying human rights abuse
and the problem
of demonstrating government responsibility
for some human
rights abuses.

Governments do not need to cooperate with other
governments
in order to improve human rights in their
own country.
if a

government wants its citizens to be free from torture,
it can
stop torturing them. How another government behaves
towards
its own citizens should not affect the first government's

choices.

Direct effects of respecting or violating human

rights norms generally do not cross borders.

Because of

this, cooperation in the promotion of human rights does not

rest on governments

'

constraining their own actions in

exchange for the cooperation of others, as does cooperation
on many other issues.

Efforts to promote compliance with human rights norms are
limited because a government generally has no immediate

material interest in acting on behalf of citizens of another
state.

There is no self interested reason for external

enforcement.

Even when a government decides to act, the

problem of choosing the proper sanction is a complicated one.

4

.

Because human rights regimes are
established to protect
individuals, it does not make sense
for a government to break
a treaty in response to another's
violating that treaty. The
violating state will not suffer. This
is recognized
in

article 60 paragraph

5

of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of

Treaties which stipulates that termination
or suspension of
operation of a treaty in response to a
violation "do not

apply to provisions relating to the
protection of the human
person, contained in treaties of humanitarian
character.”
Nor is it clear what other sanctions are
available.

Governments have attempted to use economic sanctions
but

issue-linkage is often controversial not only with the
target
government but also with domestic opinion in the applying
state due to weak commitment to human rights values or
the

urgency of competing concerns
Human rights regimes address an issue where it is not
always easy to decide what constitutes a violation.

Because

the international system includes states with different

cultures and ideologies, there is often no common

understanding of the way human rights problems should be
addressed or how regime injunctions should be interpreted.
Therefore, a government may consider itself to be in

compliance and may even have support from some governments
but be considered to be in violation by other governments.
If a government believes the case is ambiguous, it may feel

it can risk noncompliance.

The differences in cultural norms

may create more difficulty in human rights than in other

5

.

areas because they make human
rights a hotly contested
concept

Assigning responsibility for a
violation to a government
can be difficult in particular
cases, individual officials
can act contrary to instructions.
Yet, unlike international
environmental regimes where a government
agrees to control
behavior of private citizens, when it
comes to torture the
government is promising to keep its own
officials from using
torture, not to stop citizens from hurting
each other.
Therefore government officials may try to
blame their abusive
behavior on private groups or individuals.
Several factors make the practice of torture
a useful issue
for study. The use of torture has been
widespread and severe
enough to make eliciting state compliance a major
challenge.
At the same time, governments agree that freedom
from torture
is a right.

ambiguities

While the concept of torture is not without
,

its prohibition is more universally accepted and

its definition more common than most human rights.

World War II,

Since

a consensus that there are universal laws

against torture has developed; it is a norm that almost all
states have acknowledged^

As John Ruggie (1983, p.99) says;

while there is some disagreement about precise
content and more about whether any circumstance
justify their violation, the minimal standard here
are in fact more clearly understood and widely
acknowledged than those for any cluster of rights.
Finally, the norm against torture is specific enough to make

measuring compliance a manageable task.

Not only is focusing

on one specific human rights abuse more feasible than looking

6

at the Whole cluster of
rights covered in one of
the more

general human rights covenants,
but torture is easier to
identify.
Lii-Qrature Review

Only in the last several years
has there been increased
attention to the study of actual
compliance with
international norms
One of the reasons for the
earlier lack
of attention is that many international
regimes address
.

coordination or assurance problems (Stein,
1982).
problems, the main challenge is determining

with such

the rules.

Once

states have agreed to these rules, they
are better off
obeying than violating; individual interest
in obeying is
sufficient to elicit high levels of compliance
from each

participant.

For regimes dealing with collaboration

problems, in contrast, eliciting compliance is
more

States have greater incentives to violate the
rules of the regime for individual gain.

Therefore, only

when scholars address this type of situation, where regimes
must overcome these incentives, does compliance become an
important focus

.

Analysts of international institutions have

recognized the importance of the issue of state compliance to
the study of institutions (Jacobson and Weiss, 1990; Sands,
1993). For the study of cooperation to be of lasting

interest, research must elucidate the conditions under which

cooperation goes beyond merely signing a piece of paper to
action.

7

The problem of promoting
compliance with international
norms has been addressed
at different levels of
analysis by
different streams of literature.
Each has developed a
characteristic explanation of
compliance. Yet very little
of
the literature has addressed
compliance with international
human rights norms.

Scholars have disagreed about
whether the characteristics
of human rights makes it a
hard case or simply an
inappropriate subject for regime
analysis. A serious
challenge to the idea that regime
analysis
which starts
from the premise that adherence to
explicit norms,

—

particularly when accompanied by
participation in formal
intergovernmental organizations charged
with promoting
compliance, significantly increases the
likelihood of
compliant behavior

—

is appropriate for human rights
study

have been raised by Conway Henderson, who
believes that
concepts associated with regime analysis such
as national
interest, international interdependence, hegemony,
and regime
as an intervening variable "are not conducive
to the study of

human rights"

(

1988, p.543).

He also pointed out that while

the concept of norms is clearly useful to the study of
human
^^ 9 hts this is a concept that human rights scholars were

using long before the beginnings of the regime approach and
can continue to use without adopting a regime approach.

John Ruggie (1983), Jack Donnelley (1986) and Nicholas Onuf
and Spike Peterson (1984) have argued that the international

regime approach can be applied to the issue area of human

8

rights

some advocates of the regime
approach have argued
that there is mutual dependence
between states on human
rights issues in the form of
perceived moral interdependence
(e.g. Donnelly, 1986,
p. 617; Henderson, 1988,
p. 529; Brysk
1993, p. 266). While Jack Donnelly
has argued that value to
regime analysis is modest, he
sees it as nonetheless
.

significant because:
By forcing us to consider norms,
procedures, and their political decision-maki nn
context as parts
structure, regime aLlysis
il particularly conducive to
IS
capturing the
insights of realism, idealism, and
legalism, while
avoiding their one-sidedness. Furthermore,
requires us to combine them into a single it
coherent
erent
^
package (1986, p. 641).
However, until recently, much of the
scholarly writing on
human rights law has focused on issues other
than compliance
with human rights norms. The dominant debates
have addressed
the nature of human rights and the difference
between

universalist and relativist views.

Universalists (Donnelley,

1986, 1989; Forsythe, 1985, 1991; Henkin, 1990; Meron,
1989;

Vincent, 1986) defend their belief that there can be a set
of

human rights principals applied to all societies against
those who believe that one can only define a right within a

particular culture (e.g. Bernstein, 1992; Pollis and Schwab,
1980; Renteln, 1990).

Relativists argue that the United

Nation's human rights standards have their roots in the

western tradition and that this western conception of rights
should not be forced on other cultures.

In may ways this

debate has been so compelling to some authors that it has

9
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diverted attention from other
important issues such as
compliance.
Many authors assessing
compliance with human rights
Obligations have drawn on the
juridical tradition focusing
on
rnternational obligations and formal
mechanisms to promote or
enforce them (Leckie, 1988; Cassesse,
1991; Kamminga, 1992).
More recently, there has been some
examination of compliance
with particular human rights
regimes. For instance, Sandra
Gubin (1995) has argued that patterns
in the Soviet Union's
compliance with family reunification
and emigration
norms

rndicate the success of the Conference
on Security and
Cooperation. Yet most scholars interested
in compliance with
human rights norms are still discussing
methods for measuring
possrble compliance rather than assessing
actual compliance
Domestic Factors
.

Several scholars have made a start on assessment
by

concentrating on state repression, which includes
execution,
torture, political imprisonment and disappearances
(Henderson, 1991, 1993; McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Mitchell

and McCormick 1988; Park, 1987; Poe

&

Tate, 1994).

Four of

the domestic factors included in this study, religion, type
of regime, income and armed conflict, have been examined in

these quantitative studies.

The importance of domestic

factors in promoting or discouraging compliance with human

rights norms has received widespread attention because of the

close relation between compliance and basic definitions of
the government-population relation (e.g. Park, 1987;

10

Henderson, 1982,1991; Strouse
1973)

&

Claude, 1976; Robert Jackman,

.

Han Park (1987) produced a
study arguing that the most
important domestic factors are
religion, degree of ethnic
diversity, and urbanization. He
divided human rights into
three types; political rights,
economic /basic needs rights
and social rights. His premise
was that "the degree of human
rights violations co-varies with
certain contextual

characteristics of the society (1987,
p.405). The first
result he reported is a relatively strong
positive
correlation between political rights and
welfare spending,
proportion of Christian population, and
urbanization.
asserted that ethnic diversity, generally
regarded as

He

counter-productive for stability and development,
did not
show any degree of adverse effect on social
well-being. He
also found that civil and political liberties were
inversely

correlated with military and education expenditure as
well as
percentage of Islamic population. He found the fewest
correlations and weakest predictive power with social rights.
Only military expenditure showed a slight negative

correlation with income equality.
Domestic Political Regime

.

Many scholars have considered

the type of domestic political regime (e.g. Aidoo, 1993;
Crone, 1991; Henderson, 1982, 1991).

Conway Henderson (1982)

and others have found that military governments have lower

levels of compliance than civilian ones.

Henderson (1991)

also finds the more democratic the government, the less the

11

likelihood that it will repress.

These findings are backed

up in other major studies (Poe
and Tate, 1994

;

Rummel, 1995).

Though it has been consistently
shown that democracies have
less torture, the context under
which they may or may not
torture has not been sufficiently
explained. The relation
between transition to democracy and
state repression is even
less clear than that between democracy
and state repression.

Helen Fein (1995) has argued that there
are more life
integrity violations in states that are
in transition than in
states that are not democracies. This
study, therefore,
classifies governments into three types,
democratic, non
democratic, and in transition to democracy.

^med Conflict

.

The relationship between armed conflict

and human rights abuse is clearly an important
one.

This

factor has recently been given more attention in the
human
rights literature. Steven Poe and C. Neal Tate
(1994) pointed
out that this factor had been neglected in past quantitative

studies and found that democracy and participation in civil

war have substantively important and statistically

significant effects on repression.

R.J. Rummel (1995) looked

at the effect of armed conflict on democide which is a

broader term than genocide indicating "the intentional
killing of people by governments" including such things as
starving by blockade, assassinations and creating famine.

He

found that the extent to which a country was involved in war
or rebellion along with its form of government best explains
democide.

12

incoae.

The Importance of Income
has been much debated
in
the literature with studies
showing inconsistent results.
Studies have yielded some
evidence of a modest relation
between level of economic
development and repression.
Poe
and Tate have said that
"economic standing is negatively
but
only rather weakly, related to
regimes’ propensity to abuse
of personal integrity rights"
(1994, p. 867). However
Rummel, in his examination of
democide, found that "there is
virtually no relationship" of democide
to socioeconomic
Standing (1995 p.21)

Chayes and Chayes (1993, p.i76) have
argued that
noncompliance often does not reflect a
deliberate decision.
Compliance with human rights regimes may
not have the same
magnitude of financial cost as there is with
some of the
environmental regimes where upgrading technology
is often
necessary, it may nonetheless be difficult for
a less-

developed state to comply.

Lack of financial resources that

other states use to control populations can limit
the ability
of developing states to comply.

One reason often given for

the use of physical punishment rather than imprisonment
is
the lack of facilities to deal with either political or

ordinary prisoners.

Therefore, complying may involve a

financial outlay to improve the penal system.

There are also

costs involved with training officials and monitoring the

police and the military.

Some governments may find it

difficult to implement the rules of a regime without outside
assistance

13

Like the general human
rights literature, this
study does
not limit itself to domestic
factors, it also looks
at the
relationship between foreign
pressure, membership in
international regimes, the
activities of human rights
organizations and compliance with
norms against torture.
Foreign Pressure
some regime approaches and a
substantial portion of the
human rights literature have
focused on the role of pressure
from other governments in eliciting
compliance. Several
explanations of why peer pressure
from other governments
would increase compliance have been
advanced. First, many
commentators have argued that governments
react to peer
pressure for fear of losing their
reputation as a reliable
cooperator. Reputation is important in
the international
arena. The claim here is that a state
that is seen as

untrustworthy in one area will also be seen
as untrustworthy
in other issue areas and therefore a
state may risk relations
with states in these other areas if It does not
comply.

As

Oran Young has written, "A reputation for
trustworthiness is
one of the most valuable assets that any member
of
international society can acquire" (1989, p.75).

Chayes and

Chayes argue that;

A state's reputation for acceptable compliance is
thus important to achieving, its aim of being an
international player (1991, p.23)
Second, governments may comply with peer pressure to avoid

deprivations

.

While breaking the treaty in retaliation for

non compliance is not a viable option for human rights

14

regimes, there are other
sanctions that states can
apply.
Chayes and Chayes 1991
P*19) have argued that these
kind of
attempts at ©nforcement are
not important to compliance.
Sanctions have been used only
infrequently because they are
seen as too costly and because
when they are used they
often
fail in practice. Nonetheless,
this factor has been
considered as potentially important
by many scholars
concentrating on human rights
(

^

The foreign policy literature
has focused on the role of
foreign pressure on behavior of
target states (Armstrong,
1986; Escude, 1991; Forsythe,
1988). Most of the foreign
policy studies of the impact of human
rights pressures have
been case studies but there have been
cross-national studies
looking at overall impact. The results
have been

contradictory (Cingranelli

McCormick

&

&

Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1992;

Mitchell, 1988).

This literature includes a long debate about
the

effectiveness of foreign pressure.

There has been some

discussion about what means of encouraging compliance
in
other states are acceptable with the most contentious
issue
being the use of foreign aid as leverage against repressive
governments.

Katerina Tomasevski has argued that human

rights issues are not the only reason for conditionality and

that conditions put on foreign aid by donor states are often

mutually contradictory.

For instance, structural adjustment,

decreasing public expenditure and 'privatization' may

15

negatively affect the human
rights picture in a state
(1993,
p. xiii).

International Recimes

Human rights organizations often
call for governments to
sign human rights conventions.
There has not, however, been
much attention paid to what role,
if any, membership in these
conventions have in improving
government practice.
The
regimes against torture have not
been studied to any great
extent. Peder Van Magee (1992) has
examined the Bush
administration's policy in regards to the
UN convention and
Ache Boulesbaa (1990) suggest the
"means and interpretations"
by which the obligations under article
2 of the UN Convention
Against Torture could be attained. The
European regime
has

attracted attention because of its innovations.

Malcolm

Evans and Morgan Ros (1992) have written on
the operational

practice of the European Convention. Keightley

(

1995

)

has

looked at compliance in one state, South Africa,
by examining
recent developments related to torture and cruel
inhuman and

degrading treatment or punishment, while James Ron has
done
an interesting study on changes in the way torture has
been

practiced in Israel (1997).

Antonio Cassesse (1991)

evaluated the effectiveness of the existing mechanisms for
safeguarding humans and their degree of possible overlap.
Human Rights Organizations
Domestic

.

This study also explores the role of domestic

and international NGOs in international efforts to fight

human rights abuse.

These organizations have been studied by
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many scholars (e.g. Green,
1978; Rodley, 1992; Sikkink,
1993welch, 1995, but their impact
is still unclear. Some
of thesl
studies have been done by area
specialists who have analyzed
activities in a particular country
or area in depth. Latin
American human rights organizations,
have received the bulk
of attention (Alvarez
Escobar, 1992; Brysk 1993,
s,

1994

;

Garcia-Sayan, 1992; sikkink 1993).
Several studies have
focused on the role of women in
these organizations (Agosin,
1993; Fabj, 1993; Arditti

&

Lykes, 1992; Bouvard, 1994

Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993).

;

NGOs in Africa developed

later and have only recently been
addressed in the
literature. Claude Welch (1995) analyzed
NGOs in four
countries (Ethiopia, Namibia, Nigeria and
Senegal) and argued
that their efforts can be appreciated in
terms of gradual
steps with cumulative effects rather than
massive leaps.

Susan E. Waltz found in a recent examination
of NGOs in North
Africa that:

domestic human rights groups constitute one
important vehicle by which democratizing forces
raise a call to change not just the players, but
the content of political discourse and the rules of
the games as well (1991, p.504).
Besides these regional studies there have been more general
surveys of NGO activity.

David Weissbrodt (1977, 1981, 1984)

has examined their role in fact-finding, implementation and

general protection of human rights.

Laurie Wiseberg and

Harry Scoble (1976, 1979, 1981) have addressed, both as
scholars and as NGO officials, the role of NGOs in human
rights struggles.

Hans Thoolen and Berth Verstappen pointed
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out the importance of NGOs
to Intergovernmental
Organizations- fact-finding, saying
-Almost invariably the
direct or indirect sources of
such allegations are the
nongovernmental organizations..."
(1986, p. vii)
T ransnational Links.

.

Many domestic human rights

organizations develop transnational
links to increase their
effectiveness, a growing number of
international relations
scholars looking at human rights
have begun to focus on the
role of iNGOs and other transnational
actors because they
believe it is necessary to employ a
non state-centric

approach in order to understand human
rights regimes. Anne
Mane Clark has argued in her study of the
influence of NGOs
that they should be classified "as new
international actors
that represent non-state interests
(1995, p. 509)." These
scholars have paid greater attention to policy
networks

operating simultaneously at the intergovernmental,
transnational, and domestic level where activist
attempt to
obtain greater governmental respect for both human
rights and
the environment.

Kathryn Sikkink (1993) sees NGOs, global

and regional intergovernmental organizations iGOs
(

)

and

private foundations as international issue-networks driven by
shared values or principled ideas rather than causal ideas or

instrumental goals.

Much of the literature examining the

importance of NGOs and other non state actors has

concentrated on the way these groups affected the negotiating
process or the creation of norms but some recent studies have
focused on improvement in compliance.
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They argue that

sometimes alone, but more
often now in conjunction
with
domestic NGOs, INGOs that
focus on human rights
can affect
target governments in two
ways. Pi.st, they can
worK within
countries to influence the
government by direct lobbying
or
mobilizing the local population
on human rights issues.
Second, they can operate from
outside countries by drawing
international attention to a
particular government's
policies

Sikkink has argued that foreign
government pressure and
domestic political pressure cannot
by themselves explain
human rights improvements in
Argentina because "foreign
governments placed pressure on human
rights violators only
after non governmental actors had
Identified, documented, and
denounced human rights violations and
had pressured foreign
governments to become involved"
(1993, p. 436). Alison Brysk
(1993) has also examined the relationship
between civil

society and the state as mediated by the
international system
using Argentina as a case study. These
studies have
emphasized improvements in certain states.
Unfortunately,
it is not clear from these studies whether
the cases of

improvement are representative of a larger cluster of
states
or are exceptional cases

Sikkink has argued not only that transnational non-state
actors are important in the struggle against human rights

abuse but that this process is helping to transform

sovereignty (Sikkink, 1993).

in order to really understand

the impact that the human rights movement has had on state
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sovereignty, we need to know
the extent to which
human rights
norms themselves are relevant
and what overall impact
there
IS on actual state practice.
These authors have not,
for the
most part, addressed the
issue of how much improvement
in
behavior there has been in the
period since these norms
have
been accepted,
part this results from
their contention

m

that changes in the practices
of repressive states is
not the
only or most important way to
measure the impact of non-state
actors. Alison Brysk argues
that "most studies measure
outcome of International pressure
in very narrow terms as an
immediate and acknowledged shift in
state repressive
practices" (1993, p. 273).

IntGraction of Factors
Two scholars have recently examined
specific changes in
state behavior outside of Latin America
as a result of
international norms, in her article on Soviet
compliance
with CSCE human rights norms, Sandra Gubin
(1995) has argued
that both realist and regime analysis are
lacking. She

employed transnational agenda setting which:
...employs a more systematic examination of the
interaction of international and domestic factors
in order to determine the circumstances under
^hich international norms may or may not, have an
impact on the behavior of states, it focuses not
on the existence of institutions, principles or
norms but on a process by which transnational
actors including interesting groups, NGOs and
international organizations which seek to
influence the agenda and the degree to which
states are able to exhort or resist pressure to
comply with international norms (p. 279).
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James Ron looked at different
levels of analysis in
order
to understand -complex
interactions among the
international
system, the repressive state,
and the repressed populationin Israel (1997, p.276).
He did not examine how
compliance
increased but how noncompliance
in Israel has changed.
He
argued that government officials
began to use torture that
did not leave scars, that
infliction was standardized,
and
that these actions were acknowledged
and portrayed in public
as humane. He argued that the
Israeli changes illustrate
that global forces are pushing
at least some states to alter
their sanctioned violence practices
toward a worldwide norm
of legitimacy.

However, many studies are still
limited by the fact that
they tend to focus on one level of
analysis without

considering factors operating simultaneously
at others.
awareness of the connections among phenomena

As

at the

international, the transnational, and the domestic
levels
grows, it becomes more obvious that a full
understanding of

government compliance with international norms requires

taking all three levels into account simultaneously.

For a discussion questioning the universality of pain see
Asad(1996) He underscores "the unstable character" of the ideas of
torture, cruelty, inhumanity, and degrading treatment 1082
(

)

.

See, for example, Robertson's discussion of the problem of
measuring state compliance with resource allocation obligations
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CHAPTER

2

qualitative comparative
analysis

A deeper understanding of
state compliance with
international norms requires a
multilevel understanding of
how different combinations
of factors influence
government
behavior. This is best done
not through traditional
statistical analysis of variance
but through a conf iguarative
approach looking at different
clusters of factors viewed
as
distinct contexts. This study
compares configurations of
ctors using the Qualitative
Comparative Approach(QCA) a
causal comparative methodology
developed by Charles Ragin.
This method uses Boolean algebra
to formalize a variation of
the logic of agreement and difference.
,

QCA provides a third way between case
studies and
statistical studies. Lack of a sufficient
number of cases
limits the use of statistics in many
studies. QCA allows for
the systematic study of fewer cases than
statistical analysis
and yet is not as limited to a very small
numbers
of cases as

is the case-oriented approach.

This flexibility is necessary

in the segment of this study comparing the
relatively small

number of improvers to a group of democracies that did
not
improve

Even when there are sufficient numbers, using technigues of

statistical analysis does not allow researchers to pay
sufficient attention to context.

QCA, however, does so by

allowing researchers to
examine combinations of
Characteristics, with this
method each factor is not
taken
out Of context but is
analysed in conjunction
with the
presence or absence of other
conditions, it is possible
to
see domestic, transnational
and international factors
as they
Interrelate rather than simply
as a list of variables.
This

is important in a study
Intended to understand not
only

whether certain factors, like
the presence of NGOs, are
important but also the circumstances
under which they are
important, qca can also capture
the heterogeneity of reasons
why states comply with international
norms against torture
because it allows researchers to
deal with more than one
distinct combination of factors that
yield similar outcomes.
QCA does not require the same simplifying
assumptions that
statistical studies do. Griffen et. al.(l
991 point out that
while It IS possible to use statistical
analysis holistically
by using log-linear analysis and logit
and probit regression:
)

the logistical problem of incorporating and
assessing causal configurations statisticallymulticollinearity and shrinking degrees of freedom
induced by the addition of "too" many interaction
terms,- are often in practice insurmountable
(p.
.

11

^

.

•

Truth Table Reduction
In the QCA approach each case is treated as a combination

of conditions.

Thus, the first step is to identify and

tabulate the outcome and the presence or absence of the

conditions identified as influencing the outcome in each
case.

This information is then arrayed in a preliminary
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table laying out the
particulars of each case.
To use an
abbreviated example, states
are coded for the presence
or
absence of democracy, internal
armed conflict, and membership
in a regime against torture.
So countries where there
is the
presence of democracy, the absence
of conflict, the presence
Of membership, and a negative
outcome are coded
101=0.

The resulting data provides
the material for a truth
table.
Each combination of factors
observed in one or more oases
becomes a row of the truth table;
the first columns of the
truth table are each factor, the
last column is the outcome
given in the last row. The possible
results of a given
configuration of factors are: a) all
cases with that
combination of factors lead to the same
outcome (either all
cases are positive or all negative)
and b) different cases
with the same combination of factors lead
to different
outcomes, if all cases with that combination
have a positive
outcome, the outcome for that combination
is 1; if each has a
negative, then the outcome is 0. if some cases
have a

positive outcome and others a negative, the combination
is
listed on the table as C for contradictory.

Assuming for the moment that all outcomes are consistent
the following steps are taken to create a minimal solution.

The truth table laying out the combinations produced by each

case is analyzed systematically through a series of

reductions to produce equations for either

negative outcome.

a

positive or a

In the first reduction, unnecessary

factors are removed from the configuration.
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If two

configurations have the sa„e
outcome yet differ only
on the
presence or absence of a
single condition, that
factor cannot
be decrsrve in producing
the outcome and can
logically be
dropped. For instance,
if the configurations

no

and ill,

produce the same outcome,
then the last factor is
regarded as
irrelevant and is eliminated.
The two configurations
therefore become a single
configuration, 11, with one
less
factor. This new configuration
is called an implioant
of the
two configurations because
it logically implies
each. Then
the process is repeated with
the reduced combinations

combined in the same manner until
there are no more
possibilities for reduction. The
configurations that remain
at the end of this process are
called prime implicants. They
imply all of the configurations
that were selected for
minimization from the truth table.
A second stage of reduction is
involved because there are
often more prime implicants than are
needed to cover all the
original primitive expressions, in this
reduction, a prime
implicant chart is created and then simplified.
The prime
implicant chart shows the relationship between
the prime
implicants and the original configurations from
the truth
table. This chart is simplified by applying
two
rules.

First, all configurations must be implied by at
least one

prime implicant in the solution.

implicants must be removed.

Second, all redundant prime

The prime implicant chart is

used to see which prime implicants are covering a subset of
the configurations that are already implied by another prime
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implxcant.

This process permits
identifying the minimum
solutron containing the
least number of implicants
that cover
all the configurations
in the Boolean equation.
For the
complex Charts used in
this study computer
algorithms were
used. The minimisation
was done with Oualitative
Comparative
Analysis, QCA 3.0 using the
Quine-McCluskey Algorithm
(brass,
1994), a program specifically
designed to analyse data
using’
Ragin' s approach.
AS mentioned above, it is
possible that some configurations
yield contradictory outcomes.
Because Boolean analysis
requires that each configuration
have only one outcome, the
researcher has to decide how to
treat combinations that do
not exhibit consistent outcomes.
Whenever there are

configurations of factors that include
one or more cases with
a positive outcome and one
or more with a negative outcome,
they cannot automatically be assigned
a
0

or a

1.

in the

initial truth table these are shown by
using a C for
contradiction, but deriving equations
requires deciding how
to treat the configuration. There are
three possible
choices. The first is to code all contradictory
combinations
as having positive outcomes. The logic
here is that because
some cases with this combination of factors
have a positive

outcome they should all be coded in this way in
order to
capture every instance of a positive outcome.

The second

option is to code all contradictory combinations as having
negative outcomes on the grounds that a combination should
only be coded as positive if all cases with that combination
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of factors are positive.

The third option is to
use
algorithms to choose a neaativo
ornegative or
positive outcome depending
Oh Which produces the most
logically minimal alternative.
I follow a two-fold
approach to the identification
of the
circumstances under which either
a positive or a negative
outcome can be expected. I
produce two alternate sets of
minimal solutions for each type
of outcome. Thus, I first
analyze conditions yielding
positive outcomes by including
only those configurations having
a consistently positive
outcome. I then gain a sense of
how far this approach might
understate possibilities by also
treating all of the

contradictory configurations as positive,

similarly,

i

first

analyze conditions yielding negative
outcomes, then check the
degree of likely understatement by treating
all contradictory
configurations as negative. The latter
analyses, by

including a larger number of configurations,
allow for
checking whether the more limited pools of
consistent
configurations, miss anything significant.
This did not seem appropriate for the more focused

comparisons of improving and non-improving governments
in
chapters four and five.

Here there is only one contradictory

configurations, so the problem is less pressing.

More

importantly, erring in the direction of modest conclusions
seems particularly important in an analysis seeking to

discern what conditions separate improvers and non-improvers
in democratic or transitional states.
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A decision must also be
made about how to treat
configurations that are logically
possible but do not
actually exist in the cases
analyzed. One can Include
them
rn the reduction of
configurations in the same way
as
described with the contradictory
configurations;

that is, one
can choose the outcome for
these configurations based
on
Which would make the equation
most simple. Analysts do
this
as one way to keep the limited
diversity of their cases from
rnhibrtlng production of the most
reduced equation. Logical
configurations are not used to further
reduce the equations
rn this study because accuracy
is more important to
understanding the complexities of
government behavior than
greater simplicity.

Though the frequency of each combination
is not as
important an issue in QCA as it is in
statistical studies,
this does not mean that frequency is
irrelevant.

Having only

one case in a configuration is a problem
because there is no
way to determine whether contradictions would
occur if there
were more cases. Therefore, in this study,
configurations

that had only one case are treated as contradictory.

Thus

they are used only in equations that include contradictory
outcomes
As stated above, QCA was designed as a method of causal

analysis.

However, my intention in this study is not to

arrive at causal inferences.

There are still few cases of

improvement and thus very few different combinations of
factors.

While QCA can address small numbers of cases, it
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can be insufficiently
reductionist if one is not
willing to
use logical as well as
actual combinations to
make
simplifying assumptions.
Factors that are not
relevant may
not drop out of the equations
as insignificant,
since my
purpose is hypothesis testing
and refinement, I regard
it as
more important to indicate
regularities in patterns of
outcomes as various patterns of
state characteristics vary
in
an effort to Identify situations
when efforts to end torture
could have some potential lor
success.
By comparing actual
contexts in which torture did not
decrease to those where it
drd, I eliminate some factors
that could not have had any
impact and indicate the circumstances
where others factors
may have been important.
Coding
As with statistical analysis, use
of QCA requires

distinguishing compliance from noncompliance
and the presence
or absence of each of the various factors
hypothesized as
promoting or inhibiting compliance. Thus users
of QCA face
the same issues of operationalization as users
of statistical
methods
Outcome
The first task was to code for the outcome, compliance
with

international norms against torture.

This task is simplified

by greater consensus about how to define torture than about

many other human rights concepts.
in Article

1

The definition established

of the UN Convention Against Torture specifies

that torture includes
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physical or^mental^'^is^intent^^ suffering, whether
inflicted on a
person for such purposes as
him or
from a third person
punishing him for any act
he^or a\hi

-

-- i-ii

the instigition°of"o“SIS\h1

^L'enror""

“

ac?pnn-L%1.?efafc%-i-(General Assembly Resolution
39/46).
This study, unlike many of the
guantitative studies of
human rights abuse, did not examine
repression of civil
liberties or violations of personal
integrity generally; it
focuses on one particular violation
of personal integrity:
torture. This adopts James M McCormick's
and Neil j.

Mitchell's argument that the components
of personal integrity
rights should be analyzed separately to
avoid information
loss and missed analytical opportunities
1997
(

,

p.

511

Both imprisonment and torture are methods
of
P^fif-ical control that are important in
themselves, and research efforts ought to be
geared to maximizing information gains about both
of these activities. Using separate indices
seems
a more appropriate means for moving in that
direction (1997, p.525).
This also study does not cover cruel, inhuman and degrading

treatment or punishment short of torture even though many

international conventions cover this as well as torture.
Cruel and degrading treatment is worthy of study, but should
be appraised separately.

While there is some controversy

over what constitutes torture, it is less extensive than what
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prevails regarding the definition
of degrading treatment
or
punishment. The United Nations
Convention Against
Torture(UNCAT) does not give a
specific definition of what
constitutes cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment that is
short of torture^.

Even with the relatively clear
definition of what
constitutes torture, there are
serious difficulties in
measuring compliance with the regimes
against torture. The
methodological issues raised by such
endeavors have been
discussed extensively in the human
rights literature (e.g.
Barsh, 1993; Claude, 1976; Jabine
i Claude, 1992; Mcnitt,
1986; Nanda, Scarritt, & Shepherd,
1981). For example,
essays in Ved Nanda et al's. book.
Global Human Rights (1981)
addressed problems of definition and critiqued
measures of
human rights development. Richard Claude
has done important
work in this area with his study Comparative
Human Rights
(1976)

One difficulty is categorizing the compliance
of states

without being able to observe directly.

Torture is

particularly hard to document (Forrest, 1996, p. 167).

Even

when a government wants the population or at least certain
segments of it to be aware and afraid of the practice, it
does not want the exact incidence of torture documented or

reported.

External observers cannot report fully on torture

in detention centers and the more repressive governments tend

to be the best at hiding the extent of abuse. As NGOs and

others have become more sophisticated about discovering and
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documenting the abuses, many
governments have become more
sophisticated in the practice of
torture. Many methods now
employed leave no or very ambiguous
physical traces. The
only evidence is the testimonies
of survivors and witnesses
who are often too terrorized by
the process to serve
as

sources for those making accusations
of torture. However,
the upsurge in NGOs and monitoring
by international
organizations mean that more Information
is now available in
reports on individual countries and
regions and in several
cross-national reports.
This study relied primarily on the
annual cross-national
reports published by the State Department
and Amnesty

International to assess the level of torture.

These sources

are the only ones that can provide information
on most states
for every year from 1979 to 1993. while
Freedom House was

reporting in 1979, it did not provide sufficient
information
on torture. Human Rights Watch only reports on the
situation
in selected states

Both reports present their own particular difficulties
for

creating cross-national comparisons.

Assessing the extent of

torture by relying only on Amnesty reports is difficult
because Amnesty International does not divide its reports
into sections addressing different human rights.

Amnesty

International often assess the more general repression and
does not address a particular right every year.

When the

issue of torture is not mentioned, it is sometimes unclear
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whether this means there was
no torture or the report
just
did not address it that
year.
The State Department reports
are divided into sections
covering particular rights so
do permit more direct
comparison. However, they are
also problematic. Sometiries
these reports do not convey a
separate assessment but simply
restate the Amnesty International
report, while a partial
explanation could be that the state
Department relies on or
is in total agreement with
Amnesty, one instead gets the
impression that often the human rights
situation was not very
high on the US agenda in relations
with that country, and the
US embassy there did not bother to
check, when this happens
one does not really have two independent
sources.

Some of the differences between State
Department and
Amnesty International reports are minor
and some seem to be
caused by differences in emphasis rather than
serious

differences in opinion or belief.
likely political.

Others, however, are more

The reports of other NGOs were used in an

attempt to reconcile these sorts of differences.

Human

Rights Watch and Freedom House are particularly useful

because these organizations are generally regarded as being
on different ends of the NGO political spectrum. However,

Human Rights Watch is not available for all years and only
highlights some countries.

A second issue when coding states for compliance is
deciding how much torture disqualifies a state from being

considered "in compliance".

Norms against torture are the
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type of norm inspiring
demands for "zero tolerance”,
This
requirement would, however, make
it so difficult for a
state
to be considered complying
that almost all states would
have
to be considered in violation
of conventions.
Co ding Levels of Torture

it is not possible to
assign

,

quantitative measures to levels of
torture.
Department and Amnesty International

The state

reports rarely give

numbers of victims or percentages
although they will, in some
cases, quote statistics gathered
from national governments or
independent human rights organizations
most cases given
available information, it would be
irresponsible to estimate.
Thus, states were coded into places
where torture was
.

m

,

practiced: a) never or occasionally, b)
sometimes, or c)
frequently and systematically. Three categories,
rather than
two, were used because

wanted to distinguish the very worst

I

from the rest.
Some cross-national studies examining personal
integrity

rights have used five categories based on a scale
created by

Raymond Gastil (1980) for Freedom in the World reports
(Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Sirirangsi, 1993,
1994)

.

However, in my view it really is not possible to use

categories to distinguish levels of torture for a study

examining so many states

.

The main reports

,

by Amnesty

International, the US State Department and Freedom House give

only general comments about torture.

Amnesty International

sometimes is more specific, but usually only reports trends
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and highlights specific cases.

The Preedo™ House scale
does
not distinguish particular
rights of personal integrity.

Governments are reported as torturing
never or occasionally
when the sources reported "no
torture", "isolated incidents
of torture", "rare cases" or
"occasional cases" of torture.
Governments which torture occasirm;=>n
occasionally are grouped with
those
that do not practice torture for
two reasons. Firstly,
current methods of gathering information
cannot reliably
distinguish between the two because of
difficulties in
getting accurate and specific information.
Secondly, a
government can produce occasional cases
of torture and yet
still be considered as complying since
in those cases torture
does not appear to be a normal part of
official routine.

The

military and the police may be acting on their
own.

it is

true that governments sometimes claim this is
the case even

when torture is a part of government policy.

Such a claim is

not credible when there are even moderate levels
of torture.
is plausible when there are only scattered cases,

as this is to accept when contemplating human

suffering as direct and extreme as that inflicted by any
instance of torture.
States that were described by more than one source as

practicing torture "frequently" or where torture was reported
as being "widespread and systematic", or "endemic" are coded

in this category.

It is important to note that only the

worst offenders are coded as having frequent and systematic
torture.
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Governments are coded as
torturing sometimes when
the
sources report the occurrence
of torture as more
than
occasional but less than
frequent. This coding
leaves a wide
range of state behavior in
the middle category.
However,

this IS the best that can
be done.

The limitations of the

data sources do not allow
distinguishing levels of torture
within the group of states that
sometimes practice torture.
The nature of the reports being
used means that only those
states that almost consistently
comply with norms against
torture and those that are the
absolute worst offenders can
be distinguished reliably from
the rest. Trying to narrow
the boundaries of "sometimes" would
lead to greater
inaccuracies
C oding for Improvement

,

m

addition to coding each state

for compliance in 1993, states were
coded for compliance in

each year from 1979 to 1993 to see whether
and how much
government levels of torture had changed in that

period.

All

states included in the study of behavior in 1993
with the

exception of countries that just gained independence
in the
last few years or those for which information was only

available in later years were examined.

Here contemporaneous

information could be supplemented with information that
became available in later years,

if a report

presented new

information on past torture this was used to decide whether a
state had increased or decreased compliance.

The year 19 79 was chosen as the starting point because it
is the first year that enough information was available to
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judge the level of compliance
in most states with any
degree
of accuracy. Though the State
Department and Amnesty

International were already reporting
in 1975, they covered a
relatively small number of countries
and those included were
not discussed in any comprehensive
way. By 1979, the reports
were far more complete. Secondary
sources could not be used
to push the data collection back
further because they
included information on a few states,
such as Bolivia or
Chile, but not on most states.
In chapters four and five, the states
where the level of

compliance improved were compared to other
democracies and
transitional states that continued to torture
at high levels.
Increased compliance with international norms was
the
positive outcome; lack of improvement,

—

whether a steady

level of non compliance or an actual decline in
compliance -was the negative outcome.

My ability to determine whether states increased their
level of torture was affected by changes in the quality of

human rights reports discussed above.

Most of these reports

became more detailed and more accurate over the time studied.
This meant that for some countries there would be more

discussion of torture than in previous years, even if the
government was not actually practicing more torture.

It was

not always just a matter of the amount of information

discussed but the slanting of information. The level of
reporting in the State Department reports has not always been
consistent.

Under the Reagan administration, they were
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widely thought to be politically
motivated and came under
heavy criticism from NGOs.^
There was a change beginning
in
the last years of the Reagan
Administration with a greater
attempt at non-partisan reporting
and these reports are now
viewed by most human rights activists
and scholars as much
more reliable. This means that some
changes appearing
in

State Department reports are likely
to be a result of more
accurate reporting rather than of changes
in state behavior
(Prokosch, 1996, p. 34).
It was therefore necessary to determine
that perceived

increases were not due only to greater
transparency, more
careful reporting, increased NGO resources and
improvements
in State Department reports.
I

l

did this in two ways. First,

coded an increase only when more than one source
reported

an increase in the amount of torture practiced.

Second,

i

coded a state as getting worse only when the reports actually
said that the government increased its torture as compared to

earlier years not simply because torture was mentioned when
it had not been before.

This study does not analyze all increases or decreases, but

only sustained shifts between categories.

For instance,

there was a period from 1979 to 1990 when Chile decreased the
numbers tortured rather significantly but still practiced

enough torture to be categorized as "frequent and
systematic."

Many states fluctuate within the category of

"sometimes" because it is such a broad category. Unsustained
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Shifts between categories are
ignored: states that improved
but then reverted to earlier
levels are not included.
Coding decreases in torture also
poses some problems.
There is still insufficient
information to know how much
torture was practiced in some states
during the years 1979 to
1993.
It IS not entirely clear how
much torture was
practiced before the end of the
Marxist-Leninist regimes in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and therefore
whether there was decline afterward, in
some states, like
Romania, there are now more reports of
brutality,

particularly against gypsies, but these reports
may be
accounted for by greater openness in the society.

The State

Department and Amnesty International yearly reports
on which
I primarily relied did not present
sufficient information

on

torture in these states

,

to allow coding these state as

having higher or lower levels of compliance.
It is also likely that several more states made

improvements in compliance that were not great enough to be

tracked in this study.

Smaller changes occur in most states

that torture from year to year without signifying any real

change in government policy

.

Even with the more accurate

reports that emerged in the eighties, this study can only
assess rather large scale change.

While one may be able to

pinpoint smaller change in some states, it cannot be done

consistently across states with the necessary accuracy.
The most significant absence from the list of improvers is

those governments that made fairly significant reductions in
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their level of torture but not
enough to remove them from
the
worst category of torturers.
A government that has been
torturing at extremely high levels
can torture many fewer
people and still be doing it
frequently and systematically.
Several Latin American governments
fall into this category in
the late seventies and eighties,
so are not included
as

improving compliance,
because

i

do not include them as "improvers"

am interested in governments that
are moving
towards compliance, not governments
like the Guatemalan and
Brazilian which simply came back from the
very worst but have
not come anywhere near acceptable
levels of compliance.
Making this distinction is important because
one of the
I

interesting questions raised by preliminary
research is why
the practice of torture still continues in some
states where
there was increased respect for political rights
and
a

dGclin© in mass killing and disapp©arancG
"ImprovGrs" also do not includ© govornmonts that failGd
to
sustain improvGd compliancG.

If a govornmont wont back to

torturing at th© sam© IgvgI or ©v©n a high©r IgvgI than it
had during th© p©ak of abus©, it was ©xcludGd.

For instanc©,

th© practic© of tortur© d©clin©d in Cam©roon from 1984 to
1988 but th©n b©cam© wors© than it had b©©n b©for©.

This is

diff©r©nt than Arg©ntina wh©r© tortur© incr©as©d from its
lowGst point but stay©d w©ll b©low its p©aks in th©
s©v©nti©s.

Whil© all statGS ar© vuln©rabl© to r©turn and may

at som© lat©r point hav© anoth©r cycl© of viol©nc© it is

important in ord©r to avoid coding statGs with inconsistent
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records as improvers.

i

am interested in states that

maintained at least some level
of improvement during the
years of this study.
Conditions
Cross-national

Using QCA analysis also requires

Identifying conditions relevant to
outcomes. I have coded
for eight factors identified in
the international regimes and
human rights literatures as possible
influences state
compliance. The data used to code the
independent variables
was based on an examination of
government documents, reports
of intergovernmental human rights
committees and commissions,
newspaper accounts and reports by NGOs
These factors are:

A state's membership or non-membership in one
of the
regional regimes against torture, the universal
regime
1.

against torture or both.

This is shown by ratification or

accession to the relevant treaty or treaties.
2.

The level of prosperity.

States that are classified by

the World Bank in the World Development Report as Low-income
or Lower-middle- income were coded as Low- income.

Those that

are upper-middle-income or high-income were coded as high
income.

The World Bank uses GNP per capita to classify

states in these categories.

The GNP per capita cutoff levels

for 1993 were for low income economies GNP per capita of $695

or less.

Middle income economies were those of more than

$695 but less than $8,626.

A division of $2,785 was made
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between lower-middle income
and upper middle income
economies. High income economies
were those of $8,626 or
more (World Bank, 1995
pp. viii-ix).
Therefore in this study
the cut off between high and
low income states is $2,785.
3 & 4. Major or minor
armed conflict. States are
categorized
using US State Department and NGO
Reports. The more severe
category includes conflicts where
the conflict is described
as civil war, serious guerrilla
warfare, large scale or
extensive insurgency. Minor armed
conflict is conflict
described as sporadic guerrilla warfare
and terrorism, even
if a few of the terrorists attacks
take a large number of
lives and sporadic or low-level fighting
or clashes. Not all
violence is taken into account in coding for
this factor
however. One-sided violence by the government
or their
agents against the population is considered
political

repression rather than armed conflict.

Large numbers of

murders and a society of violence, as in Brazil, may
cause

many deaths but does not constitute armed conflict.
5.

The presence of a multi-party democratic system.

States

that have experienced two successive changes of leadership by

multi-party elections are coded as having the presence of
this factor.

Though this may seem a narrow measurement of

democracy, it is better than others for the purposes of this
study.

Using constitutional arrangements or other formal

criteria can result in states with authoritarian behavior
being coded as democratic.

However, many of the substantive

criteria of democracy are themselves measuring human rights
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and can lead to conceptual
circularity,

if one includes

measurements of freedom of speech
and association and other
political rights as part of the
definition of democracy then
one will end up saying of course
democracy is necessary for
respect of rights because democracy
is respect of rights and
respect of rights is democracy.
As I am interested in

whether a particular form of government
is more conducive to
human rights, i decided to simply
code those states that have
6.
multiparty systems and successful
elections as states with
functioning democracies. The presence
or absence
of

multiparty democracy will be coded using
US State Department
reports and the Freedom House reports.
The existence of a military regime.

This factor was based

on the categorization of Freedom House Reports
and the State

Department Reports,
7.

Whether the government is transitional.

This category

contains states that have taken steps toward a democratic

system but have not yet proven themselves to be fully
democratic,

in this category is any state that has had one

democratic election.

Also included are states that are even

earlier in the process, those that have just legalized

opposition parties and have scheduled elections.

Therefore,

states may be coded as having a military regime as well.

States that have set up transitional governments such as

Ethiopia are also included.
8.

Presence of state-sponsored religion.

This factor was

based on the categorization of the Statesman's Yearbook.
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States are coded as having state-sponsored
religion if one
religion is recognized by law as the
state religion or if one
religion only is funded by the state.

—

itional Factors

torture,

.

After identifying states experiencing

examined whether any of the potential factors
had
changed by coding all factors year by year
from 1979 to
I

1993.

In this way it was also possible to see
how long a time

elapsed between creation of active human rights
organizations, establishment of transnational links,
or

initiation of foreign pressure and the improvement in
compliance.

When improvement happened in the earlier part of

the period covered it was necessary to go back to
information

before 1979 to find out when these changes occurred.
In addition to the presence or absence of armed conflict,

and membership in a regime the following factors were
Q^ddressed in the more detailed analysis in the latter part of

this study:
1

.

The influence of pressure from foreign governments

measured in terms of sanctions made by high-level foreign
officials directly linked to human rights abuse.

Distinguishing between passing rhetoric and genuine pressure
is necessary when coding for foreign pressure.

States were

coded as recipients of foreign pressure when other states'
actions were undertaken with or after a clear message that
the reason was human rights abuse and not other political

reasons.

However, distinguishing between situations where
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human rights concerns are
genuine and those when they
are
used as camouflage for other
political goals and motivations
is not always possible.
Foreign pressure against any
human
rights abuse is considered in
this study not just those that
have to do with torture because
governments usually express
concern about the repressive practices
of a regime in general
rather than focusing on particular
types of abuse.
The impact of human rights NGOs
operating within the
state. Sources define human rights
NGOs differently, i
first had to decide what groups and
organizations would be
considered human rights NGOs. Wiseberg
(1991, p 529) defines
a human rights NGO as "a private
association which devotes
significant resources to the promotion and
protection of
2

.

human rights, which is independent of both
governmental and
political groups that seek direct political power,
and which
does not itself seek such power"

Though analytically clear,

there are difficulties in applying this definition.

The

first is establishing whether an organization is truly

independent from the government.

States have been known to

create organizations to discredit truly independent ones and
in some cases have even give their puppet organization the

same name as the independent one it had previously closed

down (Wiseberg, 1991,

p.

529).

The second is in separating

political groups from human rights NGOs.

Eliminating

political groups as human rights NGOs is made possible
because other NGOs usually are able to publicize these
actions
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There is also the related
difficulty of deciding how
broadly to define human rights
organizations. As the human
rights movement has grown, the
number of organizations
seeking to use this title has
increased as well. Some of
these groups focus primarily on
other issues, such as
consumer protection, the environment
or economic development,
in some instances these groups
argue that there is a right to
a clean environment or to
development. Others are

interested in human rights as a specific
part of their
activities because their struggles cannot
be engaged well
unless the government is respecting their
rights. At a human
rights retreat sponsored by Harvard Law
School's Human Rights
Program, many participants expressed that
"self-perception
and self-definition by NGOs constitute the
only sensible

method of identifying human rights organizations"
(Steiner,
1991, p. 7).

Others felt however that human rights

organizations should have clearly defined mandates based on

commonly accepted human rights norms.

in this study, labor

organizations and groups promoting the interests of a

particular ethnic group are not considered to be human rights
NGOs.

3

Groups that base their actions on domestic law rather

than international norms are also considered human rights

organizations, which means that civil rights organizations
are included.

The factors examined to determine the level of

NGO activity were organized protests, publication or

consultation with government or transnational organizations.
Most of this information came from NGO sources;
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Human Rights

Internet's Human Rights Directories
and the HRI Reporter,
Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch.
3. Whether there are
significant connections to the
international human rights community,
transnational links
between the local human rights NGOs
and international
organizations, or human rights iNGOs
when coding this, i
looked for more than just the existence
of local branches of
INGOs like Amnesty International.
Almost all states have
received attention from INGOs, like Amnesty
International or
Human Rights Watch. However, only those
states where local
human rights groups actively pursued relations
with
.

transnational actors, had their work published or

disseminated abroad, had overseas training or received
funds
were coded as having transnational links. As with
domestic
factors, the information comes primarily from NGO reports

with particular reliance on Human Rights Internet reports.

iCassese addresses this in a chapter "What is Human, Inhuman
or
Degrading" in Inhuman States He argues that it is more difficult to
discover 'inhuman' or 'degrading' situations for two reasons:
.unlike torture, which takes the form of single acts against an
1)
individual, these situations are the result of numerous acts and
circumstances combined" 2 "the intent to humiliate, offend or debase
the victim is almost always absent" Cassese 1996 p.48).
.

.

.

)

(

^For example, see "In the Face of Cruelty": The Reagan
administration's human rights record
p. 8
^For a more in depth discussion of the definition and mandates
of human rights organizations NGOs see Steiner 1991 and
Wiseberg( 1991
(
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CHAPTER

3

COMPLIANCE IN 1993

This chapter presents a broad survey
of the conditions
present in 179 states during 1993. in
this part of the study
the factors used in the analysis are:
major armed conflict,
minor armed conflict, presence of state
religion, democracy,

membership in a regional and/or universal
convention against
torture, state income, military government and
government
transition.
The first section of this chapter presents the
record of

state compliance in 1993.

This survey shows that the record

with international norms against torture in
this year is a weak one.

The second section presents the

first three truth tables, one for the world, one for the

Americas and the other for Europe, which contain only major
armed conflict, minor armed conflict, democracy, and income.
These tables are presented to demonstrate that these

important factors do not alone distinguish governments that

torture from those that do not and thus to make apparent that
they are not sufficient to explain government behavior.
The third section presents truth tables containing the

longer list of factors and discusses their ability to explain

government behavior. It demonstrates, with this second set of
truth tables, that the additional factors of state religion,

international regime memberships, and state income also did
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not distinguish between states
that complied and those that
did not. This section contains
five truth tables, one for
the world and two for each of the
regions. Section four
presents a discussion of the equations
that can be derived
from the second set of tables and
which demonstrate the

conditions under which compliance occurred
or failed to
occur.

The survey does bear out the view that
internal conflict
raises the likelihood of torture. All the
governments faced
with major armed rebellion used torture at the
middle and
high levels. While it substantiates the
widespread claim

that a democratic form of government or movement
towards

democracy and the absence of internal armed conflict are
associated with compliance with international norms against
^®^ture, it makes clear that compliance is not always

achieved when there is a combination of democracy and lack of
such conflict.

In twenty-one countries, the government used

torture more than occasionally even though the country was
not experiencing internal armed conflict and had a democratic

political system.

While consistency in outcome may be

achieved by looking at other factors and thereby capturing
the complexity of government behavior, this is only feasible

when looking at a smaller number of states.
State Compliance in 1993

Despite the amount of attention given to human rights
issues and the international efforts to pressure governments
into ending torture, the majority of governments still
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practiced torture in 1993.

in most of the states
where

governments practiced torture,
the level was in the middle
category but a significant
number of governments practiced
frequently,

it

of the 179 states coded
for compliance in the

year 1993, 76 were coded as
never or occasionally torturing,
67 were coded as torturing
sometimes torturing and 36 were
coded as widely torturing.
This situation was not an improvement
over behavior in
X979.
In the period from 1979 to
1993, there was no worldwide reduction in the level of torture
practiced
by

governments.

Even more disturbing is the number
of

governments that increased the amount of
torture they
practice; at least 15 states were marked
by an increase in
the amount of torture practiced: Algeria,
Brazil,
Burma,

Burundi, Cameroon, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea,
Kuwait,

Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea,
Rwanda, Sudan
and Venezuela, in nine of these the government
was

practicing torture frequently by 1993.
While there were large differences in the number of torture
victims from year to year in the worst violators, in all of

them the practice remained widespread and systematic.
Despite the efforts of the international human rights
movement, torture was still being practiced widely and

systematically in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cameroon,
Chad, China, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mexico,
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Pakistan, Peru, South Africa,
Syria, Tunisia, Sri Lanka,
Turkey and Zaire throughout the
period studied.
In eight states
Argentina, Bolivia, Benin, Chile,
Ethiopia, The Philippines, Suriname
and Uruguay
the
government improved its compliance with
norms against
torture. More governments improved
some other aspect of
their human rights practice without
coming into greater
compliance with norms against torture,
if smaller

—

—

improvements in compliance were taken into
account, many more
states, particularly in Latin America,
would be included as
improving. States where the improvement was
temporary or for

which there was not enough information available
to track
torture in this period were also excluded from
the list of
improvers
The finding that the number of torturing governments
has
not declined is similar to that of Eric Prokosch
(1996).

He

compared the information in the country entries of Amnesty
International's Report on Torture covering the four and half

y®^ts from 1970 to mid 1974, Torture in the Eighties covering

from 1980 to mid 1983, and the Amnesty International Report
1994 covering the year 1993 in order to ascertain the trend

in torture worldwide.

He notes a substantial increase in the

number of countries from which Amnesty International received
reports of torture but notes that is was due in part to

greater research.

He found fourteen countries where torture

now appears to be serious but was not before

(p.

32).

His

reading is however that the number of states where torture is
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serious may have remained
approximately the same. He
argues
that although "it is not
possible on the basis of the
facts
available to say that the
geographical extent of torture has
widened since 1970, it is safe to
say at the very least it in
not decreasing (p. 33)."

Preliminary Truth
The first three truth tables

(

3

.

1-3

.

3

)

explore the major

factors that have been most consistently
advanced as
influencing the level of torture in the
human rights
literature. These truth tables demonstrate
that, while where
there is major armed conflict there is
no compliance, minor
armed conflict by itself or in combination
with type of

domestic regime is not sufficient to explain
state behavior.
Nor does type of government and conflict in
combination with
income discriminate well between states where the
government
complies with international norms against torture and
where
it does not.

The weakness of explanatory power is further

indicated by the fact that these configurations do not have
only one or two deviant cases; they show a fairly even split

between states with positive outcomes and those with
negative
In truth table 3.1 there are seven negative, seven

contradictory and no positive configurations.

Because there

is not one configuration with a positive outcome, this table

cannot lead to equations telling what configuration of
factors leads to compliance.

While there are clear patterns

of configurations where there are negative outcomes, 142
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Table

3.1

)

Conflict, Government Type
and Income, Global
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY
(
(
(

Configurations with negative
outcomes (torture)
Configurations with positive
outcomes (compliance)
C) Configurations with
contradictory outcomes
0

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE
1

1

7

1

MA MI DE HI TR CO

+
1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0
7

MA
MI
DE
HI

TR
CO
0 Cases
Freq
Pct

1 Cases
Freq
P(

11

100

0

0

6

100

0

0

0

1

c

17

47

19

53

0

c

9

43

12

57

0

0

0

c

13

68

6

32

0

0

0

c

8

80

2

20

0

0

1

1

0

c

11

29

27

71

0

0

0

1

1

c

1

23

2

67

0

0

0

1

0

c

6

43

8

57

0

1

1

0

0

0

3

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

6

100

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

6

100

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

3

100

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

For country names see appendix
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states are in contradictory
configurations. Not only are
they in contradiction but
they do not for the most
part even
Show trends Several of the
percentages in the column for
positive outcome are in the
fifty percent range.
Truth table 3.2 which only
contains European states,
demonstrates, as in the world
wide, that the shortened list
of factors does not distinguish
well between noncompliance
and compliance although it does
distinguish more clearly here
than in the American or the World
table.
.

In truth table 3.2, there is
one configuration with a

positive outcome, covering two states,
and there are clear
tendencies among the contradictory
configurations. In the
European region, looking at only basic
factors, there are
six negative, one positive and three
contradictory

configurations

.

The negative configurations hold eight

states, the positive only two and the
contradictory thirty.

Because there is only one configuration with a
positive
outcome, a reduction process to eliminate irrelevant
factors

cannot be done. So while in this case there is a

configuration that can be presented as an equation, it
represents only two states.
In the American region, table 3.3,

the shorter list of

factors cannot distinguish between states that comply and

those that do not

.

The truth table looking at only five

factors is even less useful than Europe's.
be derived from this truth-table.
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No equations can

Table 3.2
Conflict, Government Type
and Income, Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

negative outeomea torture
ontoomea oomplianoel
c ConJ
(C)Ccnfiguratrona
with contradictory outcomea
(

)

’

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
transition
COMPLIANCE
MA MI DE HI TR CO

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

c

6
f
3

MA
MI
DE
HI

TR
CO
0 Cases
Freq
Pct

—

1 Cases
Freq
Pet

+

2

25

6

75

0

0

2

100

c

1

33

2

67

0

c

3

16

16

84

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

2

100

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

1
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Table 3.3
Conflict, Government Type and
Income, Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

?

positive outcomes (compliance)
negative outcomes (torture)
(C) Configurations with contradictory
outcomes
i

NUMBER OF RAW DATA CASES FOR EACH TRUTH
TABLE CONFIGURATION

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME
_
TRANSITION
_
COMPLIANCE
_

MA
MI
de
gj
tr

CO
0

I

MA MI DE HI TR CO

Freq

Cases
Pct

1

Freq

Cases
Pct

0

0

1

0

0

C

75

25

0

0

0

0

0

0

100

0

1

0

0

1

0

C

46

54

0

110

0

0

100

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

c

33

67

10 10

0

0

IQO

0

Complete Truth Tables

Because armed conflict and democracy do not distinguish
well between states that comply with international norms

against torture and those that do not, they must be viewed in
the context of variations in the other factors examined in

this study.

This section, containing truth tables
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3. 4-3. 8,

will show that it

possible to find positive
outcomes and
to derive equations when
the other factors are
added.
However, while they identify
some factors that are
important
the patterns they reveal do
not fully explain government
behavior.
,

The worldwide table still
yields many configurations
with
contradictory outcomes. There are
three positive

configurations, containing only nine
states; thirty-two
negative configurations, containing
sixty states; and fifteen
contradictory configurations containing
110 states,

seventeen of the configurations with
negative outcomes and
one of those with a positive outcome
have only one state in
them.

These are coded as contradictory.

The positive configurations highlight
the problem of using
equations from tables with so many contradictions.
Clearly,
an equation based on only eight cases cannot
provide a

sufficient understanding of the context in which
governments
comply. However it does tell us some interesting
things
about what distinguishes some states from others.

Both of

the positive configurations have no regime membership.

There

were many European states that were members of the regime
and
whose governments did not practice torture.

Yet, these

states cannot be grouped into any clearly positive

configuration.

Therefore, simplifying the configurations by

using negative and contradictory configurations as
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Table 3.4
All Factors, Global
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

'®9ative outcomes (torture!

(C)confi^^:ti:s:

,,

o:^tris=:orro«cS''“""’

number of raw data cases for
each truth table configuration
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT - MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT - MI
STATE RELIGION
_ ST
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME
_
MILITARY
_
REGIME
RE
TRANSITION
_
COMPLIANCE
_ CO

m

i

MA MI ST DE HI ML CV TR CO

0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0 Cases
Freq
Pet

1 Cases
Freq
Pet

0

0

2

100

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

c

5

36

9

64

1

0

0

0

0

c

3

23

10

77

0

0

0

0

0

c

4

50

4

50

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

4

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

100

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

c

2

25

6

75

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

4

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

c

9

41

13

59

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

c

1

33

2

67

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

continued next page
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Table 3.4 continued
1

MA MI ST DE HI ML RE TR CO
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

Freq

Pet

Freq

cases
Pet

1

0

0

6

100

1

0

0

2

100

c

2

29

5

71

0

1

100

0

0

0

c

1

50

1

50

0

c

3

75

1

25

1

1

c

2

18

9

82

0

0

c

2

67

1

33

0

0

1

c

3

75

1

25

0

0

0

0

3

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

2

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

c

1

50

1

50

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

c

3

60

2

40

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

5

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

3

100

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

100

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

0
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Table 3.4 continued
0

MA MI ST DE HI ML RE TR CO
0

0

10
0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

50

0

0

2

100

0

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

2

100

0

0

4

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Pct

50

1

0

0

0

Freq

2

0

0

Pct

cases

C

1110

0

Freq

1

0

10
10
10 10
10
10 10
10
10
10 10 10
10
10
10
10 11
10 10
10
10
110
111 10 10
0

cases

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

non-complying produces a misleading conclusion if one does
not remember the limited explanatory power.

All these

configurations say is that there was an absence of regime

membership in the eight states.

This does lend credence to

the idea that membership in the regimes is not important to

compliance.
The full European table, 3.5, shows improvement in the

consistency of outcome over the European truth table looking
only at type of government, income and armed conflict.
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Table 3.5
All Factors, Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

(O)Configurations with negative
outcomes (torture)
1 configuration, with
positive outcomes compuILe)
(C)Configurations with contradictory
outcomes

in
3
2

NUMBER OF RAW DATA CASES FOR EACH
TRUTH TABLE CONFIGURATION
Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MI
STATE RELIGION
_ ST
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME
HI
TRANSITION
_ tr
REGIME
_
COMPLIANCE
_ CO

I

MA MI ST DE HI TR RE CO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0 Cases
Freq
Pct

1 Cases
Freq
Pct

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

100

0

1

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

c

1

33

2

67

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

c

3

25

9

75

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

7

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

6

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0
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Table 3.5 continued
0

MA MI ST DE HI TR RE CO
0

0

Freq

111 10 10
10

0

0

10

Cases

0

1

Pct

Cases

Freq

Pct

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

There are ten negative configurations,
three positive ones,
and only two contradictory outcomes
Fifteen states
are in these two contradictory
configurations; eleven of
fifteen have positive outcomes. Many
states that complied
with international norms against
torture would not
.

be

included in the equation.

There are ten negative

configurations that have only one state and
so are coded as
contradictory when creating equations. This
leaves no

configurations coded as negative.
In truth table 3.6, there are fewer
contradictions once

all the factors are added.

There are nine configurations

with negative outcomes, four configurations with
positive
outcomes, and three with contradictory outcomes.

The nine

configurations with negative outcomes contain ten states.
The four configurations with positive outcomes contain
eight

states and the three contradictory configurations contain

sixteen states.

Of those sixteen, only four are states where

the government is in compliance.

There is a definite trend

in the contradictory configurations for this table.

split down the middle.

None are

If configurations with only one
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Table 3.6
All Factors, Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

(O)Configurations with negative outcomes
(torture)
positive outcomes (compliance)
(C) Configurations with
contradictory outcomes

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
_
DEMOCRACY
_
HIGH INCOME
_
MILITARY
_
TRANSITION
_
REGIME
_
COMPLIANCE
_

I

mA
MI
ST
qe

m

ml
tR
•pfT

CO

MA MI ST DE HI ML TR RE CO

0 Cases
Freq
Pct

1 Cases
Freq
Pet

0

0

0

10

0

c

4

80

20

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

0

100

0

0

1110

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

c

5

71

29

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

100

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

100

0

0

0

1

0

c

3

75

25

0

0

1

1

0

0

2

100

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

100

0
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Table

3

.

6

continued
0

I

MA MI ST DE HI ML TR RE CO

001000110
010100010

Freq

Cases
Pet

Cases

1

Freq

Pet

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

State are not used to create equations
then eight negative
and two positive lines are no longer
positive. This leaves
only two lines, made up of six states, as
positive

configurations
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 contain one additional piece
of

analysis because states were coded for membership in
the

regional or universal regime separately.

Given the confused

results about membership in a regime it seemed possible that

membership in a particular regime would be important, when
membership in the regimes is coded separately, the resulting
truth table has only one configuration that is contradictory.
In Truth table 3.7, there are eleven configurations with

negative outcomes but only one state in each configuration.
Six configurations, containing twenty states, have positive
outcomes.

The one contradictory configuration contains nine

states, six of which have positive outcomes.

When the two

regimes are separated in the analysis of Latin American
states there are eleven negative configurations, six positive

configurations and two contradictory configurations which
have eight states.

Nine negative and four positive

configurations contain only one state.
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Table 3.7

All Factors with Regimes,
Europe
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

positive outcomes (compliance)
Configurations with negative
outcomes tor^urjr
(C) Configurations with
contradictory outcomes
0

6

j

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
_
STATE RELIGION
DEMOCRACY
_
UN MEMBER
EUROPEAN MEMBER
HIGH INCOME
_
TRANSITION
_
COMPLIANCE
—

I

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

MA
MI
ST
DE
UN

EU
HI

TR
CO

MA MI ST DE UN EU HI TR CO

0

11

0 Cases
Freq
Pct

1 Cases
Freq
Pct

1

0

1

100

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

2

100

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

c

3

33

6

67

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

6

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

3

100

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

6

100

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

100
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Table

3

.

7

continued
0

MA MI ST DE UN EU
0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

TR CO
1

0

1

0

0

Cases

Freq

Pet

1

Cases

Freq

Pet

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

1

100

0

0

0

The results do not show that membership
in the European or
the UN regime is more important in Europe.
There are now
more configurations that contain only one
state. This in
Itself would cause fewer contradictions.
The equations below
do not indicate that membership in a regime
is important.
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Table

3.8

All Factors, Split Regime,
Americas
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

negative configurations torture
outcomes (complancer
c Configurations with
(C)
contradictory outcomes

11

(

6
2

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MA
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
- MI
STATE RELIGION
- ST
DEMOCRACY
- DE
UN MEMBER
- UN
AMERICAN MEMBER
- AM
HIGH INCOME
- HI
MILITARY
- ML
TRANSITION
- TR
COMPLIANCE
- CO

—
Cases
Freq
Pet
0

MA MI ST DE UN AM HI ML TR CO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

Cases
Freq
Pet

—

0

0

0

0

0

4

80

1

20

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

4

100

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

C

2

67

1

33

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

5

100

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0
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Table 3.8 continued
0 Cases
Freq
Pct

MA MI ST DE UN AM HI
ML TR CO
1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

100

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

1

100

1

100

0

0

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

100

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1 Cases
Freq
Pct

Equations

Because truth tables 3.4 -3.8
contain fewer configurations
that have contradictory outcomes,
they are more useful than
the first three for the purpose
of deriving equations from
the configurations. The following
tables show the equations
derived from these truth tables
these equations uppercase letters designate the presence of
a particular factor
and lower-case letters the absence of
a factor,
plus signs
r©pr©SGnt Bool©a.n "or" conditions.
.

m

Type of Government and Armed Conflict
The equations derived from truth tables 3.4 to
3.8

elucidate the multiple conditions present in states
where the
government complied and where the government did not comply

international norms against torture.

The equations

presented in tables 3.9 to 3.13 demonstrate the importance of
the combination of type of government and armed conflict in

distinguishing compliance from noncompliance.

while the

equations which include contradictory configurations also
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indicate the importance of
armed conflict and democracy,
they
demonstrate that some governments
of states which are not
democracies and do have minor
armed conflict have complied
with norms against torture.
The lack of democracy or
transition and the presence of
minor armed conflict do not
always mean that torture will be
practiced.
The positive equations for the
world and each of the
regions contain only combinations
with the absence of armed
conflict and the presence of democracy
or transition to
democracy. As mentioned above, the
equation derived from
truth table four, using only clearly
positive outcomes,
presented in table 3.9, is by itself of
limited value because
so many states that do not torture are
not represented in the
equation. However, while only covering eight
states, this
positive equation is worth noting because it
reveals the only

situation where every state complied.

This configuration

identifies complying states as high-income, democratic
states

experiencing no internal armed conflict that do not belong
to
a regime.

Of course the lack of armed conflict and the

presence of democracy is expected but it is surprising to
find the lack of regime membership.

This will be discussed

further below.
In the regional equations, all positive configurations also

include the absence of armed conflict and the presence of

democracy or transition toward democracy.

The positive

equation derived from the European table (3.5), presented in
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Table 3.9

Global Comparison, Consistent
Results
Compliance
ma.mi .DE .HI re =
.

Noncompliance
l

mi ST de hi ml RE t r+
.

.

.

.

.

.

MA.st.hi.ml.tr+
MI St .hi .ml .TR+
MI St de hi ml RE+
.

.

.

.

.

.

MA.st.de.hi.ml.re+
MI St .DE .RE+
.

ma mi s t hi ML re TR+
ma.mi ST .de .hi .ml .RE+
ma.mi.ST.DE.hi.re = 0
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Truth Table 3.4
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
hi-high income
RE-REGIME
TR-TRANSITION

ML-MILITARY

table 3.10, contains two possible
combinations of factors.
NO internal armed conflict is combined
with democracy in one
and with transition to democracy in the
other. The first
configuration shows that in states that were
democracies

without armed conflict and with an official state
religion
and membership in one of the regimes against
torture,
the

government did not use torture.

Income is dropped out of the

equation because in both high and low income states

displaying this configuration the government did not use
^®^ture.

There is also compliance in states without armed

coriflict that were in transition toward democracy with no

state religion, low income, and membership in a regime.

This

configuration characterizes many of the eastern European
states such as Poland and the Ukraine that joined the

European and/or the UN regimes early in their post
transitions
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-

Leninist

Table 3.10
All Factors, Europe, Consistent
Results
Compliance

ma.mi.ST.DE.RE+
ma.mi.st.hi.TR.RE =

Non Compliance

1

Derived from Truth Table 3.5
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
hi-high income
RE-REGIME
TR-TRANSITION

Table 3.11 is derived from the truth
table that
distinguished between the world and the
European regime, in
the positive equation in this table,
all states in these
configurations are democracies or in transition
and have no
armed conflict. Three of those configurations
have the

presence of democracy; one has the presence of
transition to
democracy. The configuration where there is the
presence of

transition has membership in one regime (the UN, not
the
European) and no state religion along with the lack
of

internal armed conflict.
It is interesting to note that there is movement
towards

democracy in equations with positive outcomes.

This

configuration shows the context in which states in transition
comply with international norms against torture.

This is

important because while studies have shown that democracies
are less likely to torture, the record of states in

transition is not as clear (Fein, 1995).

It is not

surprising that low income would be linked to transition in
states that complied as most states in transition were low
71

income states.

Only two European states in
transition,
Hungary and Estonia, could be coded
as high income and as one
is in compliance and the other
is not they are
in a

contradictory configuration.

Table 3.11
All Factors with Regimes, Europe,
Consistent Results
Compliance
ma.mi.ST.DE.EU.HHma.mi.DE.un.EU.HI+
ma mi St UN eu TR+
ma.mi.ST.DE.UN.eu.hi=
.

.

.

.

Non Compliance

.

1

Derived from Truth table 3.7
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH
RE-REGIME
TR-TRANSITION

The positive equation derived from the American
region,

presented in table 3.12, has two configurations.

Here too

the absence of armed conflict and the presence of democracy

or transition are present in the equation indicating

compliance with noms against torture.

In this region,

democracy and lack of armed conflict are combined with an
absence of a state religion and the absence of regime

membership along with high income.

Transition is combined

with the absence of state religion, the absence of military
government and with low income and regime membership.

72

Table 3.12

All Factors, Americas,
Consistent Results
Compliance

Non Compliance

ma.mi.st.DE.HI.re +
ma.mi.st.hi.ml.TR.RE =1
Derived from Truth table

3

ma.mi.ST.DE.hi.re =0
6

CONFLICT
BI-HIGH
TR-TRANSITION

t)i bTATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
ML-MILITAR.Y
RE-REGIME

Table 3.13
All Factors with Regimes, Americas,
Consistent Results
Compliance
ma .mi St DE am. HI
.

.

.

=

Non Compliance
ma.mi.st.DE.UN.AM.Hi+
ma.mi .ST.DE .un.am.hi=0

1

Derived from Truth Table 3.8
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH

SsiS' ™

Me-r^arship

-

American Hena.ership

TR-

The contradictory equations, presented
in tables 3.14 to
3.18, show most clearly that the simple combination
of

presence of democracy and the absence of armed
conflict
cannot explain government behavior.

These equations are

important because, as the truth tables above showed, in
some
tables most states that complied were not in the positive

configurations,

it is the contradictory equations that

highlight factors that existed in all states that complied.
While they include situations where there were negative
outcomes as well, the contradictory equations identify all
the contexts that cover any possibility of compliance.
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In

particular, they indicate the
possibility of compliance
in
states that are not democracies
and states that have
minor
armed conflict.

Table 3.14

Global Comparison, Inconsistent
Results
Instances of
Compliance

Instances of
Non Compliance

ma.mi .DE .ml .RE+
ma mi s t H I mi tr+
ma mi .HI, mi re t r+
ma .mi st de re tr+
ma mi de hi ml re+
ma mi s t mi RE TR+
ma.mi st de hi re tr+
ma.st.de.hi.ml.re.tr=
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ma de hi ml re TR+
mi .de.hi .ml re+
ma .mi.de. ml tr+
.

.

,

.

.

.

.

1

ma.st.de.hi.mi+
ma.st.hi.ml.tr+
mi. st.de. hi. ml+
mi st hi .ml tr+
mi hi ml re t r+
mi .DE .HI .RE+
ma.mi st.hi.TR+
ma mi s t de ml RE
MI.st.de.hi.tr+
ma s t de ml .re.tr+
MI de hi ML RE tr+
mi de hi re tr+
MA.ST.DE.hi.re.tr =0
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Table 3.4
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH INCOME
ML-MILITARY
RE-REGIME
TR-TRANSITION
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Table 3.15
All Factors Europe,
Inconsistent Results
Instances of Compliance

Instances of Non Compliance

ma.mi.DE.HI.tr.RE+
ma mi ST DE t r RE+
ma.mi -st .de.TR,RE=i
.

.

.

.

MA.DE. HI. RE+
ma.st.DE.HI.RE+
ma .mi St .de HI .RE+
MA. st.de. hi. RE+

.

.

MA. St .hi .tr .RE+
MI St .hi .TR+
ma. St .hi .TR.re+
ma mi ST hi TR RE=0
.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Truth Table
5
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICI
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH INCOME
RE-REGIME
TR-TRANSITION

Table 3.16
All Factors with Regimes, Europe,
Inconsistent Results

Instances of Compliance

ma.mi.DE .EU.HI+
ma mi St UN eu TR+
ma.mi. St. DE. Hit
ma mi ST DE UN eu hi tr=l
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Instance of Non Compliance
MI.DE.UN.EU.HI+
ma St DE UN EU HI+
MI.st.eu.hi.TRt
MA s t de UN eu hi+
ma St un eu hi TR+
ma.mi.st.UN.EU.Hl.TRt
MA.St.DE.UN.EU.hit
ma mi ST UN eu hi TR+
ma mi s t de UN eu HI tr=0
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Truth table 3.7
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICI
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH
UN-UNITED NATIONS EU -EUROPEAN TR-TRANSITION
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.

Table 3.17

All Factors, Americas,
Inconsistent Results
Instances of Compliance

Instances of Non Compliance

ma.mi.st.DEt ma.mi DE hi ,re+
ma mi DE .HI. ml t r re+
ma mi s t hi ml TR RE=
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ma.mi .DE .HI .RE+ mi st DE hi
.Re+
ma mi DE hi re+
ma.st.DE.hi+
ma mi s t hi ml tr re+
ma.mi.ST.hi.MI.tr. re+
mi.ST.de. hi .ml tr .RE=0
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Truth table 3.6
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-:
DE
-DEMOCRACY
HI -HIGH
ML-MILITARY
RE-REGIME
HME
TR-TRANSITION

Table 3.18
All Factors with Regimes, Americas,
Inconsistent Results
ma mi St DE am mi tr+
ma.mi.DE .UN. am. HI. ml. tr+
ma mi DE UN am hi ml t r+
ma mi s de AM hi mi TR= 1
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

ma.mi.DE .UN.AM.HI+
MA.st.DE .UN.AM.hit
ma mi t DE un hit
ma mi DE un am hit
ma st DE am hit
ma mi s t un am hi mi tr+
mi. ST.de. UN. AM. hi. ml. tr+
ma.mi.ST.un.am.hi.ML.tr=0
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Derived from Truth table 3.8
MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI -MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ST-STATE RELIGION
DE-DEMOCRACY
HI-HIGH
ML-MILITARY
UN-UNITED NATIONS AM-AMERICAN
TR-TRANSITION

The equation presented in table 3.14, derived from the

worldwide truth table using all configurations where any
state was in compliance, includes eight configurations.

Only

two of these have the combination of no armed conflict and

democracy or transition to democracy.

Most are

configurations where there was no armed conflict and no
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democracy or transition.

There is one combination
where the
absence of minor armed conflict
is not necessary to

compliance.

This configuration is with
the absence of major
conflict, no democracy or
transition, a civilian government
and no regime membership.
Minor armed conflict drops out
meaning there could be minor armed
conflict in this
situation.

The negative equations also tell
us more about states in
transition to democracy,
the negative equation, two
configurations have governments in
transition, one in
combinations with the presence of minor
armed conflict and
the other in combination with the
presence of a military
government

m

In the European table, 3.10, there are
no negative

configurations once those with only one case are
eliminated.
However, an equation derived from the contradictory

outcomes,

shown in table 3.15, which includes those negative

configurations containing only one case, identifies
contexts
in which there were any negative outcomes.

Once again, many

but not all negative configurations have armed conflict,

in

the European, there are two configurations with the presence
of democracy that did not comply,

in one, there is a

combination of major armed conflict, high income and regime
membership.

The other, however, is where there may or may

not be minor armed conflict, as it drops out of the equation.

This is a configuration where there is high income, regime

membership and no state religion.
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R0qime Membership

only in th. cases of states
where the government did
comply
with international norms
against torture and did belong
to
the regime could norms have
mattered. This global survey
provides little encouragement
for arguments that
international regimes matter. Clearly
regime membership did
not matter in states where
torture was practiced despite
regime membership and where torture
was avoided even though
the state was not a regime member,
addition, there are
several instances where regimes were
present

m

in

configurations but dropped out of the
final equation because,
according to Boolean logic, they were
irrelevant.

In the worldwide analysis, regime
membership is absent in

positive but is present in contradictory and
negative
equations, in the positive, lack of membership

in a regime

IS in conjunction with the presence of
high income and

democracy and the absence of armed conflict.

This makes a

stronger statement than if this factor just did not
appear in
the equation, which would mean that it did not matter
for the

outcome whether or not a state belonged to a regime.

In this

equation, regime membership was actually absent. So when

there was a clear outcome of compliance, there was an absence
of regime membership in conjunction with the other, expected

factors.

However, as mentioned above, this equation leaves

out many states. Regime membership is present in a positive

equation only in the European analysis, not in the world wide
or American ones.

The presence of regime membership would
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Show up in more configurations
than in the other analysis
simply because a higher
proportion of states in Europe

have

joined.

Regime membership is also
present in some negative
configurations. This could easily
be explained if it
appeared only in combination with
armed conflict, as it is
now clearly established that
armed conflict is associated
with the practice of torture.
But there are configurations
where members of a regime lacked
internal conflict and yet
did not comply with international
norms, it is again
apparent that membership in a regime was
present in complying
states in Europe. There is no indication,
however, that
membership in the European regime was more
important than
membership in the United Nations regime.
The question of regime impact on compliance
cannot be
answered completely without doing time analysis.
An argument
against their importance can be supported if there
has been
no improvement in states that were practicing
torture before

joining the regime.

That is why it is important to look at

states that improved or did not improve their records
since
197 9 to really understand the importance of these

conventions
Conclusion

This research identifies certain combinations of factors

present in all states complying with international norms
against torture and many more configurations present when

contradictory configurations are coded as positive to capture
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all cases of compliance with
international norms. These
equations are derived from truth
tables that demonstrate
that
for the most part the factors
cannot separate compilers from
noncompliers
This study finds that the same
factors, armed conflict and
type of government, that Rummel
showed to influence democide,
are linked to government use of
torture. Yet it also
demonstrates the limits of their
explanatory power, it shows
that armed conflict seems to be an
even stronger factor in
torture than type of government because
it reveals no cases
of compliance when there is major
armed conflict but some
cases of compliance when there is a lack
of democracy. Yet
it IS also apparent that democracy and
armed conflict even in

combination are not enough to distinguish between
compliers
and non-compliers and that other factors are
necessary to
truly understand state behavior.

This study also explores

the complexity of armed conflict by distinguishing
between

major and minor armed conflict.

Doing so shows that while in

every context states experiencing major armed conflict

governments resort to torture, the same is not true for those

experiencing minor armed conflict.
While the transnational movement to end torture is examined
in later chapters, this analysis does reveal something about

the success of one important part of this effort.

The

findings in this chapter begin to build a case against the
idea that international regimes are important.

Though this

case cannot be complete until we look at time analysis in
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later chapters, even in this
beginning there are indications
that international regimes
have not acted as constraints
on
government behavior. Yet it is
too early to conclude that
they are irrelevant. Regimes
may be important at the
margins

These findings also address the
question of whether
democracy is necessary for respect
of human rights and
whether states that do not respect
rights can even be
considered democracies. Any finding
on this point is
affected by how the analyst defines
democracy. Some define
democracy in a way that allows states that
are not rights
respecting to be considered democracies.
They point out that
states that should be considered democracies
based on the
form of government do not respect rights.
David Forsythe
(1995) points out, giving India as an example, that
democracy

and rights- protective states are not the same
thing.

As

Akwasi Aidoo (1993, p. 705) argued:
The point here is that where as it is not possible
to have human rights in undemocratic conditions
democracy will not automatically guarantee human
rights"

Others define democracy in such a way that all democracies

must by definition respect human rights.

Some argue that

states can only be considered democracies if they at the very
least, respect political rights and some include most

universally recognized rights.

Kaballo argued that within

his understanding of democracy there is nothing like
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democracy without human rights.

He said "democracy
without

universal human rights is a
contradiction in terms"
,p. 189,.
However, in order to understand
the circumstances under
which
hold
-LU erections
0l0d~'ionQ and have
K
multi-party systems
violate human rights it is
useful to separate the
categories
of rights respecting states
and democracies. As discussed
in
the methodology chapter, for
the purposes of this study,
states were coded as democracies
bases on a very limited and
minimal standard.
This study also addresses the
impact of a transition toward
democracy on government behavior
towards its citizens, while
thxs part of the study does not find
that transition

necessarily leads to compliance, neither
does it confirm
Fein's argument that there is "more
murder in the middle"
(

1995

,

p.

185

).

Configurations with transition to democracy

are present in equations with positive
outcomes and

contradictory ones.

Transition appears in positive

configurations when there is no armed conflict or
military
control. With one exception, it appears in negative
configurations only when there is armed conflict, military
control of the transition process or with the combination
of
state religion and low income.
It is clear from this study that the complexity of

government behavior makes it crucial to look beyond the
factors emphasized in the literature and undertake a closer

analysis of fewer states in order to really understand

government behavior.

There are two ways that the rest of

H2

this study can clear up
some of the unresolved
questions
The first is by looking
at fewer states in more
detail. The
sacrifice of detail in order
to code for so many
countries
may have contributed to
weak explanatory powers of
some
factors
The second is by looking
at state behavior over
time. In the study of states
that have shown significant
improvement or decline in compliance,
the additional factors
examined may show that non-domestic
factors, such as
transnational networks and pressure
from other states, are
important to the process
As Chayes and Chayes pointed
out
rn a discussion of regulatory
treaties "a cross section at
any particular moment may give a
misleading picture of the
State of compliance (Chayes and Chayes,
.

.

1995, p. 15
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).

CHAPTER

4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMPROVED COMPLIANCE

TO begin the task of elucidating
the dynamics of
governments' compliance with
international norms against
torture, this chapter presents
results drawn from a survey of
selected states in the years 1979-93.
particular, it
compares the small group of states
identified as increasing
levels of compliance to a group of
states that were
democratic or in transition and yet tortured
frequently.
This analysis permits an assessment of
some of the dynamics
at work as states' internal conditions
or exposure to
external influences change over time.

m

This chapter first describes in greater detail
those

states that were coded as improvers,

it shows that total

compliance is rarely achieved and difficult to maintain.

The

states that improved from the worst levels were still

torturing at middle levels in 1993.

This part of this

chapter discusses the amount and timing of the change in each
of these states and the situation in the twelve comparison

states.

The second section reports the results of the

comparison between the two groups of states.
reveals several things.

This comparison

First, membership in any of the

torture regimes has not had any serious impact on government
behavior.

Second, an analysis of the comparison confirms and

further develops the importance of armed conflict as a
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domestic factor and Indicates
the circumstances under
which
the presence of minor armed
conflict may be overcome.

Third,
it highlights the importance
of foreign pressure and
the more

limited circumstances under
which NGOs with transnational
links may have been able to effect
government practice.

Improvement in Compliance
Not only IS the number of
governments that improved small;
the improvement by these governments
is incomplete. As can
be seen in table 4.1, when governments
improved it was, for
the most part, from very high levels
of torture to moderate
levels; only a few reduced their use
of torture to the level
of no or only occasional torture. Of
the eight improving
states discussed in this chapter, six were
previously among
the worst offenders,
these states, torture declined from
the very worst levels to moderate levels; none
of those six

m

achieved total compliance.

For some of these governments to

reach even this moderate level involved massive
improvement,
but the movement clearly stalled after a certain point,

in

Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay there was a period of complete

compliance before the practice of torture resumed at much
lower levels.

There were vast improvements in terms of

overall human rights in these three states.

Disappearances

almost stopped, democracy was restored, and those who were

tortured were more likely to survive.

Yet there remains the

disturbing fact that these governments were unable to
maintain the level of compliance they achieved when civilian
rule was first reestablished.

Improvement was only sustained
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in the two states who went
from the middle level to

occasional or no torture.
Table 4.1

Compliance Patterns of Improver
States

state Name

79

80

Argentina
Benin

Bolivia

82

83

84

85

8

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

+

+

-

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

_

*

+

+

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

k

k

k

+

+

+

+

+

k

k

k

k

k

+

+

k

k

k

•k

k

+

+

+

+

+

+

—

+

+

*

-

-

-

ie

Chile

k

Ethiopia

*

*

*

Philippines
Surincime
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*

*

-

-

*

+

Uruguay

+

*

•k

+

+

k

-

_

+

Frequent torture
+
Some torture
No or occasional torture

Transition to Democracy
The most obvious common factor in the eight states
where

improvement occurred is a transition to democracy before the

decline in torture.

Despite the development of norms against

torture in the post World War ll period, no government

remaining in power changed significantly for the better.
Only after a repressive government was no longer in power did
the practice of torture begin to decline.

The Philippines is

perhaps a partial exception because the new leaders

democratically elected in 1986 continued to torture and the
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decline only occurred after
the second set of elections
in
1992.

The Latin American improvers
had previously been
democracies but during the worst
of the abuse were under
military dictatorship. Four
successive military juntas
ruled
for six years in Argentina
from 1976-1983. After defeat
in
the 1982 Falklands War, the
military lost power and civilian
rule was reestablished in 1983.
When the military lost
power, the amount of torture in
Argentina, which had been
declining since its peak in 1976 and
1977, decreased enough
to no longer be classified as wide
or systematic torture.
Yet it was not until late 1983 that
Argentina significantly

decreased torture.

At this point, the new government

appeared to be heading toward total compliance
but in 1988
and 1989 there was an increase in new
torture
reports.

This

level of torture did not become and showed no
signs of

becoming anywhere near the level reached under the
military
regime.

However, there also was no sign that further

improvements would be forthcoming.
The first country to have a significant, sustained decline
in torture was Bolivia,

its difficult and complicated

transition to democracy ran from 1978 until 1982.

The first

attempt at a return to democratically elected civilian rule,

following the June, 1978 elections was cut short by a

military coup in August and another in November.

There was

another election in 1979, a coup in July, 1980 and another

election in 1980 (Schoultz, 1981,
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p.

357).

The practice of

torture had declined briefly
in late 1979, but with
the next
coup that halted the
transition process, torture
resumed, it
began to decline again in
1983 and was almost
non-existent in
1985 and 1986. Torture
increased again in 1987 but

not
nearly to the point where it
was frequent.
Torture was practiced widely
in Uruguay until 1985.
The
Uruguayan military had previously
reduced its torture rate
from the peak of the late seventies.
However, while there
were fewer cases than in the past,
the situation was still
serious before 1985. From 1985 to
1990, there was almost
complete compliance with international
norms against torture.
But, as in Argentina and Bolivia,
there was eventually

resumption of low levels of torture.

The almost complete

compliance lasted for six years after which
torture increased
to relatively low levels.
Chile had experienced a longer period of
high levels of
torture than most other states and did not at
any point reach
the same levels of compliance as Argentina,
Uruguay and
Bolivia.

There was frequent torture throughout the seventies

and the eighties, although later in this period there
was
some decrease in the number of victims,

in 1978 Chile's

secret police force (DINA) was dissolved and replaced by a new
state security body, the National Center for

Investigation CNI
(

DINA.

)

.

CNI used torture more selectively than

According to the Washington Office on Latin America,

torture was still practiced frequently but became

"institutionalized and more sophisticated" (WOLA, 1985,
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p.

The transition fro™
military rule began in
Chile in 1988
when 55% of the population
voted against Pinochet's
continuing to rule (Country
Report Chile, 1988.4,
p. 5).
A
new constitution came into
effect in July of 1989 and
in
December, Patricio Aylwin won
the presidency (Country
Report
Chile, 1989.4, p. 5). The
practice of torture finally
declined significantly in 1990
and stayed at moderate levels
through 1993.
8).

In Suriname, the pattern of
torture was different than in
many of the other states: a
generally lower level of torture

was punctuated by highly publicized
cases of torture and
killing. For instance, on December
8-10 1982, fifteen people
were arrested and executed (O.A.S.,
1983, p. 27). After
members of the International Commission
of Jurists visited
from February 25 to March 4, 1983 they
reported that human
rights had "deteriorated dramatically” since
the previous ICJ
visit in February 1981 (ICJ, July 1983).
There was some
signs of improvement in the mid eighties when
an interim

government was installed, but these initial signs
of
improvement did not lead to sustained change (Country
Report
Suriname, 1987.2, p. 17). in November 1986 there was a

massacre at Moiwana of supposed sympathizers of the Jungle

commando (Amnesty International, 1987).

The abuse continued

on New Year's Eve 1987, when twenty people were severely

tortured and six murdered (Country Report Suriname, 1987.2,
p.

18).

It was not until 1990 that the real improvement in

state behavior occurred.

Suriname began its transition in
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1990 but this attempt at
democracy was hampered when
the
military took power in a bloodless
coup on December 25th
(State Department, 1990,
p. 769).
The military government

did very soon arrange for new
elections on May 25, 1991,
These were supervised by OAS
observers and generally held
to
be reasonably free and fair (The
Economist, June 1989, p.
48)

.

in the Phxlippines and Ethiopia,
transition occurred when

long-time rulers were forced to flee
the country. Neither of
these states where torture was practiced
frequently had
dramatic improvements in human rights
practices by 1993.

Torture was reduced at the end of the
period studied just
enough to move them out of the category of
states where
torture is frequently practiced.
During the Mengistu regime torture was practiced
routinely
in Ethiopia. Serious challenge to Mengitsu's
rule began when
the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF)
was formed in 1988 as an alliance among insurgent
groups.

On

May 21, 1991, Mengistu fled the country and six days later
the U.S. convened peace talks (Freedom in the World,
1993, p.
224; Amnesty International, 1992, p. 114).

The Transitional

conference was held in July 1991 and the first regional
elections followed in 1992 (Country Report Ethiopia, 1992.3,
pp. 21-22).

The rate of torture only went down in Ethiopia

in 1992, dropping from frequent to lesser levels of torture.

While torture was still practiced in 1993, particularly in
areas of military conflict, it was no longer occurring as

90

frequently.

Human Rights Watch Reports
reported that the
transitional government in Ethiopia
made significant progress
and remained more accountable
on human rights matters
than
any other government in Ethiopian
history. (Human Rights
watch, 1993, p. 10).

Yet even this significant
progress left
an enormous gap between Ethiopian
government conduct and the
requirements of international norms.
In the Philippines, the improvement
was much less and did
not occur until 1992. Many expected
and hoped for an earlier

improvement in state practice after
February 1986, when
Marcos was removed from power. Corazon
Aquino placed human
rights at the top of her campaign platform
in the February
1986 elections and the new constitution,
ratified in February
of 1987, provided a number of judicial and
other safeguards
including the creation of the Presidential Commission
on

Human Rights PCHR) (Nemenzo, 1995, p. 119).
(

initial decrease in human rights violations.

There was also an
However, the

democratization process was endangered by seven coup attempts
right-wing elements of the military and when negotiations
between the government and the New People's Army insurgents

collapsed the human rights situation started to worsen
(Amnesty International Report, 1992, p. 17).

Unlike in

Argentina, it was not a moderate increase but a return to

systematic abuse.

Under Aquino, torture by the army and by

government-backed militia, became rampant,
Force Detainees of the Philippines
the violations of the year before.
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'

in 1987 the Task

statistics showed double
They reported that about

27% of individuals arrested in
1988 were subject to torture

(Philippine Human Rights Update
4.3, p. 10). The situation
began to change with the peaceful
transition of power in June
of 1992 when Fidel Ramos, who had
been Secretary of National
Defense and Chief of staff of the Armed
Forces in the Aquino
administration, became president, in 1992
and 1993, the
practice of torture finally began to lessen.
The human
rights situation improved just enough
for the state to be
removed from the category of frequent torturer.
The last of the eight states experiencing
sustained

improvement is Benin.

In the early 1980s it was a Leninist

one-party state where abuse of prisoners was
practiced
throughout the country.

Many political prisoners were freed

in 1984 and there seemed the potential for change
(Amnesty

International Report, 1984, p. 20).

However, beginning in

1985 there was a steady increase in imprisonment and torture.

The political transition in Benin began in 1989 when the

government began negotiations with exiled political
opposition.

A group of Beninese leaders forced President

Kerekou to relinquish control to a transitional government in
June.

On February 19-28, 1990, a national conference for

reconstruction established a multi-party democracy and in
early 1990 an interim government was set up to prepare for

democracy (Nwajiaku 1994,

p.

429).

Multiparty local

elections were held in late 1990 and a new constitution was
approved. Torture declined significantly after that point.
In March 1991, national elections were held and Prime
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Minister Soglo defeated General Kerekou
in the election lor
President (Derryck, 1991, p. 24).
G overnments Prac t icing Widespread TortnT-o

To explore further the conditions
under which democracy or
transition is insufficient to reduce torture,
i examine a
group of states that are democracies or
in transition to
democracy and continue to torture frequently
and

systematically.

This group consists of Turkey, Sri Lanka,

India, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Peru, Colombia,

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and El Salvador.

This group of

comparison states does not include states where claims
of

democratization rested only on elections which foreign
observers judged to be fraudulent or only on government

declarations of transition.

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the

biniing of democratization and the level of torture.

Each of the governments in this group either continued to
use torture at roughly the same high level throughout the

period studied or actually increased its level of torture.
Table 4.4 illustrates that nine of these comparison states
had governments that were constant torturers, and the

governments of three

— Ecuador,

Peru, and Venezuela

— actually

increased the amount of torture practiced in the period
studied.

In Ecuador, which did not have a history of serious

human rights abuse, torture became a significant problem for
the first time in 1985 when, under President Febres Cordera,
it began to be practiced consistently by the police and to a

lesser extent by the military.
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Torture also became more

Table

4 .2

Democracy, Transition and

Never or
Occasional

Some

Non Democracy

Transition

Democracy

Benin (79-84)
Surinam( 80,90)

Argentina( 85-87
Uruguay 85-89
Surinam( 90-93
Benin( 91-93

Bolivia( 85-86
Uruguay 90
Surinam( 79

Argentina( 83-

Argentina( 89-93)
Bolivia( 87-93
Uruguay( 91-93
Chile(93)
Philippines 92-

Surinam (81-86)
Benin( 85-90

Frequent

Compliance, Improvers

Chile (79-87)
Bolivia( 79-82
Argentina( 79-82
Uruguay 77-84
Ethiopia 79-90
Philippines (79(

(

(

(

84,88)
Bolivia( 83-84
Chile( 89-92
Surinam( 87-89
Ethiopia( 92-93

(

93)

Bolivia( 82
Chile( 88
Ethiopia( 91
Philippines 86(

91)

85)

Table

4

.

Democracy, Transition and Compliance, Non Improvers
Non Democracy

Transition

Democracy

Never or
Occasional

Venezuela 79-86

Some

Ecuador( 79-83
Pakistan( 86-87

Ecuador 84
Colombia( 81-82
(

Mexico( 86-87
Venezuela( 87-91

Frequent

Pakistan( 79-83
El Salvador(79-

Pakistan( 85 88-

82

Bangladesh( 90-93
Brazil 85-88
El Salvador(83-

)

Bangladesh( 79-89
Brazil 79-84
Turkey 79-82
(

(

Ecuador 85-93
Colombia 79-

,

(

89)

(

(

1

80,83-93)
Mexico 79-85 88(

,

93)

88)

Venezuela 92-93

Peru( 79-84
Turkey 83-90

India( 79-93

(

(

Brazil{89-93)
Peru( 85-93)
El Salvador(8993)

Pakistan( 90-93
Sri Lanka( 91-93)
Turkey 91-93
(
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serious and frequent in Peru,
although it was a problem
throughout the period studied,
in Venezuela, torture also
increased in the late eighties to
the point of becoming a
systematic practice.

Table

4 .4

Compliance Patterns of Non-Improver
States

state Name

79

Bangladesh
Brazil

Colombia

Ecuador

80

El Salvador

India

+

Mexico

+

Pakistan

Turkey

+

Venezuela

-

85
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*

*

k

+

+

+

+

+

*

+

*

+

*

*

+

*

ie

+

*

+
*

_

—

k

87

88

89

+

90

91

92

93

*

k

*

*

k

•f

k

+

k

*

k

k

k

*

k

1r

Hr

k

k

k

+

k

+

k

k

*

k

+

k

k

*

k

k

k

*

*

k

+

+

k

k

k

*

k

+

+

k

k

k

k

k

k

*

k

*

k

+

k

+

k

*

+

*

k

k

+

+

*

*

+

+

-

*

+
+

*

84

k

+

Sri Lanka

83

+

Peru

*

82

+

•k

+

81

+
k

+
*

*

*

_

_

_

*

k

+

k

k

*

*

*:

Frequent torture
Some torture
No or occasional torture
-t-

Circumstances of improved Compliance
The Qualitative Comparative Analysis undertaken in this

chapter elucidates the very limited circumstances under which
NGOs have possibly been part of the process of change, and
the sets of circumstances under which improvement can occur
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without the presence of human
rights activists.
The only
configuration in the positive
equation where human rights
groups were part of a process
toward greater compliance was
when major armed conflict was
absent and where there was
signrficant foreign pressure on the
offending government.
Such circumstances have characterized
relatively few of the
states where levels of torture were
high. Most governments
that were torturing extensively were
engaged in domestic
armed conflict and only rarely have
they been under any
serious sustained pressure to comply
with international human
rights norms.
The cross-national study showed that the
domestic factors
alone could not explain state behavior but
it did clearly

demonstrate the importance of armed conflict and
domestic
regime type in distinguishing compliance from non
compliance.
Armed conflict is therefore included in this analysis
along
with foreign pressure, NGOs and transnational links.

Regime membership has not been an important factor in state
compliance.

The examination from 1979 to 1993 gives further

evidence that regimes have not had an impact on member
states

.

Most of the states where the government improved its

human rights records were not members of the UN or regional

convention until after they had already improved compliance.
As illustrated in table 4.5, only three states, Suriname,

Chile and the Philippines, became parties to the torture

conventions before the government reduced the amount of
torture practiced.

Bolivia and Ethiopia did not become
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me^^ers of these regimes
in the period studied,
every
other case a new government
undertook the treaty
ohiigations
after torture had been
reduced. So human rights
activists
struggling for greater
respect for rights in
these states did
not have regime membership
as a focal point of
their
protests, but rather had to
point to more general
human
rights treaties and norms
against torture.

m

Table 4.5

Regime Membership and
Compliance
Member

Improved
Compliance

Non Member

Chile U88 A88
Phil(U86) Suriname A88
(

,

)

(

Widespread
Torture

Brazil (U91 A89)
Mexico(U86. A87)
Peru( U88,A91
Ecuador U88
Turkey(U88,E88)
Venezuela (U91, A91)

*Argentina(U86 A92),
*Benin(U92), Bolivia
Ethiopia
*Uruguay(U86,A92)

Bangladesh, Colombia,
El Salvador, India,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka

)

(

joined convention after improvement in
compliance
U - United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
A - Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture
E - European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
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'

The importance of these
international regimes is also
called into question by
the fact that many states
where
governments still torture are
members of the regimes,
it is
apparent that governments
have joined them without
seriously
intending to obey,
six of the twelve comparison
states,
Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru,
Turkey and Venezuela, the
government continued to torture
at high levels after becoming
party to a convention. Even
if human rights regimes
affect
governments after a relatively long
timelag, after several
years of membership some signs
of improvement could be
expected. Certainly the states
included in this study are
not alone in this pattern.
Therefore, membership in a
regime is not included in the QCA
analysis.

m

.

Because this part of the study does
not involve as large a
number of states, it was possible to
do a somewhat more
extensive examination of factors,
this section, l coded

m

for the presence or absence of three
factors that were not

included in the larger cross-sectional study:
the activity
level of NCOS, the existence of links between
domestic human
rights activists and iNGOs willing to assist
their

cause, and

foreign pressure.

Each of the improving states was coded for

the factors as they existed in the period preceding
the

change in outcome.

The comparison states were coded for each

factor at the end of the period studied.

By coding states

for conditions present at the time of the improvement and

comparing this to the conditions existing in states that did
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not improve by the end of the period
studied, it is possible
to explore the context in which change
occurred.
As shown in Table 4.6, the combinations
of these five
factors distinguish between states where
the government

improved its compliance and those where it
did not in every
configuration but one. The configuration with
a

contradictory outcome includes minor armed conflict,
active
NGOs with links and the absence of foreign pressure.
This

configuration is noteworthy because it contains the
,

one of the three improving states where human

rights organizations were active before the change.

Because

it is in a contradictory configuration with Bangladesh and

Colombia, the Philippines is not represented in the equation
for improvement in compliance.

The slowness of the

Philippines improvement reinforces the conclusion that in
states with this combination of factors, the presence of

minor armed conflict and the absence of foreign pressure,
governments are likely to continue torturing at high levels.
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Table

4

.

Conflict, NGOs and Foreign Pressure
TRUTH TABLE SUMMARY

Negative Outcomes continued torture)
Configurations with Positive Outcomes
less torture)
Configurations with Contradictory Outcomes

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
ACTIVE NGOs
LINRs
FOREIGN PRESSURE
OUTCOME

|MA MI NG LI

0

FO 0

1111
1110

0

10
10

0

11

0

(

5

(

4

MA
MI

NG
FO

Neg. Cases
Freq Pet

Pos
Freq

.

Cases
Pet

0

0

2

100

2

100

0

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

110

0

2

100

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

C

2

67

1

33

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

100

0

0

0

0

1

1

3

100

110
110

10
0

0

1

0

3

100

0

0

0

1

100

0

0

CASE IDS FOR THE TRUTH TABLE

0

0

1

1

1

1

=>

argentine

=1

chile

1

0

1

1

1

0

=>

turkey

=0

el Salvador =0

=1

continued next page
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Table 4.6 continued
0

1

0

0

1

1

=>

ethiopia

=1

0

0

1

1

0

0

=>

mexico

=0

0

1

1

1

0

C =>

Colombia

=0 bangladesh

brazil

Philippines = 1
0

0

0

1

0

=>

0

ecuador

=0

venezuala

=0

0

0

0

0

0

1

=>

benin

=1

0

0

0

0

1

1

=>

Uruguay

=1

bolivia

=1

sri lanka

=0

1

0

1

1

0

=>

0

peru
0

1

0

1

0

=>

0

Pakistan

=0

4

ma.ng. li FP+ma .mi .ng li+ma.mi .NG.LI .FP =
.

Equation
MA. mi. NG.LI + ma.NG.fp =

india

=0

Equation
,

Suriname

4

.

1

.

0

MA-MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MI-MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
NG-ACTIVE NGOs LI-LINKs
FP-FOREIGN PRESSURE
1-IMPROVEMENT 0-Non Improvement
.

indicates and

+

indicates or

Three combinations are present in the equations derived
from configurations with positive outcomes.

The first,

ma.ng. li.FP, indicates an absence of major armed conflict, an

absence of active local NGOs and the presence of foreign
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pressure.

Reduction according to the QCA
procedure revels
that mrnor armed conflict drops
out of the configuration.

In

thrs configuration, it does not
matter to the outcome whether
or not there was minor armed
conflict. Either way improvement
occurred. The second combination,
ma.mi.ng.li, indicates the

absence of both armed conflict and active
NGOs.

In this

case, foreign pressure drops out of the
equation.

So when

there is no minor armed conflict there
might be foreign
pressure but it is not necessary to improvement.
Together
these two configurations show that improvement
occurs when
there is either the absence of minor armed
conflict or the
presence of foreign pressure.
In the third combination, ma.mi.NG.LI .FP, there
is no armed

conflict, the presence of active local NGOs with links
and
the presence of foreign pressure.

This tells us that the

only circumstance under which NGOs could have been part of
the process leading to improvement was when there was no

armed conflict and there was foreign pressure.
In the equation created by reducing negative outcomes there

are two configurations.

In the first, there is major armed

conflict and the presence of NGOs with links.

It did not

matter whether there was foreign pressure; either way greater

compliance did not occur.

In the other combination there is

an absence of both major armed conflict and foreign pressure,

the presence of human rights organizations, but the absence
of transnational links.

Under these conditions, minor armed

conflict drops out of the equation.
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T he Importanc e of Armed
Conf 1

^n^-

This section focuses on
the Importance of armed
conflict in
efforts to achieve compliance
with human rights norms
and
elucidates the circumstance under
which the presence of minor
armed conflict may be overcome
so that compliance can
be
achieved even with armed conflict.
No matter what the
context improved compliance with
norms against torture occurs
only when there is no major armed
conflict. There is no
context in which compliance has
improved during periods of
major armed conflict and not very
many situations it has
during minor armed conflict.

Armed Conflict in Improvers
One of the configurations in the
positive equation,

ma.ng.li.FP, represents a situation where
improvement could
occur despite minor armed conflict, when
there was no major
armed conflict, there were no NGOs and there
was the presence
of foreign pressure whether or not there was
minor armed

conflict the outcome was compliance.

Ethiopia which had

minor armed conflict is covered by this configuration.

While

the worst fighting of the civil war in Ethiopia was
over by
1992, there were clashes between the Ethiopian People's

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) which left the government after the
elections (Amnesty International Report 1993, p. 127).

In

March and April 1992, fighting erupted between EPRDF forces
and militia of the Issu and Gourgoura Liberation Front(IGLF).

103

in addition, intercommunal
clashes in Arsi province were

causing extensive loss of life
(Country Report 92.2, p. 20).
However, there is one state that
is in a configurations
with a contradictory outcome and
improved despite armed
conflict and no foreign pressure, it
should be noted that
the improving state in contradiction,
the Philippines,

is as

discussed above, the state where the government
made the most
minimal improvement of those states coded
as
improving.

Measuring the level of violence more finely
would not help
to distinguish these two improvers from
non- improvers
.

The

level of armed conflict in Ethiopia and the
Philippines when

they improved was as high as in some states that
did not
improve.

However, in both the violence was a reduction from

what had been experienced before,

in both the Philippines as

in Ethiopia there was at least some chance of negotiated
end

to the strife.

Therefore, there was more cause for optimism

among policy makers.

It appeared that negotiations were

working and government officials would be well served by more
conciliatory stands.
Armed conflict that had been going on for twenty years was
still a serious issue in the Philippines.

The intensity and

number of military-rebel encounters continued to be high

through 1991, with Aquino's directive that the insurgency be

crushed by the end of her term (Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights

,

1990 , p

.

3

)

President Ramos made efforts to negotiate an end to the
insurgencies.

He set up a National Unification Commission in
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August of 1992, attempting to
make peace with the Moro
National Liberation Front(MNLF)
the Muslim separatist
organization, the New Peoples
Army(NPA) made up of communist
insurgents and the Reform the Armed
Forces Movement-Soldiers
of the Filipino People-Young
Officers' Union (RAM-SFP- YOU)
whose members were right wing former
members of the armed
forces (Country Report Philippines,
1993.2,
p.

8).

He

legalized the Communist Party and
offered amnesty to
insurgents. There was a decrease from
26,000 New Peoples
Army Rebels operating in 1988 to an
estimated 11,000 active
in 1993 (Country Report Philippines,
1993.4,
p.

8).

While these states that improved compliance
during armed
conflict only improved a small amount and had
armed conflict
that was declining, their improvement is not
all that
demonstrates that armed conflict by itself cannot
separate
improvers from non improvers.

There are circumstances under

which there was no armed conflict and still widespread
torture

Lack of Armed Conflict in Torturers
One of the configurations in the negative eguation gives
the circumstances under which states have tortured despite a

lack of any armed conflict.

That configurations is:

ma.NG.fp. Without major armed conflict and with NGOs, with or

without links, if there was no foreign pressure, whether or
not there was minor armed conflict, these governments

tortured.

Minor armed conflict and links drop out of the

configuration.

Four democratic or transitional states did
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not have armed conflict and
yet continued to torture at
high
levels: Venezuela, Ecuador,
Brazil, and Mexico.

Venezuela was not experiencing
internal armed conflict
during the period studied. Though
there were two attempted
coups in 1993, I did not code
Venezuela as having armed
conflict because they occurred at the
end of the period
studied and obviously could not have
affected government
behavior in the time studied. The first,
on February 4,
involved 1,400 army and air force officers
but was put down
immediately by troops loyal to the President.
In the

second,
on November 27, insurgents bombed military
installations and
government buildings but were also quickly
stopped (Amnesty
International Report 1993, pp. 131-132).
In Mexico's rural states, as in Brazil,
violent disputes

over land occurred frequently.

According to U.S. State

Department Country Reports, paramilitary bands, police
auxiliaries and local police controlled by political bosses

indigenous activists.

As in Brazil, this was mostly

one-sided violence that did not qualify as armed conflict.
Ecuador also had torture despite a lack of armed conflict.
There was a very small group of armed insurgents and drug

traffickers operating in Ecuador.

The group, Alvaro Vive

Carajo(AVC) a leftist, nationalist organization with close
ties to Colombia's M-19 guerrillas had no more than a few

hundred active members.

They committed bank robberies,

kidnappings and occasionally killed a policeman.

This group

reached a peace agreement with the government in February of
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1991 (Amnesty International
Report 1992, p. 104).

a small
guerrilla group claiming allegiance
to the Maoist Shining
Path in neighboring Peru emerged
in 1992 (Country Report
Peru, 1992.4, p. 89).

All of these were too small to
qualify

as even minor internal armed
conflict.

While Brazil did not experience
insurgency or organized
terrorist groups, it did experience
high levels of internal
violence. Criminal activity and
politically motivated
murders against indigenous people, street
children and labor
organizers were common. This was not
conflict between two
armed groups however, most of the violence
was done
by

paramilitary forces and by thugs hired by land
owners to kill
and threaten squatters and organizers (Amnesty
International,

Report 1992, pp. 70-71).
In these states there was violence but not
internal armed

conflict and yet they continued to torture.

Clearly, armed

conflict while extremely important is not enough to explain
why some states continue to torture and others do not.

Another important factor that helps provide the context in
which improvement occurs is foreign pressure.
Foreign Pressure
The equation derived from positive outcomes shows foreign

pressure as part of the context in which improvement occurs.
In the positive equation, there is no configuration that

indicates the absence of foreign pressure.

Foreign pressure

is present in two of the three configurations in the equation

for improved compliance and drops out of the third.
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It does

not matter for the outcome
whether or not there is
foreign
pressure where there is neither
major armed conflict nor
minor armed conflict and no
active NGOs
Foreign pressure is
present as a condition in the
configuration where there is no
major armed conflict and no NGOs
where minor armed conflict
dropped out and where there is no
armed conflict there are
NGOs with links.
.

The second configuration in the
negative equation also
points out the importance of pressure.
When there are NGOs
but an absence of foreign pressure,
there is a negative
outcome whether or not those NGOs have
links and whether or
not there is minor armed conflict.
The other configuration
in the negative equation shows that
when there is major armed
conflict, even in the presence of NGOs
with links and foreign
pressure, there is also a negative outcome.
Six of the eight states that improved had
been subjected to
foreign pressure. Of the three states that had
active NGOs

with links, two, Argentina and Chile, had foreign
pressure
and one, the Philippines (despite its active human
rights

organizations) was never the focus of sustained pressure.
Four countries without human rights communities, Ethiopia,
Uruguay, Suriname and Bolivia, experienced foreign pressure.
Benin, like the Philippines did not have pressure.

Two of

the comparison state, Turkey and El Salvador, experienced

some foreign pressure.
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Forei gn Pressure on Improvers

There was significant pressure
on the Argentine military
regime to improve human rights
practices beginning in the
carter administration. In
1977, the u.s. government
reduced
the planned level of military
aid and terminated direct
economic aid for Argentina due to
human rights abuses and on
September 30, 1978, a law eliminating
all military assistance
to Argentina went into effect
(Forsythe, 1988,
p.

106).

The

U.S. also froze Export-Import Bank
Funds in this period.

However the restriction on arms sales
was lifted in 1980.
The Reagan administration wanted to
give military aid back to
Argentina in 1982 and 1983 but Congressional
opposition

prevented this from happening (Mower,
1987, pp. 109-110).
Under Pinochet, Chile came close to being an
international
pariah and at various times lost aid from almost
every donor
country (Tomasevski, 1993, p. 96). Beginning in
1974, the

U.S. Congress placed a ceiling of $25 million
on economic aid

to Chile and banned new military assistance although
before

Carter took office these laws were not actively implemented
(Forsythe, 1988, p. 102).

The British ambassador was

withdrawn in December of 1975 after the torture of a British
woman.

Diplomatic relations were restored in January of 1980

but a ban on UK arms sales continued.

In January 1975,

Australia decided to suspend wheat shipments to Chile and in
December 19 76 France, West Germany, and the UK all favored

denying World Bank loans to Chile.

In 1976 the Ford

administration imposed an embargo on military sales to Chile.
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The UN established an ad
hoc working group on
Chile in
February 1975. it visited
Chile in 1978 and was then
replaced by a special rapporteur.
Under the Carter
administration, aid and Export-import
Bank credits were cut
off (Tomasevskr, p. 96).
Reagan lifted most of Carter's
sanctions and there was an effort
to resume better relations
with Pinochet (Forsythe, 1988,
pp. 103-104).
The United
States, under Reagan, started
asking that Chile be praised
for improvements by the UN Human
Rights Commission,

m

October 1980, the U.S. Senate approved
an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Bill lifting the
embargo on military sales
to Chile. However the amendment
laid down that the president
would need to certify “significant
progress" in complying
with internationally recognized standards
of human
rights.

Congress continued some sanctions on Chile
and in 1985, the
Reagan administration began taking a tougher
stance toward
Chile.
In February of 1982, a delivery of French-

manufactured tanks was suspended and the French
Defense

Minister said there would be no more weapon sales as
long as
the present Chilean regime was in office.

The U.S., on

December 24, 1987, withdrew Chile's privilege to sell certain
P^o*^uc:ts in

the United States duty free under the generalized

system of preferences GSP
(

)

citing violations of

internationally accepted standards of workers rights (Country
Report Chile, 1988.1,

p.

6).

Bolivia and Uruguay both received pressure from the United
States.

In mid-1978, the Carter administration briefly

suspended military aid to
Bolivia when Asun seized
power
(Schoultz, 1981, p. 266).
This suspension only lasted
25
days, however, later, the
Garcia Meza regime received
more
pressure from the u.s. for its
cocaine involvement and human
rights violations. Under both
Carter and Reagan, the
u.s.

followed a "nonrecognition" policy
and the U.S. veto in the
inter-American Development Bank held
up development funds.
The UK in 1977 denied a loan to
Bolivia's state mining
industry because of the human rights
situation. The UK
reconsidered in February, 1979 citing
some improvement in
human rights practice. After the
1980 coup, the u.s.
withdrew its ambassador from La Paz and
suspended all aid and
a U.S. military training mission
was withdrawn on July 25th.
Diplomatic relations were renewed with the
U.S. in 1981,

Canada in February 1982, Sweden in July 1982
and the

Netherlands in September 1982.
Uruguay, in 1977, was one of three states to
which the

Carter administration denied aid (Schoultz,
1981,

p.

257).

Arms and services were totally cut off and, by
1978, Eximbank
was refusing consider loan applications from Uruguay.

The

U.S. in 1979 reinstates some of the military aid (Mower,
1987, p. 109).

When Reagan took office he shifted the policy

to one of "quiet diplomacy".

The Reagan Administration

reversed policy regarding multilateral development bank loans
and no longer opposed loans to Uruguay on human rights
grounds 1

Ethiopia also received foreign
pressure because of its
human rights record, in 198S +-ho tt c rthe u.s. Congress mandated
a
trade embargo. However, it
depended on a presidential
finding that Ethiopia was
deliberately starving its people
and had failed to grant its
citizens fundamental human
rights. The administration
decided that the country's
government was not pursuing a policy
of starvation and
consequently did not impose the embargo
(Ottoway,
1985).

it

was difficult for foreign
government to apply sanctions that
hurt the government when there was
such desperate need for
food aid in Ethiopia because of severe
famine. However,

Ethiopia did lose MEN status and the U.S.
decided to vote
against World Bank loans to Ethiopia but
the U.S. and Europe
continued to give relief aid (Tomasevski,

1993, pp. 102-103).

The pressure on Suriname to improve its
human rights

practices, came mostly, but not exclusively,
from the Dutch.

Suriname which had been ranked first in Dutch aid
until 1982,
lost Dutch aid after a military massacre of
political

opponents (Tomasevski, 1993,

p.

87).

The U.S. at this time

ended the $1 million per annum which it had been providing
(Human Rights Watch, 1992, p. 321). The Dutch did not invoke

human rights criteria but changed circumstances when they

suspended the development co-operation treaty, however the
Dutch Prime minister stated aid would be resumed only after

concrete steps had been taken toward restoring democracy and
fundamental Rights.

The Dutch resumed aid to the civilian

government in 1987 by giving $58 million for the year but did

not resume their development
program (Country Report
Suriname, 1988.4, p. 19,. This
was significantly less
that
the $120 million that Suriname
received previously. The
Dutch said they would only fully
restore aid when three

conditions were met: first, serious
peace talks with the
Jungle Commandos; second, a sharply
devalued currency and
third, the military returning to
barracks for good (The
Economist, November 10, 1990). From
January 8 to 10 1985, a
special commission of the lACHR held
hearings at the
Hotel

Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam, Netherlands to
hear testimony of
persons claiming that their human rights
had been violated
since 1983. The U.S. and France were more
concerned
with

Surinam's relations with Libya.

In 1986 and 1987 they warned

about involvement with a terrorist sponsoring
state (Country
Report, Suriname, 1987.1, p. 22).
Clearly, compliance has occurred without foreign
pressure.
In two states where there was improvement, Benin
and the

Philippines, the government did not suffer significant

pressure in regard to their human rights record.

While donor countries put pressure on Benin, most of the

concern other states showed had to do with economic policy
and Benin's links with Libya which the Department of State

condemned in 1988 (Country Report Benin, 1988.2,

p.

33).

Under Carter, the U.S. did vote against some loans and under
Reagan opposed IFI aid to Benin based in part on human rights
conditions.

In 1983, however, Benin was removed from the

list of leftist-ruled countries to whom the United States had

consistently sought to deny IFI loans
(Mower, 1987, p. 110).
There was some pressure from European
donor countries to
grant the August 29, 1988 amnesty
for those arrested for
alleged conspiracy against the government
but as in other
countries dependent on loans, the major
pressure

was to make

agreement for structural adjustments.
The Aquino government did not suffer
pressure because of
the renewal of torture. This was the
continuation of a

policy of ignoring human rights abuses in
the Philippines.
The Philippines enjoyed U.S. support for
most of the Marcos
period primarily because of security interests.
The Subic
Bay and Clark Airforce bases were an important
part of U.S.

defense strategy (Steinmetz, 1994,

p.

143).

There really was

no foreign pressure until the U.S. withdrew support
for

Marcos immediately before his ouster.

Carter did not stop

aid to the Philippines in 1977 when he denied it to

Argentina, Ethiopia and Uruguay (Mower, 1987, p. 106).

There

was, however, some opposition to loans to the Philippines.

Congress, during the first Reagan administration, adjusted

foreign assistance for human rights reasons but this was
fought by Reagan.

Between 1980 and 1983 aid to the

Philippines actually increased 23% (Forsythe, 1988,

p.

173)

The Reagan administration began to change its policy toward
the Philippines only after the murder of Benigno Aquino.

In

an attempt to distance the U.S. from the Marcos

administration, a planned visit by Reagan to the Philippines
in November was canceled.

The U.S. then withdrew its support

from the government but used
its influence to bring
down the
regime only after the massive
fraud of the 1986 election
(Steinmetz, 1994, pp. 175-176).

However when the new Aquino
government continued to torture
or perhaps even increase the
amount of torture practiced,
no
pressure was put on the government
to improve its human
rights record. The United States
had an interest in keeping
good relations with the Filipino
government for three
reasons. The U.S. could now point
to an ally that was a
democracy so it was not in its interest
to look any further.
There was also fear that the new
government was still
unstable and anti-governmental forces
could take advantage of
any pressure. The third reason was
that the U.S. was

interested in keeping its bases in the
Philippines.
Foreign Pressure on Torturers
Two states experiencing foreign pressure, Turkey
and El
Salvador continued to torture. One factor may be
the vast

difference in levels of foreign pressure between
states like
Chile, which suffered from world pariah status, and
those

like Turkey experiencing smaller conseguences

.

The reality

is that the pressure on these states has not been
consistent

or overwhelming.

However, as discussed above, there was also

inconsistent and low levels of pressure in improvers.

While

there were, as in many other states, more threats than actual
sanctions, there were, eventually, some real consequences for
El Salvador and Turkey.

The pressure was inconsistent but
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more serious than for states
coded as not receiving
foreign
pressure.
in the early eighties,
El Salvador was the focus
of much

human rights related attention.
The UN General Assembly
agreed to condemn the situation
of human rights and
fundamental liberties in El Salvador
at the end of 1983 and
the UNHRC named a special
representative for El Salvador.
Both the U.S. and Canada, while
reducing aid, looked for
excuses to reinstate it. In November
1980, the situation in
El Salvador had deteriorated
so badly that the Canadians
suspended bilateral aid. while it was
stated that the safety
of aid workers was the main reason,
improved human rights was
a condition for reinstating
aid. Four years later, Ottawa
restored official assistance, arguing
that this was justified
by improved conditions for human
rights

There had been conflict in the U.S. over
whether to
sanction El Salvador for human rights abuse.
The Reagan

administration wanted to continue aid because it
wanted the
leftist guerrillas defeated. The administration,
during the
worst abuses in El Salvador as in Argentina attempted
to

continue its support to these governments by claiming
that
things had gotten better^.

In December 1981, the U.S.

Congress enacted a law requiring presidential certification
that certain human rights conditions were being met in El

Salvador before U.S. military and economic aid to that

country could go forward.

The first such certification took

place on January 28, 1982.

Three subsequent certifications

were required at 180 day
intervals in order for u.s.
aid to
continue (America's Watch,
1985, p. 3).
Four times
certification occurred,
November 1983, the president
vetoed legislation adopted
by congress that would
have
extended the certification
requirement (Americas Watch,
1985,
P-3). So, at this time efforts by
Congress to pressure El
Salvador were all blocked by the
White House. However, the
congress continued to tie US
assistance for El Salvador

m

to

human rights without using
certification,

m

1984 it

withheld 30 percent of funds until
concerns were addressed
and started a new certification
process. But throughout this
period aid continued to increase
(Forsythe,
1988 p. 14

).

The United states did eventually
increase the pressure on
El Salvador after the murder of
six Jesuit priests on
November 16, 1989 (Country Report El
Salvador, 90.1, pp. 18However, diplomatic visits to the U.S.
at the end of
January, the arrest of army officers involved
in the murders
19).

and a more flexible stance on talks with
rebels all helped to
minimize the pressure the Bush administration
felt to exert

more pressure on El Salvador (Country Report El
Salvador,
1990.2, p. 20).

Bush was at this time proposing an increase

in military aid and a reduction in economic
assistance.

In

1990, bills before both the U.S. House and Senate called
for

cuts of at least 50 percent in U.S. aid to El Salvador. Bush

resisted the cuts but Secretary of State Baker had accepted
that a proportion of the aid would be made conditional on

continuing progress in the peace negotiations (Country Report

El Salvador, 1991.3,
pp. 18-19).

After a U.S. congressional
team visited El Salvador and
described investigations into
the murder of the six Jesuits
as at a virtual standstill.

Baker accepted that some aid
be linked to progress in
this
case,
in 1990, the House of
Representatives voted to cut the
military aid allocation for 1991
by half and to make its
disbursement conditional on an
improvement in the human
rights situation and progress
being made in the Jesuit murder
case. Germany also indicated
that its aid to El Salvador

would depend on the human rights
situation. On October 19,
90, the U.S. Senate confirmed the
House of Representatives
votes in May to withhold 50 per cent
of u.S. military aid to
El Salvador in 1991.
This would have amounted
to 42.5

million (Country Report El Salvador,
1990.4, p. 22-23).
While this aid was restored after guerrillas
shot down a U.S.
helicopter in January 1991. However, pressure
for the
government to improve human rights conditions
continued to
build after this period (Country Report El Salvador,
1991.1,
p.

26).

The pressure on Turkey came almost exclusively from

Western Europe and was limited by strategic concerns. Because
of its strategic importance and membership in NATO, Turkey

was a large recipient of foreign aid from both Europe and the

United States and throughout the period studied, remained one
of the largest recipients of foreign aid (Human Rights Watch

Arms Project, 1995, p. 30).

The United States, though

beginning in 1993 to acknowledge and criticize the extent of

torture and other forms of abuse,
continued to provide among
other forms of aid anti-terrorism
training to Turkish police
(Helsinki watch, 1992, p. 70,.
However, Turkey did receive
significant pressure from Western
Europe. Most of the
pressure came in the form of denial
of full membership in the
European Community. There was some
other lesser pressure put
on Turkey at various times.
Beginning in 1981, the European
Economic community withheld an aid
program to Turkey but the
really significant pressure came with
Turkey's formal
application for full membership in the
European Community.
Turkey failed in its attempt to move from
associate to full
member of the European community because
of both economic and
human rights reasons. Turkey formally
applied for membership
to the European Union in 1987 (Helsinki
Watch,
1987

,

p.

135

).

In the spring, the European Community
postponed a decision on

Turkey's bid for full community membership until
1992
(Country Report Turkey, 1991

.

1

,

p.

13

)

The European

commission cited among other things failure to satisfy

community human rights standards.

Since then the European

Union has repeatedly cited human rights problems as a barrier
to membership (Freedom House, 1991, p. 365).

The difference between those with foreign pressure who

improved and those that did not may be the presence of major
armed conflict.

The comparison shows that improved

compliance did not occur when there was major armed conflict.
The two states where torture has continued despite foreign

pressure both were experiencing major armed conflict.

Foreign pressure may provide
part of the context for
improvement but only
u-Ly in rne
the absence of major
armed conflict.

Conclusion
The most important indication
of the role of
democratization is that only in states
moving toward
democracy did the government reduce
torture. Armed conflict
in many cases distinguished those
states from other states
either moving toward or already
practicing democracy.
However this alone cannot explain why
no existing democracy
improved compliance: there were democracies
without armed
conflict practicing torture.
One of the strategies used in efforts
to improve human
rights has been to generate foreign
pressure. The QCA

analysis indicates that foreign pressure may
be important in
promoting compliance. The only configuration
in the positive
equation where NGOs with links were present was when
it was
in conjunction with the presence of foreign
pressure and the

absence of armed conflict.

However foreign pressure was also

part of the context leading to change in the absence of
NGO

activities.

This chapter has shown that NGOs could only have

been part of a process of change under particular
^^^^‘-^^^tance .

The next chapter will look at how limiting

these circumstances are.
^
For a discussion of changes in human rights policy between the
Carter and Reagan administrations see Rossiter, C. 1984 p.25

For a discussion of claims of improvements in El Salvador see
Managing the Facts: How the Administration Deals With Reports of Human
Rights Abuses In El Salvador pp 28-38 or Americas Watch 1985.
.
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CHAPTER

5

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

An analysis of states where
the government continued to
torture despite democracy or
transition to democracy shows
that greater success for the
human rights movements requires
more than the movement spreading
to and becoming increasingly
active in more states, while NGOs
with transnational links
may have been helpful in decreasing
the practice of torture
in the Philippines, Argentina and
Chile, lack of improvement
in other democratic or transitional
states indicates their
limited role. Even when human rights
groups
had

transnational links to other parts of the
human rights
movement, they were often unsuccessful in
pressuring
governments to change repressive practices.

The first part

of this chapter demonstrates that the lack
of progress in the

comparison states cannot in most cases be explained
by weaker
or newer human rights organizations.
The difference
between

successful cases of improved compliance and failed efforts
comes instead from the different contexts in which they

worked.

The QCA analysis presented in chapter four

highlighted this context.

The second part of this chapter

discusses how infrequently NGOs have operated under the more
favorable circumstances.

Many studies have concluded that the human rights movement
is most effective when the domestic organizations are able to
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form links with counterparts
abroad (Sikkink, 1993
Nemenzo, 1995, pp. 121-122;
Brysk, 1993, p.

p.

435

259; Clark,

p.

525; Garcia-Sayan

,

1992, p. 208).

activists and activists overseas

3^ce

,

1995

r

Links between local

important for local

human rights NGOs because they
allow them to exert pressure
on the international level and
to receive additional
resources and protection. Human
rights organizations should
be able to operate most freely
and have the greatest

opportunity to be part of the process
leading to greater
compliance in democracies or states in
transition to
democracy, if ngOs cannot have an impact
in these states, it
is unlikely they can have much of
an impact
in any state.

Yet this research has shown that there
has not been much
success even in democratic or transitional
states.
H uman—Right s NGOs in States that Improved

To further understand the possible importance
of human

rights organizations, it is important not just to
know

whether or not they were active at the time of changes
in
compliance but also to know the timelag between their initial
activities and improvement in government compliance. Coding
for the QCA analysis revealed that domestic and transnational

human rights organizations were active in only three of the
eight improvers before torture became less severe.

Table 5.1

shows the year each improving state was first coded as having

NGOs and the year those NGOs first developed links to

international or foreign counterparts.

It is sometimes

difficult to be precise to the year for when NGOs became

active or developed links,
but this is the best
estimate
given available resources.
This information reveals
both
Whether it is possible that
human rights organizations
were
factor in eliciting greater
compliance and whether

a

improvement is more likely after
human rights organizations
have been active for a certain
period of time. These

considerations are important when
evaluating their usefulness
and estimating the possibility
that the successes in some
states will be duplicated in others.
The majority of the states where
the government improved
compliance did not have actively
functioning human rights
communities prior to the improvement.
Table 5.1 reveals that
in only three -Argentina, Chile,
and the Philippines- could
these groups have been part of efforts to
bring about

government change, and that in each the local
NGOs had also
developed links with overseas NGOs, iGOs and
the

international media,

in addition, the NGOs were very active

for fairly long periods before the improvement
in state

practice; from

6

years in Argentina to 15 years in Chile.

While the earliest human rights organization in Argentina,
the Argentine League for Human Rights, was founded on

December 20 1937, domestic human rights organizations really
began operating in the mid 197 0s and became very
active by 1977.
Rights APDH
(

)

,

The Permanent Assembly for Human

the Relatives of Persons Detained-Disappeared

for Political Reasons, the Ecumenical Movement for Human

Rights (MEDH), the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the
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Association of Grandmothers of
the Plaza de Mayo were
all
formed between 1975 and 1977
The Mothers began
demonstrating in the Plaza de Mayo
in Buenos Aires, in
April
1977; on the 15th of October
1981 seven human rights
organizations held the first joint
demonstration in the Plaza
(Human Rights Internet, 1981
p. 75
.

).

Table 5.1

Date of Change in Factors for
Improvers
Impr
beg

Tran
beg

NGOs

83

82

77

90

90

Bolivia

82

Chile

NGOs
links

Lag
NGOs

Lag
links

80

6

3

90

no

0

_

82

*no

no

-

90

89

75

76

15

14

Ethiopia

92

91

93

no

0

_

Philippines

92

86

80

82

12

10

Suriname

90

91

90

no

0

_

Uruguay

85

85

*no

no

Argentina
Benin

*

Previously existing NGOs unable to continue functioning
during era or military rule
Impr beg - year improvement in compliance began
NGOs - year NGOs became active
NGOs links — year NGOs developed links
Tran beg - year transition began
Lag NGOs — number of years active before improvement
in compliance
Lag Links — number of years established before improvement
in compliance
-

Chile, like Argentina, had well developed human rights

organizations by the late 1970s.

New groups began forming in

1974, with the Association of
Relatives of the Detained-

Disappeared.

One of the most important was
the vicariate of
Solidarity, established in January
of 1976 under the auspices
of the Catholic Church (Dreifus,
1990, p.l62).
1978, the
autonomous Chilean Human Rights
Commission and the

m

Association of Relatives of Executed
Chileans were
established and Relatives of Persons
Executed for Political
Reasons first appeared publicly
(Human Rights Internet, 1981,
p.

197).

In 1983, the Plenary Assembly
of Human Rights

Entities was created and the Sebastian
Acevedo Movement
Against Torture was created to specifically
address the
systematic torture of military detainees
.

Domestic groups in Chile and Argentina were
able to make
connections with overseas groups and have their
reports

disseminated in Europe and North America.

These Argentine

and Chilean groups attracted enormous amounts of

international media attention and developed links outside
of
©s^rly on.

The Mothers became the focus of

international attention in 1978 when foreign journalists

arrived for the world cup games (Human Rights Internet, 1990,
p.

118).

The Grandmothers visited Canada in 1978, then

Western Europe and the United States. They filed petitions
with the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter

American Commission on Human Rights and in 1983, the
president of the Grandmothers addressed the UN General

Assembly (Human Rights Internet, 1990,

p.

114). Argentine

human rights activist Adolfo Perez Esquivel won the 1980

125

Nobel Peace Prize then went
on speaking tour of the
United
States. Support groups for
Argentinean human rights
organizations sprang up in Latin
America, North America and
Europe and Argentinean exiles
established branches in cities
around the world. The Committee
for Human Rights in
Argentina(CHRA) was organized in the
UK in 1977 (Human Rights
Internet, 1981).

Many external groups worked on
behalf of human rights in
Chile as well. Casa Chile, a foreign
human rights group, was
founded in 1981 and sponsored a "Boycott
Chile Goods"
campaign. The Chile Committee for Human
Rights, another
external group, was set up in January 1974
and was able to
complement the mobilization of political support
for human
rights in Chile (Human Rights Internet,
1990, p. 215).

The Philippines is the third state where
active groups had

extensive connections with outside media and international
groups before torture decreased.

The Philippines had one of

the most active human rights communities in the world even

under the repressive Marcos regime.

The Civil Liberties

Union of the Philippines (CLUP) was actually organized in 1938
but became very active under martial law (Human Rights

Internet, 1981).

Nemenzo (1995,

p.

112) noted that 'people's

diplomacy', the Philippine mass movement and NGOs efforts
were a large part of the human rights movement.

By 1989,

there were more than 80 human rights organizations in the

Philippines.

Groups like the Task Force Detainees of the

Philippines, established in January 1974 by the Association
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of Major Religious
Superiors of the Philippines,
were able to
produce printed publications
the 'micromedia' (Mondez,
,

p.

1988,

16-18).

Filipino groups established
links with groups abroad.
Groups in the Philippines
set up hotlines with the
foreign
media and established communications
with human rights
organizations abroad (Nemenzo,
1995). Many Filipinos living
abroad helped to start solidarity
groups. Local monitoring
groups channeled through them
news about human rights cases
for dissemination to the media
in their countries
of

residence.

Rosalinda Galong, a worker for the
Philippine
Human Rights Information Center
and the Task Force
Detainees writes of their success:

we had no problems. .getting the
attention
getting space in the international media. of and
Moreover, a broad network of human rights
and
solidarity organizations abroad.
relay (ed) the truth about the Philippine
human
rights situation to a global audience (Galanq
1996
^u.
.

.

p.

48

V

)

.

In July of 1988, an international lawyers'
forum, with the

participation of representatives of Asia Watch and several
other international organizations, was held in Manila to
call

attention to the wave of assassinations and harassment of
human rights attorneys in the Philippines (Human Rights
Watch, 1988, p. 138).
In two other states, Uruguay and Bolivia, human rights

organizations already existed and had begun to develop links
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in the early eighties, but
were unable to continue

functioning actively during periods
of military dictatorship.
This did not mean that human
rights activists had stopped
fighting the repression. As Luis
Perez of Uruguayan SERPAJ
wrote in a letter to other human
rights organizations:
moment... i continue working for
the
defense of human rights in my own
name. There is
not a decree that can impede
this conviction and
consequential action. 1 am worried
vacuum created by the prohibition of about the
SERPAJ (HRI
Reporter, Nov. 1983, p. 210).

Human rights organizations became active
in Bolivia in the
1970s. The Association of Relatives of
the Detained-

Disappeared and Martyrs for National Liberation
(ASOFAMD) was
founded in 1970 and the Comision Boliviana de
Justicia y Paz
in 1972 as an official human rights organization
of the

Catholic bishops in Bolivia.

However, their activities were

severely curtailed in the 1980s.

According to Human Rights

Internet, a U.S. -based organization disseminating information
for these organizations, "most Bolivian organizations which

were concerned with issues of human rights and social justice
were destroyed or forced to go underground, as

a

result of

July 17, 1980 military coup d'etat" (Human Rights Internet,

Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de

1981, p. 66).

Bolivia APDHB
(

)

was also unable to function; its offices were

closed by the military forces and Father Tumiri, its
president, was arrested with most of the other directors.
The majority of the leaders of The National Committee for the
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Defense of Democracy in Bolivia
which was founded in April
1980, were arrested during
an attack on July 17,
1980 by
paramilxtary forces (Human Rights
Internet, 1981, p. 66).

In Uruguay, NGOs were
established after 1980 but were
not
as active as in Argentina
or Chile.

The Mothers and

Relatives of Detained Disappeared
Uruguayans was formed in
this period, but they were
restricted in their attempts to
hold picket-lines and masses in
churches. Human Rights
internet reported in 1981 that the
severity of repression
prevented all of the local human
rights groups from
functioning openly in Uruguay at that
time (Human Rights
Internet, 1981, p. 79). There was
only one independent human
rights NGO really functioning in
1983, Servicio
Paz y

Justicia(SERPAJ)

,

the Uruguayan branch of the organization

founded in Argentina.

However it was closed in August 1983

after it publicly criticized the military
regime.

According

to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
“the closing of
SERPAJ in August 1983, eliminated the only fully
functioning

human rights organization in the country" (Lawyers
Committee,
1984

,

p.

6

)

.

Bolivian and Uruguayan human rights organizations were
not
able to maintain useful connections with the outside groups
at this time.

According to the International Commission of

Jurists, “although the situation of human rights was very

serious in Uruguay, comparable in all aspects to that of
Chile... it was much less well known at the international
level." (quoted in De Brito, 1993, p.583)
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Human Rights

internet stated in its 1981
directory that it was unable
to
provide information on groups
in Uruguay except to say
that
none were able to function openly
(p. 79) and could provide
information on only a few Bolivian
organizations that were
not currently functioning
(p. 66).
There were however some
overseas groups working for human
rights inside these
countries. CONADE Comite Nacional de
Defense de la Democracia
en Bolivia) was operating in Washington
DC. After the July
coup, offices affiliated to CONADE
were opened in many cities
in the Americas and in Western Europe.
(

In both these states human rights
organizations became

active again after the military government
lost power and
state repression was reduced under the new
civilian
government.

From this point, there were efforts to reduce

repressive practices even further, to solidify gains
so that
human rights abuses would not happen again, and to

press for

punishment of past abuses (Roniger and Sznajder,
1997,
64).

p.

In Bolivia, these groups include the Oficina de

Asistencia Humanitarian Relief Organization, the Civic
Committee for Law and Bolivian Assembly for Human Rights.
Uruguay, in September 1989, the National Coordinating

Committee of Organizations Defending Human Rights (CONADEHU)
was founded (Human Rights Internet 1990, p. 465).

Other

groups to become active after the change were the Human
Rights Commission of the Uruguayan Bar Association and the

Committee of Experts for the Prevention of Torture in the
Americas
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In

While hu^an rights
organizations in Bolivia and
Uruguay had
never functioned at the
level of those in the
Philippines
Argentina, or Chile, they
had started a process of
developing
an active human rights
community with links to
activists
abroad. Uruguay and Bolivia
at least had organizations
with
trarned activists who were
able to go abroad or underground
if they survived the
crackdown.

The other states where the
government improved compliance
had no history of local human
rights organizations, while
individual activists and political
groups raised human rights
issues, there were no actively
functioning human rights
organizations. They developed during
or after the transition
period.

When the opposition began to openly
challenge the
repressive government in Benin they did use
human rights
language and fight for greater human rights,
particularly
political rights. The human rights movement
worldwide had

clearly influenced the thinking of these
activists (Novicki,
1991, p. 41).

However, Benin did not have active human

rights groups working until after the democratization
process

began and torture had begun to decline.

Earlier efforts to

organize were put down by the government.

A human rights

organization called the Support Committee for Former
Political Prisoners existed briefly in 1984 until its leaders
were all arrested in 1984 on the way to a meeting with the

president (State Department, 1985,

p.

13).

The main

opposition to the president formally inaugurated the Benin
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Commission on Human Rights
on March 30 1990 to
push for a
new government. Saidou
Agbantou, Its president,
explained
their purposes;
We wanted to force tho
4.^
toward de^ocratizltfon
Tnltll
tights commission created hv
pushing the government along
from dic torLTnC°*
<AftifarL°po^t^! M^yTull

4

This was not a group that had
been struggling for greater
respect for human rights in
the period leading up to
the
Change. Newer groups that have
started since the change
rnclude the Association of
Christians against Torture and
the
League for the Defense of Human
Rights in Benin.
Ethiopia did not have active human
rights organizations
before the change occurred. Human
rights activists admit
today there was little done to monitor
or publicize the
horrors during the red terror of the
late 1970s (Ethiopia:
Red terror relived" 1994). The development
of a human rights

community began in the early 1990s with the
launching of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRC) in November
of 1991 and

the beginning of the Inter-African group
and Forum-84

.

By

1992 there were several new human rights
groups Including

Forum 84 and the Ethiopian human rights council
(State
Department, 1992, p. 1990).

While they began activity before

the decline in torture, these groups did not at that time

form part of an active local human rights community.
In 1985, according to an OAS report, there were no private

human rights groups in Suriname, although some individuals
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and groups such as the
Council o£ Christian Churches
were
addressing human rights issues
(OAS, 1985, p. 14).
By 1988,
the Council of Christian
Churches had become more
active in
human rights work by reporting
on violations by the military
(State Department, 1989,
p. 741).
On October 12th, 1987,
Moiwna '86 was officially
registered. This group was named
after a village where the military
massacred thirty-five
people, mostly women and children
in November 1986.
while it
was initially established just
to investigate the massacre.
It developed into a general human
rights group (Human Rights
Internet, 1990, p. 458). However its
work was greatly

reduced after its director Stanley Rensch
fled the country in
December of 1989 (State Department,
1990, p. 778).
Several
NCOS were working in 1990 but at reduced
levels of activity
because of threats. Stanley Rensch returned
to Suriname in
October 1990 despite new threats in order to
help Moiwana

continue its work (State Department, 1990,

p.

778).

By 1991,

they were more active and were operating much
more freely
than they had previously.

Although becoming active in 1991,

the human rights community in Suriname was still

significantly smaller and less active than those in Argentina
or Chile.

The situation in Suriname received some attention from

international groups like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, but
far less than accorded to Chile and Argentina.

There was

some awareness of what the domestic groups were undergoing
and support for their activities.

133

In 1988, Stanley Rensch,

director of Moiwana

'

86

,

was in Washington D.c.
at the

invitation of the state Department.

When he was arrested on
his return, -a sustained
barrage of international
outcries

from governments and human
rights organizations succeeding
in
gettrng him released after eleven
days" (Price, 1995 p.
,

446).

They had connections enough
to provide some
protection. However Surinamese
human rights organizations
were just becoming active and had
not at this time built up
©xtensive links with outside groups.
In sum, the human rights movement
could not have been a

direct influence on change in most of
the states that showed
real improvement. Five of these
states began
the

democratization process and moved toward
greater compliance
without the presence of an active human
rights community with
links to outside groups. Only in three was
it sufficiently
active beforehand to be a factor in the change.
Human Rights NGOs in Non ImprovGrs
A careful look at the period 1979

-

1993 shows there has

not been greater success in changing government
behavior as

more NGOs have come into existence throughout the world.

By

the end of the period studied, human rights NGOs had
spread
to every region in the world, although Africa and Asia were

behind other regions in the development of active human
rights communities.
It might be argued that the success in Argentina and Chile

stemmed from the size or maturity of the local human rights
movement.

The infrequency of success elsewhere might mean
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only that other human
rights organisations need
time to
develop more fully, yet an
examination of the democracies
or
states in transition where
the government continued
to
torture demonstrates that
frequent torture can occur
even
where there have been active
human rights communities
for

fairly long periods of time.

Table 5.2, showing the year

that NCOS began activity and
formed transnational links,
demonstrates that some non-improving
states have had active
NCOS with links to international
counterparts as long as in
those states where the government
increased compliance. Thus
the reasons for their lack of
success involve more than a
development process that would be
indicated by a time-lag.
By the end of the period studied,
most of the states
included in this survey of non-improvers
had active NGOs for
years and many of these domestic NGO
communities had links
with outside organizations, while in Turkey
and Venezuela
active human rights organizations had existed
for only a

short time before 1993, in most of the Latin
American

countries that did not improve the NGOs started
almost as
©arly as in Argentina and the Philippines.
While the level of activity varies in the comparison
states, several had human rights communities as active
as

those in Argentina and Chile.

El Salvadorian groups were

active throughout the eighties

.

Socorro Juridico

and Tutela Legal tabulated killings by government forces and
the paramilitary forces (Americas Watch, 1985, p. 39)

The

Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners,

13-S

Disappeared and Assassinated
of El Salvador -Honsenor
Romero" (CoMadres) began
documenting and publicizing
human
rights abuse in 1977. They
took over the Salvadoran Red
Cross Building and organized
hunger strikes
and

Date of Change in Factors for
NGOs

Links

Lag
NGOs

Bangladesh

80

84

13

9

Brazil

79

82

14

11

Colombia

79

86

14

7

Ecuador

82

no

11

-

El Salvador

78

84

15

9

India

86

87

7

6

Mexico

83

85

10

8

Pakistan

83

no

10

-

Peru

80

89

13

4

Sri Lanka

80

89

6

6

Turkey

87

87

12

-

Venezuela

81

no

Lag
Links

Lag NGOs - number of years active before 1993
Lag Links - number of years established before

demonstrations (Stephen, 1994,

p.

813).

In Mexico, by 1993

^ore than 50 local groups were affiliated with two national

networks (Mexico's Hottest Industry, 1993,

p.

16).

Human rights organizations became active in Venezuela,

Pakistan and Ecuador by the mid-eighties.
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Venezuela had

fewer human rights NGOs than
the other Latin American
states.
In Pakistan, before the
mid-eighties human rights
organizations were not particularly
active. The Human Rights
society of Pakistan was not
challenging government policy
in
any way (State Department,
1984).
Ecuador, attention was
initially focused on abuse in
other countries. This began
to
change in 1982, when among other
human rights activities, the
Catholic Church sponsored Ecumenical
Human Rights Commission
became more critical of government
policy and the Committee
of the Relatives and Friends of
Prisoners was formed. By
1988 NGOs had formed a national
network (Human Rights Watch,
1992, p. 210).

m

In many of the countries studied,
the individual

organizations not only became active during
the period
studied but also increased the amount of
coordination and

cooperation between groups,

in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian Front

for the Defense of Human Rights FEDHU) began
holding an
(

annual forum in the summer of 1983 when 65
organizations

participated in a two-day forum to discuss the human
rights
situation of Ecuador (Human Rights Internet, 9:3,
p.464).
1986, human rights organizations in Bangladesh formed an

experimental coordination council under the umbrella of the

Commission for Justice and Peace (CPJ) of the Catholic
Bishops

'

Conference of Bangladesh and the Society for the

Enforcement of Human Rights set up a resource center to
collect and disseminate information on human rights to the

locally-based Bangladeshi community (Human Rights Internet,
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in

9-3, p. 425).

in Mexico, the Comision
Para la Defense de Los
Derechos Humanos (CDDH published
the first issue of its
human
)

rrghts newsletter, Mlsiva. in
May 1988. Misiva was intended
to unify efforts in the struggle
for the defense of human
rights (Human Rights Internet,
1988,
p.

164).

The human rights movement has
not been able to operate as
actively in all countries or regions
of the world.
Turkey
had active human rights organizations
for the shortest period
of time.
Human Right organizations were
still, due to
government restrictions, unable to
function as actively as
those in the other states. Restrictions
have been severe and
human rights activists have tended to
work in one large

organization rather than many separate
organizations. They
could not operate at all after the 1980 military
takeover and
in 1983, Turkey passed an Associations
Law that meant it

would continue to be almost impossible for human
rights
workers to organize (Siesby, 1988).

There really was no

human rights community until the Human Rights

Association (HRA) received permission from the Ministry Of the
Interior to start operations in December 1986 (Human Rights
Watch, 1988, p. 192).

Since then, it has continued to

function despite severe harassment and abuse. Several
branches have been closed by the government at various times
but, by 1993, this organization had forty branches throughout

Turkey (Human Rights Watch, 1994,

p.

245).

A few other

groups were established in 1986, such as the Association of

Families of Convicts and Detainees (TAYAD) and the Association
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for the Defense of Hu.an
Rights in Turkey. This group
began

with 98 renowned intellectuals
who were pursued by military
prosecutors for signing a petition
addressed to the
president, demanding respect for
human rights (Human Right
Internet, 1987, p. 39)
C ircumstances o f Improved
Comp i

i

Since the amount of time that
these NGOs existed and the
quality of the human rights movement
cannot explain the
differences in compliance, the broader
context deserves
careful attention. One of the
factors, links with foreign
human rights organizations, was
present even in most of the
comparison states that did not improve
their compliance with
norms against torture, in only three
of the states where
torture was practiced frequently were the
domestic human
rights organizations not part of the
transnational human
rights network. Ecuadorian, Pakistani and
Venezuelan groups
had not by 1993 been able to take advantage
of the resources
of oversees groups.

The other two conditions, absence of armed conflict
and

presence of foreign pressure, have not been present as often
as transnational links.

As Table 5.3 shows, quite a few of

the democracies where governments use torture did not

fulfill even one of these conditions.
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Table 5.3

I

Foreign Pressure and Armed
Conflict in States with
Frequent Torture

I

!

state name

Bangladesh

Lack of Major
Armed Conflict
X

Brazil

X

Colombia

X

Ecuador

X

Lack of Minor
Armed Conflict

Foreign Pressure

X

X

El Salvador
X

India

Mexico

X

X

Pakistan
Peru
Sri Lanka

Turkey
X

Venezuela

X

X

X

Links

International human rights organizations, like governments,

often have only a certain amount of resources and must focus
on certain states

.

Because of this

,

organizations in some

states have not been able to draw the attention of

organizations outside of the country.

Venezuelan abuses have

received much less attention from INGOs than have abuses in
other states.

Human Rights Watch published its first report

on Venezuela in 1993, but more recently has said it will put
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more focus on Venezuela
(Human Rights Watch,
1994, pp. 135 .
136). However, throughout
the period studied links
between
states and transitional and
international organizations
increased.

New INGOs came into existence
and older ones
increased their capabilities, a
greater awareness of human
rights issues led to more support
groups.
Local organizations in the other
nine states have used
these links to attract foreign
attention, to help connect

them to foreign publics, governments
and IGOs and to attract
financial resources and training
(Weissbrodt, 1984, Rodley,

1992, Wiseberg 1991).

m

many countries one of the most

important tasks is protecting local human
rights workers.
Domestic NGOs make these connections not
only through INGOs
like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch but also
through foreign-based groups set up specifically
to address
the needs of a particular country, many of
which are founded
by exiles and emigrants
Two important groups working for the benefit of
Peruvian

rights were the Peru Campaign for Life and Peace
operated in
the U.S., an exile group, and the Peru Support Group which
was founded in 1989 by Peruvian professors concerned with

human rights and operated in the U.S. and London (Human
Rights Internet, 1990, pp. 442-443).

Info-Turk is a monthly

publication of political refugees in Belgium that has been
reporting extensively on human rights issues in Turkey and
since 1987, the Friends of Turkey a human rights group

founded by 170 politicians and intellectuals located in
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Pans, has been working toward greater
political rights
Turkey

{Info -Turk, 1987, p.

in

6)

The links developed by human
rights organizations in many
of these states are comparable to
those established
in

Argentina and Chile.

El Salvadorian groups were
particularly

active in developing these links.

The Co Madres was the

most active domestic Salvadoran group
in creating

transnational links,

in the 1980s, they traveled to
Europe,

Australia, Canada, U.S. and Latin America
(Stephens, 1994, p.
814).
Friends of El Salvador committees were
established in
U.S., Australia, Switzerland, Germany,
Mexico and Canada

beginning in the mid 1980s.

Other outside groups fighting

for human rights in El Salvador included the
Action Network

for Emergency Support 84 - El Salvador (USA) the
Comite De

Solidaridad Marti (USA), the El Salvador Committee For Human
Rights (UK) the National Labor Committee in Support Of

Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador (USA) and El
Rescate Human Rights Department (USA) founded in 1986 (Human
Rights Internet, 1990, pp. 291-292).
In Mexico, links with groups in the United States have been

particularly important.

Local activists established links

with U.S. activists working on issues on both sides of
border.

Some groups such as the Binational Center for Human

Rights work for the rights of those who live and work on and
across the border between the United States and Mexico (Human
Rights Internet, 1990).
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Outside groups have helped local
organizations by
publishing reports on the situation
abroad
and by

disseminating the materials the
local groups produce. The
major western group specializing
in disseminating information
is Human Rights Internet,
which abstracts information
provided by human rights organizations
for its Human Rights
internet Reporter. In many states
local human rights
activists have cooperated in the
production of fact-finding
missions and reports. The human
rights situation in Sri
Lanka was the object of numerous
reports and fact-finding
missions by non-governmental organizations
in the 1980s.

Local human rights groups were able
to form contacts with
overseas groups to draw attention to the
situation in Sri
Lanka.

One of these overseas groups was the
Chittagong Hill
Tracts Commission which is composed of a group
of European,

Canadian and Australian NGOs (State Department,
1992, pp.
.

In Bangladesh in 1984, both the Anti-Slavery

Society for Human Rights and Survival International
issued
reports on repression in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (C.H.T.
(Survival International, 1984).

Overseas groups not only disseminate information to those

outside the country but also assist in disseminating it even
to those inside by way of citizens abroad.

For instance,

India Alert (lA), founded in 1987 in the United States, helped
local Indian NGOs publicize their reports overseas (Web Page:
http:

/

/home. dti.net/foil/economy/ecolgy Zindalert.htm)

.

Two

of the most important foreign support groups for Brazil have
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been the Committee in Solidarity
with the Brazilian People
founded in 1972, and Brazil
Network, founded in 1987 to

disseminate human rights information
and put Brazilian NGOs
in contact with foreign
counterparts (Human Rights Internet
1990, pp. 184-185).
Local groups have also sought
out the help of iNGOs to
represent local groups and activists
to international bodies.
Local human rights lawyers in the
Latin American countries
studied worked with overseas groups
like Human Rights Watch
and the Center for Justice and
International Law to bring
cases before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights
(Human Rights Watch, 1994 pp. 88 &
131).

Many local human rights organizations
received financial
support from overseas. Human Rights
Information and
Documentation Service HURIDOCS for instance
held training
sessions in both Pakistan and the Philippines in
(

)

1988

covering computer networking and documentation.

Human rights

activists in most of these countries have had training
abroad.

Mexican activists received training on human rights

documentation and Bangladesh human rights activists and
tribal leaders went to the United States for training.
Groups in some of these countries received funding from the
Ford Foundation and other U.S. institutions and also from

groups in Europe and the U.S. set up specifically to address
human rights issues is a particular country (Welch, 1995, p.
223

)

.
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The local groups do not make
connections to foreign-based
ones without risk. Governments
often do everything they can
top these links. The most
drastic way for governments
to
fight human rights movements
is to imprison, torture
and kill
the leaders or even the rank
and file of these organizations.
For instance, between 1987 and
1990 Human Rights Watch
reported thirty human rights monitors
killed (State
Department, 1990, p. 557). Human
rights workers faced
particular danger in Brazil, Colombia
and Sri Lanka. Most of
them faced harassment, such as mail
being checked and wires
tapped. In some states human rights
organizations are made
Illegal. However, this strategy is less
likely to work in
democratic states.

Many times, much of the effort by oversees
activists has
been concentrated on simply helping to keep
local activists
alive, out of prison and functioning at some
level.

Human

Rights Watch considers protecting human rights
activists one
of its principal responsibilities (1992,
p. 27).

Three of

the four activists who founded the Human Rights
Commission of
El Salvador were killed in 1980 and the fourth in
1983

(Amnesty International newsletter xiii.5, p. 1).

Overseas

groups attempted in various ways to highlight the extreme

dangers that human rights monitors face and to try and

provide protection (see generally Wiseberg, 1991).

International and foreign human rights organizations have
tried to protect local activists in several ways.

strategy has been accompaniment or escorting.
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One

Peace Brigades

international was founded in
Canada in 1981 at an
international conference on
nonviolence for this purpose.
Human rights activists from
other countries, usually
Canada,
the U.S. or Western Europe,
have stayed at human rights
organizations and accompany activists
in their activities.
The Idea is that repressive
governments will be reluctant to
endanger the foreigners for fear
of provoking their home
countries (Mahony and Eguren,
1997, p. i).
the very least
the foreigners serve as witnesses
when there is abuse. Their
testimony can bring pressure to bear
on governments

persecuting local activists. Peace
Brigades International was
in Sri Lanka in 1989 and El
Salvador from
1987 to 1991.

The

first accompaniment in El Salvador
was by the Marin County
interfaith Task Force on Central America
at the request of
the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission
of El Salvador
CDHES (Mahony and Eguren, 1997, p. 155).
More recently, some
human rights and labor activists have tried
the idea of using
tourists to protect protesters. Places that
are commonly

visited by tourists are pamphleted and they are
encouraged to
go to mass rallies with the hope that their presence
will
provide some protection for the marchers (Wiseberg,
1991,
525)

p.

.

strategy that has become more widespread is the use of
human rights awards.

These are seen as good protection

because they draw media attention to activists and give them
some legitimacy.
in the U.S.

By 1981 at least ten awards were given out

(Human Rights Internet, 1982, p. 534).
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Two of

the main ones are the Robert

Kennedy award and the Reebok
award,
in 1984, the El Salvadoran
group COMA was the first
recipient of the Robert F.
Kennedy human rights award
(••Refugee's Arrest at DC Church
Incites Protests," Washington
Post, March 29, 1989, p. b
7
Human Rights Watch also gives
out human rights awards (Human
Rights Watch, 1992,
,

F.

.

p. 27).
in 1991, they honored Alirio
Pedrozan, a Colombian activist

Who was disappeared in 1990,
with an award designed to draw
attention to the dangers faced by
human rights monitors
There are also awards given by the
Council of Europe and
UNESCO.

Another strategy is to provide urgent
action networks, like
SOS Torture, that can be immediately
mobilized to draw
attention to the arrest or disappearance of
human rights
activists. These networks are needed to
quickly notify
people around the world that an activist has been

seized.

Initially this was done by telegram and fax but
now the
Internet is also a

channel for this information.

Human

rights activists want to get this information out
quickly

because the danger of torture and death is greatest in the
first few days.

In order to do this, these groups do not go

through the verification procedures that other groups like

Amnesty International do.
be true they act on it.

If they believe that a report may

This is obviously risky because

mistakes can and do occur.

Governments use these mistakes to

publicly question the legitimacy of the organization and the
entire human rights movement.

However these groups take what
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they know is a calculated risk
in order to save lives
(Wiseberg, 1991 p. 533)

Armed ConfliciSrnce many states using torture
have some form of armed
conflict, not to be successful in
this environment is a
serious handicap. Eight of the
thirteen constant torturers
had armed conflict, five major and
three minor. All five
states with major armed conflict were
regular torturers.
in the Southeast of Turkey, a
major insurgency has been
waged by the Marxist Kurdistan Labor Party
(PKK) since 1984.
TWO thousand people were killed in 1992
alone (Freedom House,
92/93). An urban guerrilla group Dev-Sol
(Revolutionary path)
operating in Istanbul, focused its attacks on
police and

government officials and killed at least fifteen
people in
1993 (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 243).

Sri Lanka has also been experiencing major armed
conflict
and has at various points almost stopped being a
functioning

democracy.

The Tamil insurgency, a separatist movement which

began in 1983 in the North, is a conflict between the Tamil

^i^ority and the Sinhalese majority resulting in heavy loss
of life(Freedom House 93/94, pp. 512-513).

Between June and

November of 1990, 578 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed, 673
civilians killed and by government estimates 2,000 Tigers

There were 320,000 civilians in refugee camps by the
end of that year (Country Report Sri Lanka, 1991.1, p. 7).

There have been efforts to end this conflict.

In 1987

,

Indian forces entered the country as a peacekeeping force and
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attempted to disarm the Tamil
Fighters. However, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
and some other separatist
groups opposed the peace accord
and continued violence
against the government and rival
Tamil groups. The Indian
force was withdrawn in March 1990
at the request of Sri
Lanka’s new president Ranasinghe
Premadasa. Fighting
continued at serious levels (Freedom
House 1990/91, p. 338).

There was civil war in El Salvador from
1979 until 1992. On
December 14, 1992, the last contingent of
FMLN guerrillas was
demobilized completing the process started
on June 30th
(Amnesty International Report 1993). while
the government of
president Alfredo Cristiani and the guerrillas
of the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
signed a

peace accord in January 1992 and a cease-fire in
the twelve
year civil war was reached in February, the fighting
was
lii^gsring at low levels in 1993 (Freedom House,
1993,
p

.

216).

India has through much of its independence experienced

major internal armed conflict.

Muslim and Hindu clashes were

particularly bad in 1992 and 1993.

In one week of July 1992

1,200 were killed and 5000 injured (Amnesty International

Report 1993, p. 154).

India had within its borders three

significant insurgencies: in Punjab, in the former Assam
Province, and in Kasmir.

Tens of thousands were killed in

separatist fighting (Freedom House 1990/91,

p.

196).

The

combination of conflicts leads to coding India as having
major armed conflict.
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,

The armed conflict in Peru was
quite severe at times.
Sendero Luminoso started guerrilla
warfare in Peru in 1980
and the Tupac Amaru Movement in
1984 (O.A.S., 1993, p.2-3).
Political violence in 1989 claimed
3,198 lives (Report of the
Peruvian Senate's Human Rights Commission).
Between 1980 and
July 1992, 24,250 people were killed
in political violence
(O.A.S., 1993 pp. 2-3) Despite the
arrest of Sendero chief
Abimael Guzman and other leader on September
12,

1992,

violence on both sides continued (Freedom
House 92/93, p.
410). Sendero and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement
(MRTA) both sought to control Peru's Upper
Huallaga

Valley.

On August 18, 1993, for instance, guerrillas
seized twelve

Ashaninka villages and killed at least

62

people (Human

Rights Watch, 1994, p. 128).

Three states were experiencing minor armed conflict in
1992-93:

Pakistan, Bangladesh and Colombia.

In 1990 in

Pakistan, there was intergroup violence in Karachi and

Hyderabad which had begun in 1986 (Country Report, Pakistan,
1990.1).

There were also violent clashes between the

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its coalition partner the

Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz(MQM) and between the MQM and the police
(Country Report Pakistan, 1990.2, p. 10).
For twenty years there was insurgency in the Chittagong

Hill Tracts of Bangladesh by the tribal group, the Shanti

Bahini.

Tension between settlers and the indigenous

population began in the 1950s with the building of a dam and
a huge reservoir.

Thousands of the indigenous population
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were dispossessed of their
land and received
inadequate
compensation when the reservoir
filled up. The situation
was
made worse by a government
policy of bringing non
indigenous
settlers into the area (Country
Report Bangladesh,
1992

p

1

11 ).

According to the Andean Commission
of Jurists-Colombian
Section, there were more than
4,300 political murders in
Colombia in 1992 (Kirk, 1993,
p. 664).
The M-19 guerrilla
movement signed a peace accord
with the Government

and became

a

political party in 1990.

m

1992, the talks between the

government and the Simon Bolivian
National Guerrilla
coordinating Board broke off after
a insurgents launched a
major offensive (Amnesty International
Report
1993, p. 96

)

and insurgency continued although
at lower levels than in
Peru

This IS not a suggestion that human
rights organizations do
not or should not attempt reform during
periods of major
armed conflict. Human Rights Watch points
out that they

continue to try and protect the rights of people
where there
is armed conflict (Human Rights Watch,
1993,
xxvii).
p.

one

way is by trying to generate foreign pressure.
Foreign Pressure
One of the goals of human rights organizations is to

generate domestic and foreign pressure on offending
governments.

Of course, there are differences among

organizations about whether generating foreign, in addition
to domestic pressure, is the way to achieve their objectives

and not all human rights
organizations attempt to generate
foreign pressure. Even while
struggling for a less

repressive government, they may
agree with their government
that there should not be outside
interference (Robinson,
1995, p. 371).

Human Rights Watch has emphasized
how the U.S. government
does or does not provide foreign
pressure to particular
states; each country entry in its
annual reports has a
section on U.S. foreign policy toward
that state, it has
been criticized for putting too much
emphasis on the U.S.'s
role in pressuring others and not enough
emphasis on working
thorough international organizations (Steiner,
1991 pp. 26-

27).

Human Rights Watch has more recently widened
its

criticism to look at pressure from other governments
as well.
Given the potential importance of foreign pressure
and the

ambivalent feelings of human rights activists, it is
important to explore the extent to which there has been
f*^teign pressure on governments that did not improve

compliance with norms against torture.

In Brazil, Colombia

and El Salvador, human rights organization became active in
the same period as they did in the states where compliance

increased.

However, in only one, El Salvador, was there any

serious foreign pressure to change human rights practice.

In

the other two neither the local nor the transnational human

rights movement was able to generate enough pressure on other
states to make them change their relations on the basis of

human rights abuse.
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An extensive literature
points out the problems and
inconsistencies of linking foreign
aid to recipient
governments' human rights records
(e.g., stokke 1995
Tomasevski, 1993). These
inconsistencies become clelr when
one looks at the way pressure
was applied or not applied in
the states studied here. Many
rights abusing governments
discussed here have been regularly
criticized by other states
using the language of human rights,
and have human right
conditions included in treaties and
loan agreements and
official statements and press releases.
However, as the
following discussion illustrates, we
often see condemnation,
or symbolic or very insignificant
sanctions but nothing more.
There was foreign pressure in Brazil in
the past, but no
pressure on the current government to come into
greater
,

compliance with international human rights norms.

U.S.

Military aid to Brazil was suspended in 1977 (Schoultz,
1981,
p. 264) over human rights, but aid recommenced
in 1988.
There has been condemnation of the Brazilian government’s
human rights policy but little action following from
it.

The

latest condemnation was in 1993, when the European parliament

approved a resolution condemning human rights violations by

Brazilian military police (Human Rights Watch, 1994,

p.

81).

The same pattern of talk but no action has been true for

Bangladesh. While countries have expressed concern over the

Chittagong Hill Tracts area, there have been no actions
following from the rhetoric.

In Bangladesh most pressure was
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on other aspects of good
governance (Kamaluddin, 1993,
p.
70)

.

conditions for loans may include
demands for restructuring
that can work against government
efforts to improve the human
rights situation. The 1993 drop in
aid had more to do with
Bangladesh's faltering privatization
program and
the

government's failing to implement promised
financial reforms^.
Tomasevski points out "Human rights
conditionality has... been
added as another layer to the existing
multiple

conditionality in aid which are not necessarily
compatible
with each other" (1993, xiii). Some activists
and
governments have argued that these other issues can
work at
cross purposes to human rights issues (Human Rights
Watch,

1992, p. 78).

The focus is on economic control with no real

concern for human rights, although some allusion to human
rights is now included in most discussions of good

governance
The U.S. has refrained from putting any real pressure on
the issue of human rights abuse in Colombia because the

government has given the drug war high priority (Kirk, 1993
664).

U.S. pressure on Latin American states to cooperate in

the annihilation of drug production and export may contribute
to repressive acts by the military and police.

In 1993

,

the

United States Congress did, for the first time, place

Colombia on the list of states subject to special human
rights conditions for the disbursement of aid (Human Rights
Watch, 1994

,

p.

88

)

154

Pakistan was one of the states
that continued to receive
military aid despite bad human
rights conditions. Security
affairs came before any concerns
about human rights abuse.
Because of the Afghani war, the
u.s. and Pakistan become
Closer in the 1980s. in 1981, the
U.S. concluded a six-year
military and economic aid agreement
in spite of reports

that
the Pakistani government was
mistreating political prisoners.
This action ignored Section 620E of
the Foreign Assistance
act, which stipulated that aid be
used "to promote the

expeditious restoration of full civil
liberties and
representative government in Pakistan." Reagan

administration officials defended U.S. policy
saying that the
Asian subcontinent was too complicated for the
U.S. to

understand.

They said that the U.S. government was not

qualified to dispute Zia's definition of the situation

without ever explaining in what way it was more complicated
than Latin American countries where pressure had been
applied
(Americas Watch, 1984, p. 90).

in 1989, foreign aid was at

record levels amounting to $2.6 billion (Country Report
Pakistan, 1990.1, p. 19).

When in early October 1990, the

U.S. suspended all military and all new economic aid to the

country, it was acting under the terms of its nuclear non-

proliferation legislation not because of human rights abuse
(Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 173).

The United States government was more interested in the

economic benefits of NAFTA than with human rights abuse in

Mexico (Bryant, 1993, pp. 232-233; Human Rights Watch, 1994,
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pp.

18

19).

There was some expectation that
NAFTA

negotiations would be held up because
of pressure on the U.S.
government but no real pressure occurred.
There was some
debate in the U.S. about the Mexican
human rights record
during NAFTA negotiations. Economic
concerns took priority
over human rights. As in many other
cases, those opposed to
sanctions pointed out that greater
cooperation might allow
friendly diplomacy and improved human
rights practices. u.S.
officials took the position that membership
in NAFTA would
improve human rights in Mexico3. John Shattuck,
the Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights, Democracy
and Labor, at
a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, claimed

that adoption of the trade agreement would enhance
human

rights in Mexico (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p.
119).

There

was however during the time studied no concrete pressure.

The human rights situation in Peru provoked much debate and

little action.

In the early 1990s there was a struggle

between Congress and the administration over funding to
Peru.

Conditions were placed on U.S. funding to Peru in

1991, with Congress eliminating $10 million in assistance

that had been allocated to the Peruvian army (Human Rights
Watch, 1992, p. 318).

There was a small amount of pressure

at the end of the period studied in Peru but it was temporary

and aimed at assuring democratic elections not overall human

rights practice.

When President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the Peruvian
congress on April

5,

1992, there were temporary
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repercussions.

The Bush administration suspended
all new aid
and approximately $25 million in
economic aid and 15 million
in milrtary aid that had been
appropriated but not disbursed
from fiscal year 1991, because
members of Congress believed
that Peru had not yet complied with
human rights conditions
mandated by law. The U.S. froze commercial
military sales to
Peru and pulled out all green beret
trainers working with
Peruvian anti-narcotics police but did
not suspend police aid
worth $19 million a year (Americas Watch,
1993, p. 45 ). with
the exception of Japan, which reinstated
a $53 million credit
on July 31 other countries did the same as
the U.S. However,
foreign governments eased the pressure very
quickly, in June
a World Bank loan for $400 million was
approved,

in

September, the U.S. was actively supporting an
Interamerican

Development bank loan it had opposed just after the April
coup.
In February 1993, the Clinton administration set conditions

for its giving support through the Support Group of donor

countries.

The Peruvian government agreed to the conditions,

including having a dialogue with Peruvian human rights

organizations (Human Rights Watch, 1994,

p.

130).

The

lengthy argument about Peru may have been one reason less

attention was paid to Colombia, Ecuador or Venezuela.
Economic reasons and ideological reasons have both

contributed to the impunity with which the Venezuelan
government has committed abuse.

The U.S. government gave

Venezuela significant military sales and security assistance
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funds into the 1990s.

This state has been regarded
as an

important U.s. ally in the hemisphere
because of stable
civilian governments and willingness
to sell oil to the u.s.
(Human Rights Watch, 1994,
pp.

134-135).

Economic reasons were also important
in U.s. policy towards
Ecuador. President Febres Cordero,
who was elected in 1984,
maintained a positive image with the
international banking
and business community until his last
year in office. Reagan
refused to criticize Cordero's human
rights record publicly.
U.S. foreign aid grew throughout the
Hurtado and Cordero
years reaching nearly 60 million in
1986 (State Department,
1986, p. 488).

Human rights abuse in Sri Lanka also provoked
debate and
little action. Norway and Canada began reviewing
their aid
to Sri Lanka in the eighties.

Beginning in 1989, Canada

became more critical of the Sri Lankan government's
human
rights record and stated that it was less willing to
maintain
a large aid program.

However, overall aid did not decrease

at this time (Gillies, 1992, pp. 51-52).

supporting loans to Sri Lanka.

The U.S. continued

In 1991 Western aid had

totaled a record $1,000 million despite criticism from
Canada, Germany and the U.S. (Country Report Sri Lanka,.
1992.1. p. 10).

In February 1992, the Paris aid group, of

which the United States is a member, pledged a total of $825
million in financial support and did not explicitly link
future aid to progress in fulfilling human rights

recommendations (Human Rights Watch, 1993,
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p.

188). On June

18,

1993, the Sri Lanka Aid Group
gave a 15 million dollar
increase for 1994 (Country
Report Sri Lanka, 1992.2,
p 9 ,.

Even when local human rights
groups are active and linked
to foreign human rights
organizations, they are often
unable
to inspire foreign pressure
Relationships between local and
international groups are not without
problems. Even the most
active human rights organization
have difficulties that may
not be relieved and may even be
aggravated by relations with
foreign-based and international NGOs
if a local
.

organization is funded too heavily from
abroad it can become
dependent on these funds for survival.
Being dependent on
these funds can lead to control by the
funding group
(Ambrose, 1995, p. Ill; Welch, 1995,
p. 224).

it may also

make them vulnerable to new government
measures.

Some

governments have either prohibited local groups
from

accepting money from foreign sources or have severely
restricted their ability to do so (Robinson,
1995,
Rodley, 1992, p. 206).

p.

369;

This has heavily affected development

organizations, environmental groups and human rights

organizations.

Another problem is that local human rights

NGOs can lose legitimacy with the population as a whole if

they are seen as too closely connected with outside

organizations (Steiner, 1989,

p.

70).

The links established

between local and international organizations can be used to

characterize international human rights groups as interfering
outsiders.

Because this sentiment often exists anyway, and

many local human rights movement themselves have ambivalent
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feelings towards the international
groups, this is not an
impossible task. The goal is
to have the transnational
human
rights movement and any looal
organizations having strong
ties to outside groups lose
legitimacy with local people.
The existence of armed conflict
increases opportunities
for the government to discredit
human rights activists by
trying to associate them with
enemies of the state:
guerrillas when there is internal
armed conflict, or
terrorists and subversives when there
is not.
For instance,
in Colombia, General Ramon Emilio
Gil Bermudez, Commander of
the military forces described the
activities of a Colombian
human rights monitor as part of an
international campaign
waged by guerrillas (Human Rights Watch,
1994, p. 8).

While there is no easy way for human rights
activists to
prove that they are working independently from
any political
group, two factors contribute to making the
governments
accusations more plausible.

The first is that human rights

organizations have traditionally worked to alleviate human
rights abuses inflicted by government officials.

They have

relied heavily on definitions of human rights as what people
possess that cannot be violated by governments.

Some

organizations have seen their role as protecting the rights
of people from government abuse and have therefore focused

on that rather than on any abuses that other armed groups

may inflict.

Steiner writes that before the 1980s NGOs

almost uniformly considered abuse by nongovernmental groups

outside the scope of human rights law (Steiner, 1991,
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p.

58).

The second reason is that
opposition groups, including
violent ones, sometimes try to
associate themselves with
human rights movements. There
is some overlap in the
goals
of opposition groups and human
rights activists, while

certainly the means and stated goals
are different they
often use the same broad language of
liberation and human
rights-i.

Thus the very success of the human
rights movement
in influencing the terms of political
debate has created
difficulty for activists.

These accusations by governments, along
with a desire to
stop abuse by any group that effectively
controls the lives
of people, even if that group is acting
in response to
injustice, have led NGOs to widen the scope of
their

activities since the early 1980s.

Amnesty International

expanded its mandate in relation to opposition groups
in
1991:

P®thaps the most far-reaching decision taken in
Yokohama was to expand Amnesty International's
mandate in relation to abuses committed by
opposition groups. Amnesty International has for
many years condemned the torture or killing of
prisoners held by opposition groups. It will now
additionally oppose other deliberate and arbitrary
killings and hostage-taking by armed political
opposition groups (Amnesty International Report
1992, p. 13).

Many activists and organizations began to address the abuses

perpetrated by the rebel movements see for example: Human
(

Rights Watch, 1994, p .xxvii; Amnesty International, Annual
Report, 1992, pp. 66-71).

This will make the local human
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rights movement look more
impartial and help to counter
government accusations

There can also be great tension
between local human rights
organizations and international
organizations. Local
activists sometimes feel that they
are patronized by Western
groups and that they are not
consulted before action is taken
so they end up working at cross
purposes. They often accuse
INGOs of only being around during
crisis, addressing only
short term problems and not being
available for the long run
(Steiner, 1991, p. 27)

Generating any pressure against democratic
or transitional
governments is particularly difficult,
if a government
begins a transition to democracy, foreign
pressure often
ceases no matter how abusive the new
government may be. The
new administration is seen as an improvement
and there is
fear that any pressure will destablilize it.
Foreign

governments want to be able to claim a foreign
policy success
and further investigations are against their
political
interests.

This tendency was mentioned in the last chapter

in discussing why improvement can only occur up
to a certain

point but it also may mean in some of the worst cases of

torture that improvement will not occur at all.
However, these problems are no different than the ones

experienced by human rights organizations in those states
where there was success in changing government behavior.
crucial difference seems to be the level of abuse.

Human

rights issues only make it onto the foreign policy agenda
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One

when the worst levels of
abuse get the most
international
attention. Argentina and
Chile had in common that
they were
among the worst abusers,
where the government practices
severe repression, it can
become extremely dangerous
for
local human rights activists
to function, when they
are able
to functron, however, they
are more likely to attract
international attention. The
international media and foreign
populations and governments are
less interested when states
are abusing at lower levels,
in those states where the
human
rights movement was active and abuse
was reduced to what is a
more common level of human rights
abuse the improvements did
not continue. Attention is not
focused on lesser levels of
abuse. The kind of international
pressure that leads to
change is not sustained when there are
no longer
vast,

obvious human rights abuses.
The Argentine and Chilean governments
engaged in

disappearances and mass killings along with torturing
systematically,

in a world where there are so many

governments abusing it takes killings along with other
human
rights abuse to get serious human rights pressure. A
state

where torture is severe but not accompanied by mass

disappearances does not provoke as much or as intense public
outrage.

If a government quietly goes about torturing

without killing at a massive level then it may still gets

criticism from lOs and NGOs but this will not lead to the
kind of public attention abroad that causes governments to

apply real sanctions.
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Conclusion

Chile and Argentina, if they
are examples of successes
of
the human rights movement,
are not signs that the movement
is
gaining in power and acquiring
increased influence over
governments' practice. My findings
show that even if one can
demonstrate that human rights NGOs
were important in a few
cases, it is because of particular
circumstances that have
not been often repeated. That
is not to say that these
organizations were not important in saving
the lives of or
improving the prison conditions of
certain individuals or to
deny that they may have changed the
terms of the human rights
debate. Clearly, they have done both.
However, there is not
evidence that they can effect state behavior
in anything
Other than very limited circumstances
One might argue that these human rights
movements still
need more time to have further impact on states
that have

moved to multiparty democracy and where the
government has

lessened the amount of torture it uses,

it is possible that

states where there has been some improvement will
now have

greater human rights activity and be able in the future to
be
in total compliance with international norms against
torture.

However, the experience of those states that have had active

human rights organizations for many years does not point to a

trajectory of greater improvement in state practice as time
goes on.

There have been NGOs for a long time in Argentina,

Chile and the Philippines.

It took a large amount of

financial assistance and time for these states to achieve
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some level of compliance
and human rights organizations
have
found it very difficult to
pressure the government to
the
same extent they did before.
The first opening should
allow
them to function more freely
and have the greater access
necessary to garner public support
and influence policy.
However, even in Argentina, which
is held up as a state
that
had a really exemplary NGO system
and network, they were not
able to bring about total compliance.
After an initial sharp
decline, torture actually increased
somewhat, not anywhere
near the level it had reached under
the military government,
but still far from total compliancG.

After the worst is over, human rights
groups have new
difficulties continuing their work as actively
and

effectively as they did when the government
was more
repressive. The greatest abuse can often be
ended by a new
government that ceases a practice of deliberate
systematic
torture. However to arrive at and to stay at
very low levels
to torture requires deeper structural and cultural
changes.

While NGOs certainly are aware of this, they have
difficulty

getting these issues addressed.

When the worst abuse stops,

there is less domestic support.

Often, as was the case in

Argentina, people see the crisis as over and want to get back
to normalcy.

This desire can cause resentment towards groups

that once enjoyed wide support.

Roberto Garreton Merino, who

was the national legal director of the Vicariate of

Solidarity in Chile, has discussed this difficulty for human
rights organizations
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the population (quoted in
Dreifus, 1990, p.

Human rights workers have reported
similar problems in the
Philippines (Galang, 1996, pp. 49-50;

Nemenzo, 1995, p. 123

).

Human rights activists also have
more trouble drawing
international media attention and foreign
pressure,

in a

crisis many domestic and overseas
groups can work together
but afterwards rifts are likely to
develop. The interests of
first and third world NGOs are most
likely to be the same
when local groups are focusing on urgent
rather than long
term issues. International human rights
organizations often
turn away when the worst is over and redirect
their attention
to other crises. This problem was discussed
by local human
rights activists at a retreat sponsored by the
Harvard Human
Rights Program:
in the transition period, all these international
groups drew back. .Then we lost touch with those
organizations. That's terrible for us because
there is a kind of central decision, that when a
country starts a new process, there is no longer
any need for international action and support
(Steiner, 1991, p. 51)
.

Bolivia and Uruguay are examples of states where NGOs only
began to operate freely after the ouster of the military and

therefore states where one might expect to see further
improvement.

Yet even in them there has not been a steady
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path to compliance.

As in the states where
NGOs had been
®P®J^ating all along, initial
improvement tended to be sharp
and then stagnated.

Human rights organizations
have lobbied for the
establishment of government
structures to make sure that
the
worst abuses could not happen
again. Such offices do not
seem able to deal with the
smaller scale abuses that have
happened under civilian governments.
Human rights groups
also tend to focus on punishing
the acts of previous
governments by fighting immunity laws.
The idea is that
officials should see that following
orders is not an excuse
for the kind of abuse that occurred
under the military
governments. But again this focuses
attention on the massive
disappearances that occurred in the past and
away from the
lower levels of torture and brutality that
are the current
reality. Human rights organizations have
been struggling

with these issues as well but doing so with
less support from
the population in general and less attention
and support from
abroad

^This group grew out of an act by Acevedo who set himself
on
fire to try and gain freedom for his children.
It held
its first
demonstration in September of 1983, in front of a secret Chilean
Secret Police(CNI) detention center. The group followed this
with
other demonstrations intended to expose torture centers. Members
also
held vigils and demonstrations in front of the Ministry of Justice
and
other government buildings Wiseberg et al 19 p. 207).
(

pp.

.

For a discussion of conditionality in Bangladesh see:Hossain.
250-271

167

North
obligation to
in

AfrIS®

protect,
"pLtaor

th.
Cooperation which includes
an
enhance, and enforce basic
workers' rights."

instance Welch- 3 1995
,

168

)

discussion of opposition
groups

CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSION

Between 1979 and 1993, the human
rights movement spread,
new organizations formed, many
of those in existence became
larger and more active, and links
among national, and
regional and international NGOs
increased. There was also a
great increase in awareness of human
rights
issues and the

invocation of human rights ideals by
governments, activists,
IGOs and insurgents. Yet this new
rhetoric has not been
matched by an overall improvement in the
way
humans are

treated by their governments or much change
in the extent of
torture. There was improvement in compliance
with

international norms against torture in only eight
states.
Some moved from frequent torture to only torturing
sometimes
while others moved from that level to where torture
was

practiced never or only occasionally.

Yet in none of the six

states where torture had been practiced frequently was
total

compliance sustained.
Even this modest amount of improved compliance is

noteworthy given that human rights involves
compliance.

a

hard case for

This is a traditionally domestic issue where the

lack of incentive to cooperate, the absence of inter-state

damage caused by violation, the nonreciprocal character of
human rights treaties, and the difficulty in demonstrating

government responsibility for some human rights abuse make
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compliance with human rights
norms much different
and more
difficult than cooperation
in other issue areas.
Sources of Compl

1

Domestic Factors
The QCA analysis used
in this study provides
another way
to examine some of the
factors presented in the
statistical
and case studies as promoting
or hindering compliance.
These
studies have emphasized the
importance of domestic factors
on
government respect for personal
integrity rights (Henderson,
1991, 1993; McKinlay and Cohan
1975; Mitchell and McCormick,
1988; Park, 1987; Poe and Tate,
1994).

Both the cross-national study
presented in chapter three,
and the analysis of selected
governments' behavior in
chapters four and five, present
evidence of the importance of
type of political regime. Previous
studies have demonstrated
that democracies torture less than
non democracies. This was
confirmed in analysis of state compliance
from 1979 to 1993
which showed that only states moving
towards democracy
,

improved compliance.

However, all of these states had new

governments; no established democratic government
that used
torture improved its compliance in the period
studied.
Certainly, the observation that all the improvers
were headed
toward democracy lends support to the argument that
democracy
is important in lessening state repression.

However, the

fact that established democracies did not improve their

compliance demonstrates that democracy is not sufficient;
democracies are not necessarily open to the human rights
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movement's efforts to
increase compliance with
human rights
norms

This study also demonstrated
that in many cases the
presence or absence of armed
conflict distinguished

democracies or states in
transition that complied from
those
that did not. However, the
QCA analysis reveals that
while
there was never compliance
during periods of major armed
conflict, minor armed conflict
is not by itself sufficient
to
understand why some democracies
improved compliance and
Others did not.
While this study confirmed the
importance of type of
government and the level of armed
conflict it also
demonstrated that examining them in
isolation misses an
important part of the picture of
compliance. Domestic
factors alone do a poor job of explaining
state behavior.
This study thus elucidated the contexts
under which states in
transition or democracies improved their
compliance and the
circumstances under which minor armed conflict
might be
overcome

International Regimes
It IS clear that membership in one of the
human rights

regimes addressing torture does not help to define
the
context.

Human rights activists and scholars have looked to

greater codification of human rights and to wider

participation in the specific multilateral human rights
conventions to increase respect for these rights.

While

governments have engaged in some level of cooperation on

171

issues Of human rights by
creating and signing
conventions,
there is no evidence that
this membership has changed
their
behavior. Conway Henderson
(1988) argued that human
rights
conventions were not affecting
state behavior. This study
Shows that five years later,
there was little evidence
of
change in the area of torture.
The three conventions
against
torture have not been a major
influence to increase

compliance in member states.

Many of the states where there

was improved compliance were not
members of the UN or
regional regime until after they had
already improved
compliance, while many states that
joined have continued to
torture at high levels. There is no
indication that states
such as China and Turkey joined the
UNCAT with any

expectation that actual compliance would be
required. To
sign on to these conventions did not
constitute a costly
policy because there was no expectation that
the norms would
be enforced. Signing carried no more risk
of sanction or
disgrace in the international community because
when a state
receives pressure from other states it is regardless
of

whether the target state is a member of conventions
banning
the practice of torture.

Foreign Pressure
The analysis in chapter four showed the importance of

foreign pressure in providing the context in which states

improved compliance with norms banning torture.

Minor armed

conflict was present in a configuration with a positive
outcome improved compliance) only when there was foreign
(
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pressure,

addition, the only situation
where NGOs with
irnks to the international
hu^an rights movement were
part of
an equation with a positive
outcome was when there was
foreign pressure. Further,
when local NGOs were active
but
there was no foreign pressure
compliance did not improve
whether or not those NGOs had
links and whether or not
there
was minor armed conflict.
However, the chapter five
analysis
of the states that tortured
widely demonstrated that
foreign
pressure was not applied very
frequently; only two of those
state received significant
foreign pressure. Foreign
pressure cannot be the solution to
human rights abuse if
states are not using it.

Some scholars studying compliance
with international
obligations have focused not just on
sanctions or specific
pressure but also on the importance of
reputation. As Oran
Young has written, "A reputation for
trustworthiness is one
of the most valuable assets that any
member of international
society can acquire" (1989, p. 75). Human
Rights Watch bases
some of its strategy on the belief that
reputation matters.
We try to stigmatize abusive governments by
publicizing their conduct so governments realize
that they will have to call a halt to human rights
violation if they wish to regain their
international reputation (Human Rights Watch, 1992

p.

21

f

)

The analysis here suggests that concern for reputation
is
not great enough to elicit full compliance with human right
norms.

Rather, it gives credence to the argument that total

compliance with international norms is not expected only non
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compliance within established
boundaries.

Joshua Goldstein
has argued that Irag^s
invasion oi Kuwait was
xmmoral for going ..peyond
the normal amount of
cheating that
states get away with.when it comes to human
rights, it
appears that the amount of
acceptable cheating

U994,

p.

is quite

large.

Human rights are violated
so frequently that
only the very
worst offenders like Chile
are considered pariah.
Violating
norms against torture is
unlikely to affect treaty
negotiations in other issue areas
except in the most
egregious cases when torture is
combined with massive
disappearances or killings, in
their broad study of
compliance, Chayes and Chayes
(1993, p. 197) observe that
even parties committed to human
rights have different
expectations about compliance with
human rights treaties than
with other regulatory treaties.
This study confirms this
'

conclusion when it comes to norms
against torture. Human
rights norms are not taken as seriously
as many other norms.
NGOs

Many observers have emphasized the
importance of local
human rights activists in efforts to secure
compliance.
Recently, they have received attention not
only for their
direct impact on government behavior but also
for their
hypothesized impact on international relations.

NGOs are

seen to be important in their efforts to call
attention to
the existence of human rights norms, to promote
those norms,
to conduct fact-finding, and to pressure for
implementation
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(Brysk, 1994; Sikkink,
1993; WisebergsscoblG,
1976; Steiner,
1991).

This research focused
specifically on one particular
kind
of threat to personal
integrity. The sole focus was
on
whether the government in each
state reduced its use of
torture. I did not explore
whether governments decreased
other forms of human rights
repression, nor did I focus on
other ways that human rights
organizations may have had an
impact. However, this research
can nonetheless contribute to
a broader discussion of the
role of human rights NGOs in
increasing respect for human rights.
The right to be free
from torture has been such a central
focus of so much NGO
work that it is not unreasonable to
use progress in

eliminating torture as one measure of the
work of these
organizations
The exploration provided in this study of
circumstances

under which some governments in states that
are democracies
or in transition to democracy reduced the
amount of torture

practiced and others did not yields insight into
whether
human rights organizations could have made any
difference.
It has shown that NGOs could only have been part
of a process

of change under very limited circumstance.

They have to this

point had, at best, only very limited success in what would

seem to be their main task, changing state practice.
Civil Society
Some analysts argue that NGOs influence government

behavior through their activities not only in domestic civil
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societies but in an emerging
global civil society.
Human
rights and environmental
organizations are conceptualized
by
some as -new social movements-.
These are defined by
Lorraine Elliott ,1994, p.
223) as organizations that
-speak
not for themselves, but in
the interests of broader
social
values."
Together these organizations are
supposed to be
creating a global civil society
that can effect state
behavior. Gordon Christenson
(1997, p. 33), provides a
typical example of their claims in
writing that civil
society:
stands apart from the dominion of
and international regimes. World sovereign states
civil society is
made up of individuals and groups
in
association without regard to their voluntary
identities as
particular country, and outside the
DolitTc^^LH"^^
political
and public dominion of the community
of
nations. The voluntary associations of
this world
civil society include religious organizations,
private business organizations, the information
and
news media, educational and research
organizations
and nongovernmental organizations.

Many scholars, focusing on environmental and
human rights
issues write of the existence of a global civil
society
(Wapner, 1995;

MacDonald, 1997;

Falk, 1987; Christenson, 1997; Otto, 1996;

Lipchutz and Mayer, 1997; Walzer, 1995).

Diane Otto argues that:
The growth of international civil society is both
reflected and bolstered by the ground swell of NGO
participation in international conferences. It has
introduced a new dynamic of embryonic participatory
democracy to the global community and to the shaping of
international law (p. 120).

While NGOs are often excluded from the official multilateral

negotiation and policy review processes, these scholars argue
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that they make a significant
impact with their actions
at
parallel conferences or
counter-conferences or in their
informal influence at these
conferences (e.g.,

Falk, 1987 p.

187; Claude and Davis, 1996).

This study provides additional
evidence that transnational
links have been established in
the issue area of human
rights. All twelve states where
torture was practiced
frequently had active NGOs by the
end of the period studied.
In nine of these twelve states,
the domestic human rights

organizations were part of the transnational
human rights
network. Local organizations in these
states have, through
these connections, generated foreign
attention, disseminated
their information to foreign publics,
governments
and IGOs,

receive financial resources and training,
worked to influence
the policy of transnational organizations
and received
some

measure of protection for local human rights
workers
There is greater communication between organizations
from
states and they have gained greater influence in

international communication and interaction.

It is important

that NGO have helped establish norms and that these norms
may
have altered the language of state actors and their

interactions, but the establishment of these links can only
be successful, only mean something significant, if there is

change in governments' practice.

While it is clear that the

links exist, it is not clear that they are having a

significant impact on most governments' human rights
practice.
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Chang e in Language
some analysts have claimed
that the success of the human
rights movement can be
partially measured in terms of
change
in statements made by
governments rather than just in
concrete improvements in state
practice
(Waltz, 1991

Sikkink, 1993; Brysk, 1993).

;

The human rights movement has

helped to shape the discourse of
states and the change in
language, it is claimed, indicates
the existence of a
universally accepted norm and a changed
attitude towards
sovereignty that may lead to a change
in behavior.

Governments have become more willing to
acknowledge that they
do have an obligation to improve their
compliance with norms
against torture.
Clearly, language has changed.

Governments answer

accusations that torture is practiced in their
state by
denying the charges altogether, denying that the
problem is
as serious as their critics claim, asserting
that they
are

making a genuine effort to change the behavior of
officials,

claiming improvement has occurred and greater compliance
will
be forthcoming and by making counter accusations
against any

foreign government that accuses them.

For instance, in 1991

President Fujimori acknowledged human rights violations by

Peruvian security forces but called them occasional excesses
(Amnesty International Report 1992, p. 213).

Prime Minister

Turgut Ozal in an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal

(advertising section May 26, 1987) denied that there was any
torture in Oru prisons.

The distinction between challenging
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the norm and challenging
the accnracy of the accusation
is an
important one. Denying that
the abuse is occurring or
claiming that progress is being
made is implicitly
acknowledging that the norm exists.
Questioning the accuracy
of the accusation and the
motives of those making accusations
of abuse is not the same as
questioning the norm. John
Ruggie has pointed out that this
trend is not universal:

[Cjertain governments accused of
such violations
have gone to considerable lengths
to deny or
excuse their behavior, thereby
implicitly acceptinq
^
the legitimacy of the very rights
they have been
abusing, but other have largely
ignorL externa?
criticism and condemnation (1983,
p. 100).

Scholars and human rights activists both
claim that by
accepting the existence of a norm against
torture governments
are demonstrating a changed understanding
of sovereignty.
By

accepting an international obligation to refrain
from

torturing its citizens, a government is in fact
agreeing to
limits on its sovereignty.
The view of scholars like Sikkink

(

1993, p. 141) that

acceptance of human rights doctrine is a powerful critique of

sovereignty can also be seen in the statements of human
rights activists

.

Groups like Human Rights Watch have

claimed that there has been a very serious change in the way

sovereignty is viewed within the international system.
The tired formula that the way governments treat
their own citizens is an internal affair, not the
appropriate subject of international discussion,
lost resonance even among the governments most
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scrutiny

w«S!^"992?

(Human Rights

Thus, as Human Rights Watch
continues:

^

(1992, p.

2

^

global neighborhood

)

Yet many governments make
clear that efforts by other
governments to do anything about
violations of human rights
norms
even just drawing attention
to them
are an

-

-

unacceptable challenge to their
sovereignty.

The Indian

Government, for instance, has strongly
asserted the
prohibition of interference in internal
affairs and rejects
human rights conditionality on loans
and aid as a violation
of state sovereignty (Tomasevski,
1993

,

p.

11 ).

Many governments also manifest clear
hostility towards
representations of NGOs, ingOs or iGOs who
investigate and
report on human rights abuse. Turkish State
Minister Ayvaz
Gokdemir, referring to three female members
of the European
Parliament who were visiting Turkey in May 1995 for
talks on
human rights and a proposed customs union with the
European
Union, stated:

We are not going to release these traitors for the
sake of the prostitutes of Europe who have come to
us I do not even know as what. May God have mercy
on us and save us from these coalition partners
guoted in European parliament press release, June
14, 1995).
(
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It is possible that the
change in the language of
governments is a reflection of
a change in attitude
that will

lead to more compliance but
changed language is not a
sure
indicator greater compliance
will occur. Rather than
being a
step toward compliance, a
change in language might be
undertaken to cover continuing
torture. Ruggie argues that
universal rhetorical adoption
of human rights terms
''obscures
rather than signifies any meaningful
international normative
change (1983, p. 99). Just changing
one's language may in
fact be enough to quiet international
pressure. Governments
may not feel any need to then
conform their behavior to their
words. Amnesty International points
out that the Turkish
government was claiming that the walls
of its police stations
would be "made of glass" at the same time
as deaths from
torture were rising in 1992 (Amnesty
International Report
1993, p. 4). President Collor stated in 1990 "We
cannot and

will not again be a country cited as violent
in reports by
Amnesty International... We will not allow the

'new Brazil'

to accept any form of disrespect for human rights"
(Amnesty

International Report, 1991, p. 3).

Governments have grown more sophisticated in their

treatment of human rights issues. Many have hired public
relations firms to make their defense against accusations of
human rights abuse (Schoultz, 1981, p. 52-53, 65).

The

Center for Public Integrity identified ten U.S. foreign aid
recipients which are serious human rights abusers and spent
$24 million on lobbying, legal representation and public
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relations in the US in 1991 and
1992 (Brogan, 1992). As
Wiseberg points out (p. 531)
governments now produce reports
using all the appropriate
international human rights
language and symbolism" at the same
time they follow policies
of human rights abuse.

Changes in Foreign Poliny
NGOs have had some success at changing
the foreign policy
of states providing aid to other
states. Siklcin)c argues that
there was a "fundamental shift in the
perception of long-term
national interests" and that NGOs were
"influential in

introducing human rights ideas and reinforcing
human rights
policies" (1993, p. 140). Thakur (1994,
p. 153) points out
that this occurred in the 1970s when NGOs began
to act as
"systemic modifiers of state behavior."

Donnelly (1996, p.

391) argues that the conflict between human rights and

national security "has been substantially reduced".

Rather

than only looking to the traditional economic and security
interests of the state, some governments have begun to make
human rights considerations part of their policy making
process.

Many governments began to use the language of human

rights and to occasionally put sanctions on states that were

considered to be rights violating.

In this period some

governments have made human rights considerations an explicit
part of their foreign policy.

This policy effects their

decisions on bilateral and multilateral trade, foreign aid to

developing nations and more general diplomatic relations.
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However the actual change in
donor governments has been
modest. AS discussed in
chapter four, only two of
the worst
torturers received any
significant foreign pressure
and it
was hardly of the scope
applied against Chile or South
Africa, only in the worst
circumstances have human rights
considerations had serious impact
on decision making,
other cases, human rights are
brought up when these concerns
were congruent with other
interests. Otherwise human
rights
practice was often dealt with in
only the most superficial
way. For example, as discussed
in Chapter five, there was
condemnation of the Brazilian and
Bangladeshi government's
human rights policy but little
action following from it.
Bangladesh most pressure was on other
aspects of good
governance, in Colombia, the drug war
had higher priority.
Security affairs came before any concerns
about human rights
abuse in Pakistan, and the United States
government was more
interested in the economic benefits of NAFTA
than with human
rights abuse in Mexico.
in some cases it seems that

m

m

states

merely have a new language to use when pursuing
state
interest.

Thus, in reality, human rights organizations
may

not have influenced state practice by changing
the way

foreign policy is practiced to any great extent.

Though even inconsistent and weak pressure is a significant

departure from previous practice, arguments that this change
is the beginning of a wider change in how foreign policy is

practiced are difficult to sustain.

The situations in which

governments have actually let the human rights practice of
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aid recipients influence
their foreign policy decisions
are
so constrained that the
impact of hu.an rights
organizations
on foreign policy has to
be rated as real but very
limited.
It is questionable whether
new pressures have influenced
states to act against their
immediate material self-interest
rn more than a few instances
The examples of governments
giving human rights serious weight
in policy decisions are
the exception to the rule,
occurring in very particular
circumstances. There have been and
probably will continue to
be occasions when serious pressure
is applied but there is no
evidence that this is the wave of
the future.
.

The true way to measure the success
of these movements, to
see whether changes in language and
state foreign policy are
an important step on the way towards
a decrease in human

rights abuse is to assess how much success
they may have had
in changing government behavior.
In terms of how they have
actually reduced human rights abuse there are
claims about
improvement in individual cases, improvement in a
few states
and about more widespread impact and improvement.
Impact on Individuals
NGOs can also claim success in affecting the fates of

individuals in states where torture continued or even
increased.

Human rights NGOs clearly have been able to

alleviate suffering in more than the eight states that were
identified in chapter three as improvers.

In fact, saving

identifiable persons is a tangible goal of many NGOs. Amnesty
International reports often give names, ages and professions
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of people being abused and
direct campaigns towards their
release (see Amnesty International
Yearly Reports), while it
difficult to ascertain the impact that
NGOs have had in the
release of a particular prisoner or
in alleviating the

severity of torture that a prisoner
suffers, most observers
and participants agree that there
have been effects. Amnesty
will not itself claim that it was
responsible for any
particular improvement (Amnesty International,
World Wide
Web, http://www.amnestyusa.org/about/history.html);
however

prisoners have reported that when the letters
from Amnesty

International increased their conditions get better.

Those

who become the focus of international attention,
in many
cases, fare better than the ordinary detainee.

Chapter three, Stanly

As noted in

Rensch, director of Moiwana '86 was

released in 1988 from a Surinamese prison after an

international outcry made by Human Rights iNGOs and foreign
governments
This phenomenon is also noted by Robert
1

)

who writes

F.

Drinan

(

1994, p

:

I personally witnessed the impact of an "urgent
action message" from Amnesty. In the 1980s I was
on a human rights mission in Chile immediately
before Pinochet was removed from office by a
democratic election. The government in Santiago
had just imprisoned and sentenced to interior
exile a prominent physician because he had stated
openly that the government was engaged in
torturing political dissidents. Within a day
Amnesty had alerted over fifty nations to launch a
protest. The ambassadors of these nations In Chile
brought intense pressure on the Pinochet
government to release this political prisoner.
Within seventy-two hours the outspoken doctor was
back with his family.

—
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This kind of publicity, and
at times even that which
is
limited to national media, can
stop someone from being

tortured or shorten the amount
of time they suffer.
Another way that human rights
organizations have had an
impact is by making secret
practices public. They have
reduced the ability of governments
to abuse in silence.
Secret detention centers are made
public, the cases of those
who were meant to disappear quietly
are publicized, graves
are exhumed and stories told.
One of the most important
functions of human rights organizations
has been to provide
information. To a great extent, the
knowledge of abusive
practices on which iGOs and foreign government
base policy
decisions comes from the work of these
organizations.
The

media also often relies on this information.

This

information is important not only because it may
be a
necessary first step in the process of changing
state
behavior but also because it is important to victims
and
their families.

Many victims have expressed as one of their

primary goals the desire to let the abuse be known.

This is

particularly true when family members have been disappeared.
Some argue that there is a problem with focusing on the

tangible satisfactions of differences in the lives of
individuals because it draw attention away from things that
are more import for a whole people or a society.

However,

given the current state of human rights in the world,

analysts and activists are being most realistic when they
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base their claims on
this sort of success.
Rosenau claims that:

For instance,

dimension

ofgLLrordefthrouXwh‘'“F°"°*°^
rights is preserved

(1992^''p!' 5/6°'!'"'^''”

Cases of Improvement
My analysis does confirm
that in some states torture
was
used less in 1993 than earlier.
The human rights movements
have been part of a process
of change in Argentina,
Chile and
the Philippine. In Uruguay
and Bolivia, NGOs were
operating
before a military crackdown but
ceased to operate under
military dictatorships. However
the impact of their initial
existence and continued work cannot
be discounted. The
drastic improvements in government
practice in Argentina and
Chile have given hope to the movement
and provided material
to scholars looking to demonstrate
the usefulness of nonstate actors. The improvement in another
state held up as an

example of human rights success, the Philippines,
is much
less impressive.
However, it has not yet been demonstrated that
these

improvements are, rather than exceptional cases, the
first
successes of a movement that can have widespread impact.
This dissertation has shown that these are virtually
the only

cases where domestic NGOs could have had an impact on

improvements with norms against torture.
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As discussed in

chapter five, as the movement
has spread there has not
been a
spread of greater compliance
with international norms
against
torture, in most states with
active NGOs, human rights
activists continue operating,
working to save lives and
reduce suffering without having
had and broader impact on
the
level of torture practiced in
the country.
The pattern of improvement in
the period studied suggests
that the efforts of human rights
NGOs to end the practice of
torture can be successful where
there is a broader movement
toward democratization. Torture
was reduced significantly
only when the repressive government
lost power and a
democratization process was undertaken.
There was no
significant reduction in torture in states
where the same
government continued to run the state. While
a transition
did not guarantee that governments will
stop torturing, such
a change in government does provide a
necessary window of

opportunity
The comparison undertaken in chapter four
between states

where the government improved compliance and the
group of
states in democracy or in transition to democracy where
the

government continued to torture shows that activists cannot
always take advantage of this window of opportunity.

Human

rights groups have been present during a change toward

greater compliance when there is no armed conflict or when
armed conflict is declining and when there is a significant

amount of foreign pressure on the offending government.

discussed in chapter four, these circumstances are not
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As

common,

indeed most governments that
are torturing
extensively are engaged in domestic
armed conflict and are
rarely subjected to any serious
sustained pressure.
Therefore it does not seem likely
that the cases of

improvement will be widely duplicated.
Human rights NGOs have been most
likely to gain allies,
both domestic and transnational,
when the government abuse is
of the most extreme nature. Foreign
pressure is unlikely in
other circumstances. When there is
extreme abuse, not only
torture but also widespread killing or
disappearance,

activists can more easily obtain and
maintain the attention
of INGOs, foreign governments and the
media.

Governments can

torture at medium or even extreme levels as
long as they do
not also engage in disappearances and
killings. One reason
may be that torture is not as final and not as
easily proven.
Forms of torture have changed in many places,
particularly in
the late eighties and early nineties.

While the methods and

practices of torture vary widely from region to region and

even from state to state, many torturers now use methods that
are very difficult to document.

Implements such as plastic

bags and hard-boiled eggs are ordinary objects whose presence

can be explained away and their use leaves either no marks or
marks that disappear after a few days.

Claims of Greater Improvement

Steady improvement in only eight of the states studied in
the 1979-1993 period does challenge the most pessimistic

claims that governments are unlikely to improve their
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compliance with international
norms on human rights.
Though
the improvement is modest,
it should be remembered
that human
rights issues constitute
"least likely" cases of
compliance,
some governments do not
regard improved compliance
with human
rights norms as in their interest
because it limits
the means

they can employ for remaining
in power,

m

addition, there

is little reciprocity among
governments because one

government’s violation of its own
people’s human rights does
not directly impinge on the
material interests of other
governments. So far, only a few
governments have come
(either on their own or via pressure
by their own publics) to
regard human rights violations as a
significant
issue in

inter-state relations.

The net result is a "culture of
non

compliance" where even significant levels
of human rights
violations are ignored, if not actually condoned.
At the same time, the modest level of
improvement

challenges the more ambitious claims about the
broader
importance of these movements in influencing government
practice.

Ann Marie Clark, for instance, claims that:

[human rights and environmental] NGOs foster the
creation of an international public consensus on
principles of human rights and the environment that
tends to impel responsive states to adhere to new
legal and behavioral norms 1995 508
(

,

)

Yet the amount of attention devoted in the literature to only
a very few cases makes one wonder how large the pool of

"responsive states" Clark describes actually is.

When

activists and scholars do discuss cases they only point to a
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very few cases that are to
demonstrate the first fruits
of
network labor. One repeatedly
comes across reference to
Chile, Argentina and, to a
lesser extent, the Philippines.
These are indeed cases of
improvement, but there is of yet
no
evidence that they are harbingers
of a wider trend. This
dissertation has shown that when it
comes to international
norms against torture it appears
that the pool of improvers
is small.

Neither is it clear that the modest
success can be regarded
as the result of insufficient time
for NGOs to bring about
compliance. As argued in chapter four,
the success rate of
human rights organizations in many states
that have had such

organizations for a long time does not lead to
great
confidence that greater improvement follows from
more years
of existence. The trajectory of state
practice does
not

reflect an improvement over time,

in addition, the pattern

in those states where there was improvement shows
that this

improvement is not always the initial movement that leads to
eventual compliance.

As discussed in chapter three, even in

Argentina NGOs were not able to successfully pressure for
total compliance.

After an initial steep decline, torture

actually revived somewhat.

In Uruguay and Bolivia, total

compliance was achieved for a few years but was not
sustained.
NGQ Goals

Some who write of human rights organizations find it

unacceptable to measure their success by whether there has
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been a reduction in repression.

Welch argues that it is not

the responsibility of human
rights organizations to
correct
massive abuse. Their task is
to document, publicize and
press for change but solutions
are the responsibility of
the
government (1995, p.
n 2285).
Brett argues that “to blame
them
for failures is no more
reasonable as does not take account
of what they are actually trying
to do: to influence
l

attitudes, not govern the world"

(

1995

,

p.

no)

It IS undoubtedly true that
human rights organizations
cannot be blamed for continued abuse.
However, given the

time that has passed since the
beginning of the human rights
movement and the claims of the political
and social impact of
NGO activities, it is important to
focus on when and under
what circumstances these organizations
were part of a change
in government practice, other measurements
of the impact of

human rights organizations such as changes in
foreign policy
of aid-providing states and changes in state
language are

important to the degree they lead to reduction in human
rights abuse.

However, if the main goal of human rights

organizations, the reduction of human rights abuse, is not

achieved one may have to look to other strategies.
The fate of citizens still remains at the mercies of

governments as influenced by the domestic and international
context, particularly the domestic regime type and the level
of internal armed conflict.

However, the comparison of

improvers to democratic or transitional non-improvers shows
that these broad factors do not fully determine the outcome.
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Governments have choice about
whether, how, and how often
to
use torture. Thus, an
effort to apply social science
knowledge to the improvement
of compliance with
international
norms against torture should
proceed along two parallel
lines. The first should focus,
as this study has, on
identifying configurations of
international level and
domestic level conditions that
are most and least often
Identified with improved compliance
and seek to identify
mechanisms for changing those
conditions. The second should
focus on government motivations
for using torture and seek to
identify ways that government interest
in using it can
be

reduced even in periods of armed conflict.

Research that

took up this second line would benefit
NGOs, IGOs and
governments seeking to improve human rights
compliance around
the world by revealing why some governments
persist in the
use of torture and suggesting where efforts
to alter such
governments perceptions and incentives would be
most
•

effective.
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APPENDIX
CASE IDS FOR CHAPTER
THREE TRUTH TABLES
Variable Names by Column
major armed conflict
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
democracy
high income
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE

- MA
- MI
- DE
- HI
- TR
- CO

Case IDs for table 3.1
M M D H T C
A I E I R O
0

1

0

0

0

0

tajkistan

™
Iraq

=>

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

C =>

0

0

1

0

0

C =>

0

0

0

0

C =>

0

1

0

0

0

C =>

0

0

1

1

0

C

0

0

0

1

1

C

=:

djibouti =0

sierra leone =0
sudan =0
=0 a,erbaydzhan =0
lebanon =0
oroaria -u
-I georgia =0
albania =0 namibia =0 cote
d'ivoir=0 C.A R =0
burkinafaso -0 armenia =0 bulgaria
=0
nepal =0 paraguay =0 romania
=0
togo =0
mauritania -0 thailand
=0
Zambia
=o
nigeria -0 malawi =0 guinea =0
maoedonia =1 ghana
Kazakhstan -1 Kyrgyzstan =1
tanzania =1 fiji =i
-1 Slovak =1 Ukraine =1
capeverL =1
latvia
comoros =1 benin
=1 Surinam =1
mail II
0

botswana =0 Honduras =0 jamaica =0
ecuador =0 guyana =0 domincan re =0
bolivia =0 el Salvador =0 pakistan =0
gambia =1 sao tome =1 st vincent =1
grenada =1 dominica =1 western samo=l
soloman
isla-1 micronesia =1 marshall isl=l
Kiribati =1
costa rica =1 belize =1
Cuba —0 guinea-bissa=0 Swaziland =0
equatorial q=0
bhutan =0 iran =0 syria =0 china =0
Haiti =0
lordan =0 morocco =0 yemen =0 tunisia =0
Zimbabwe =1 Uzbekistan =1 Vietnam =1 tonga =1
maldives =1 lesotho =1
algeria —0 burma =0 chad =0 indonesia =0
mozambique =0
egypt =0 zaire =0
Uganda
=0
laos =1 madagascar =1
argentine =0 greece =0 mauritius =0 portugal =0
italy =0 Cyprus =0 brazil =0 chile =0
mexico =0 Uruguay =0 Venezuela =0
malta =1 denmark =1 finland =1 norway =1
Sweden =1 Iceland =1 australia =1 Canada =1
newzealand =1 antigua =1 france =1
germany =1 netherlands =1 luxembourg =1
Switzerland =1 austria =1 belgium =1 Ireland =1
san merino =1 bahamas =1
japan =1 trinidad&tob=l
Singapore =1 st lucia =1 st kitts =1 barbados =1
malaysia =1
Hungary =0
estonia =1
slovenia =1
.

0

=0
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M M D H T C
I E I R 0
0 0 0 1 0 C =>

A

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

=>
=>

1

0

1

0

0

0

=>

0
0

=>
=>

kuwait =0 saudia arabi=0
belarus =0 gabon =0
taiwan =0 Libya =0
bahrain =1 oman =1 qatar
-1
united arab =1
brunei
=i
Seychelles =1 hong-kong
=1
turkmenistan=l
nicaragua
=0
Philippines -0 Colombia =0
ethioni?.
ethiopia -n
-0 moldova =0
congo =0 kenva =0
c^eroon =0 russia
=0
bangladesh

4

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

Senegal =0 guatemala =0
turkey =0
papua new gu=0 India =0
sri lanka
=0
Israel =0 spain =0
united kingd=0
south africa =0

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE

MA
MI
DE
HI

TR
CO

Case IDs for table 3.2
M M D H T C
I E I R 0

A
0

0

0

0

1

C =>

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1 =>
C =>

0

0

1

1

0

C =>

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

albania =0 bulgaria =0
romania = 1 Czech
—1
poland
=1
Slovak =1
Ukraine = 1 Latvia =1
lithuani a =1 macedonia =1
hungary =0
estonia
=1
Slovenia
=1
Portugal
=0
italy =0 Cyprus =0
f ranee
=1
germany =1 netherlands =1
Luxembourg =1 Switzerland =1 greece =1 malta
denmark = 1 finland =1 norway =1 Sweden =1
belgium = 1 i^®l^nd —1 san marine =1 iceland
austria = 1
belarus = 0
=0
bosnia
Croatia =0
=0
russia
moldova =0
=0
Spain
united kingd=0
turkey
=0
=

=

195

MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
democracy
high income
transition
COMPLIANCE

- MA
- MI
- DE
- HI
- TR
- CO

Case IDs for table 3.3
M M D H T C
I E I R O

A
0

0

C =>

0

0

1

0

0 =>
C =>

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

=>
=>
c =>

1

0

1

0

0

0

0
0

=>

honduras -0 jamaica =0
grenada =0 guyana =0
dominica
=0
ecuador
=0
bolivia
=0
el Salvador
=0
domincan re =0
costa rica
=
i
belize
= 1 St. Vincent
=1
Cuba
-0
haiti
=0
argentina
=0 brazil
=0
chile= 0 mexic= 0
Uruguay =0 venezuala
=0
Canada =1 antigua =1 bahamas
= 1
=1
st lucia =1
Ici-M-cs —IK
St
^
^ Kitts
1 barados
nir';= r;^ rrn a
—
nicaragua
-0n
Colombia
=0
peru =0
Paraguay
=0
panama
=1
Surinam
=1
guatemala
5

t

Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
MILITARY
REGIME
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE

i

MA
MI
ST
DE
HI

ML
RE
TR
CO

Case IDs for table 3.4

MMSDHMRTC
aiteilero
101000100
101000110
oooooooic

=>
=>
=>

afghanistan =0 peru =0
Cambodia =0
~0
namibia =0 cote d ivoir =0
C.A.R =0 burkinafaso =0
lithuania =1 mongolia =1 macedonia =1
ghana =1 kazakhstan =1 kyrgyzstan =1
tanzania =1 fiji =1 mali =1
botswana =0 honduras =0 jamaica =0
gambia =1 sao tome =1 st. vincent =1
grenada =1 dominica =1 western samo=l
soloman isla=l micronesia =1 marshall isl=l
=1
kiribati
'

00010000C=>
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mmsdhmrtc
aiteilero
ooooooooc
011001100
100000010
100000000
00111010c

=>

Cuba -0 guinea-bissa =0
equatorial g =0

Swaziland =0
=1

=>
=>
=>
=>

001000110 =>
001100101 =>
00011010C=>

tajkistan =0 djibouti =0
argentina =0 greeoe =0

c^t^rica

v™ia-T'"=°

tonga =1

lihf^ri a -n

=“

=0 Paraguay ,0

Mexico =0

Uruguay =0

australia =1 Canada =1 new
Zealand =1
antigua -1 france =1 germany
=1

=
0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

c =>

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

=>
=>

0

0

0

0

111

0

0

10

0

1

1

0

0

0

c =>

0

110

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0 =>
c =>

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

c =>

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

c =>

ooioooooc=>
0010000lc=>
001100000 =>
100000100 =>
000001010 =>
00000100C=>
010001000 =>
01000000C=>
010000010 =>
000000100 =>
100100100 =>
100000110 =>
010100000 =>
010000100 =>
010000110 =>

1

Switzerland =1

=1
hujga^;
estonia =1 slovenia =1
bahamas =1 japan =1 trinidad&tobago
=1
Singapore =1 st lucia =1 st
kitts =1
barbados —1 malaysia =1
kuwait^=0 saudia arabi=0
bahrain =1 oman =1
qatar -1 united arab =1 brunei =1
bangladesh =0
belarus
=0
Seychelles =1
ecuador =0 guyana =0 domincan
re =0
belize =1

romania =0 togo =0 czech =1 poland =1
Slovak =1 Ukraine =1 capeverde =1
latvia =1
panama =1 benin =1 Surinam =1
bhutan =0 iran =0
maldives
=1
mauritania =0 thailand =0 Zambia =0
comoros =1
bolivia =0 el Salvador =0 pakistan =0
bosnia =0 burundi =0
nigeria =0 malawi =0
Syria =0
lesotho =1
burma =0
chad =0 indonesia =0 mozambique =0
laos =1 madagascar =1
moldova =0 congo =0 kenya =0 ethiopia =0
niger =0
china =0
Senegal =0 guatemala =0 turkey =0
Croatia =0
nicaragua =0
egypt =0 zaire =0
Cameroon =0 russia =0
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010100100
00001000c
100100000
000001110
001001000
101000000
010110100
001000100
001010100
100001000
010010000
101100000
101001000
010001100
011110100

=>
=>

—0
colombia =0
gabon =0 taiwan =0
hong-kong =1 turkmenistan =1
papua new gu=0 India =0
guinea =0
haiti =0
iraq =0
israel =0 spain =0
Jordan =0 morocco =0 yemen =0
libya =0
sierra leone=0
south africa=0
sri lanka
=0
Sudan
=o
Uganda
=o
united kingd=0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
DEMOCRACY
HIGH INCOME
TRANSITION
REGIME
COMPLIANCE

-

tunisia =0

MA
MI
ST
DE
HI

TR
RE

CO

IDs for table 3.5
M M s D H T R c
A I T E I R E 0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

=>
=>
0 =>
c =>

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

c =>

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

o

II

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

=>

1

0

=>

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0
1

=>
A

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

o

II

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

o

II

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

=>

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

o

II

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

=>

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

o

II

A
V
A
V

albania = 0
lithuani a =1 macedonia =1
bulgaria
0
hungary =0
estonia = 1 Slovenia =1
Portugal = 0 italy =0 Cyprus =0
france = 1 germany =1 netherlands =1
luxembourg = 1
Switzerland =1 austria =1 belgium =1 ireland
san marino = 1
greece = 1 malta =1 denmark =1 finland =1
norway = 1 Sweden =1 iceland =1
belarus =0
romania = 1 Czech =1 Poland =1 Slovak =1
ukrain = 1 latvia =1
bosnia =0
Croatia =0
russia =0
=0
Spain
turkey =0
united kingd =0
moldova =0
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MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
democracy
high income
military
TRANSITION
REGIME
COMPLIANCE

MA
MI
ST
DE
HI

ML
TR
RE
CO

Case IDs for table 3.6

MMSDHMTRC
aiteilreo
00010000 c
00000000
00110001
00011001
0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

00011000
00111000
00010001
00110000
10010001
01010000
10100001
00100100
00000011
00100011
01010001

=>

=>
=>
1 =>
c =>
0
0

1

=>

1 =>
c =>

0

0
0
0
0
1

0
0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

honduras = 0 jamaica =0 grenada =0
dominica =0
St. Vincent
=1
Cuba =0
argentina =0
costa rica = 1
brazil =0 chile 0 mexico =0
Uruguay =
venezuala
Canada
=1
antigua
=1
bahamas
=1
trinidad&tob=l
St lucia
=1
St kitts
=1
barbados
1
ecuador =0 guyana -0 dominican re=0
belize =1
bolivia =0 el Salvador =0
guatemala =0
nicaragua
=0
peru
=0
haiti
-0
panama
=1
Suriname =1
=0
Paraguay
Colombia
=0
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Variable Names by Column
MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
democracy
UN MEMBER
EUROPEAN MEMBER
high income
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE
Case IDs for table

3

MA
MI
ST
DE
UN

EU
HI

TR
CO

7

M M s D u E H T c
I T E N U I R 0

A
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0
0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

=>
=>
1 0 =>
1
1 =>
1
0 =>
0 c =>

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

II

II

1

0

0

1

—

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

o

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

‘
—

V

A
V
II A
II

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

=>

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

o

II

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

A

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

=>
0 1 =>
0 0 =>
0 0 =>

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

o

II

0

=>

1

A

Albania =0
lithuania =1 macedonia =1
bulgaria =0
estonia =1 slovenia =1
Hungary =0
Portugal =0 Italy =0 Cyprus =0
france =1 germany =1 netherlands
=1
luxembourg =1 Switzerland =1
austria =1
greece -1 malta =1 denmark =1
finland
norway =1 Sweden =1
belarus =0
belgium =1 Ireland =1 san marino =1
romania =1 czech =1 poland =1
Slovak
Ukraine —1 latvia =1
bosnia
=0
Croatia =0
russia
=0
iceland =1
Spain
=0
turkey
=0
united kingd =0
moldova =0

MAJOR ARMED CONFLICT
MINOR ARMED CONFLICT
STATE RELIGION
DEMOCRACY
UN MEMBER
AMERICAN MEMBER
HIGH INCOME
MILITARY
TRANSITION
COMPLIANCE

- MA
- MI
- ST
- DE
- UN
- AM
- HI
- ML
- TR
- CO

Case IDs for the table 3.8

MMSDUAHMTC
AITENMILRO
200

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1111
1110

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

110

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

=>
0 c =>

0

110

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

10 10

0

0

0

0

o

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

=>
=>
=>
=>
=>

0

0

1

->

=>
=>
II

=>
=>

10 0 111
10 10 11

0

0

0
0

0

0

0

0

o

II

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

o

II

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

10 11
10 110

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

V

A
A

0

0

1

1

=>

0

0

1

o

II

0

0

0

0

=>

0

0

1

1—

II

V
A

honduras

=0

Oainaica

=0

grenada

dominica
=0
St Vincent =1
Cuba
=0
argentina
=0
costa rica =1
Canada
=1
antigua
=1
St lucia =1
St kitts
=1
barbados =1
ecuador
=0
guyana =0
belize =1
bolivia
=0
el Salvador =0
brazil =0 chile =0 mexico
venezuala
=0
nicaragua
=0
dominican re =0
guatemala
=0
peru
=0
haiti
=0
panama
=1
Paraguay
=0
-0
Colombia
surninam =1
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Uruguay =0
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